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* ’ F e d e rn  1  P r o c u re n w n t: A  S tu d y  o f S o m e  P ti rti w n t P ro p e rti e s , p o l i c i e s  
a n d  P ra c ti c e s  o f a  C ro u p  o f B u s i n e s s  G rg a n i i z i c ti o n s  
T h i s  p a p e r i s  a  fi n a l  re p o rt o f 6  q u e s ti o n n a i re  s u rv e y  o f 
2 7  i n d u s tri a l  o rg P n L z e ti o n 6  d e s i g n e d  to , 2 . i l l o m i n s te  s e l e c te d  
p e rc e p ti o n s , p o l i c fe s  a n d  p ro c e d u re s  re g a rd S n g  g o v e rn m e n t c o n - 
tra c ti n g ; h . d e s c ri b e  g e n e ra l  b u s i n e s s  o b j e c ti v e s  a n d  m a n a g e ri a l  
m e th o d s ; a n d  c . y i e l d  a s x s s m e n ts  o f h o w  th e  s u rv e y e d  fi r:r,s  -. 
p e rc e i v e d  th e i r p re s e n t a n d  fu tu re  b u e fw s s  p ro s p e c ts . A  m e a s u re  
o f s p e c i a l  a tte n t!o n  ~ 8 5  a c c o rd e d  to  e x p l o rk g  p o l .i c i e s  a n d  D r O -  
c e d u re s  re l a ti n g  to  c o n tra c tu a l  i n c e n ri v e s  a a d  th e i r  ro l e  i n  
p ro g ra m  p l a n n i n g  a n d  p e rfo rm a n c e  
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In proportion a8 Federal government procurcwnt function6 ,I 
1 
) 3 
have become larger crnd mre complex, ao he ye concernt‘ vith davising 
efftceive means of ~mplcmenting them increased. Shared by the 
egtocfes responnihls for Federal ptogram6, by the Congress, by elm -4 
-1 
tnduatrieu and other organizations more end more enmeshed in govern- 
mental undartekfnge, and, sot iecmt, by on interested citizenry, . 
concern with Padoral procul2z-Iectt ?o~icies oad practices has gtcnm 
into a matter of the highest, moat enconFassing natlanal interest b f 
t 
Civinv ero~+saion ta the drnth af thin cnnrern tn x-went VM~R hrvp 
Legfs!atures, together with leas dramatic if not lesu rwmerous 
atvdiw nnd experiments In the fielda of procurement 4112 contreettng.’ 
Out u&n reeearch adds a further increment to ttic sum of these Ictter. 
Undertaken 46 a brood-gouge rtudy of contracting, motivational, 
orgeniaationai and m4n4geCi41 procesats televent to Fedo.‘al R&D 
efforta, we bosed our activities on the belief that, regardless of its 
context or object of the moment, effective performance of the 
government’8 procurement role depended on forging po~icics 4nd 
methods adapted to an understanding of the socIcta1, institutional 
and human nexus of their application. Oriented around that przmfse, 
detailed questlonn4irer and 6earchlng inCervitxi eneblpd us to 
Purdue a great renge of vital snd faacinatIng topics ulth m4u~ 
people repreoenting a wrriety of functions in governwent and .~. 2. 
industry.’ Kost of the data produced by these inveotigarions 
I 
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curTent ly art undergoinz; anal’:fsirr and await lntrt report. ::., 
I ;’ 
present paper discusaor one p&ion of those data derived from a  , 
qweti.onnntre survey of a  diverse group oi bosincso organizations. 
lo addition to providing descriptive lnformztion useful in the 
interpretation of Intensive interviews conducted vitn peisons in 
many of the same firms, this survey was deeigned to, p. flluminrtc 
selected percegrl.one, polfcieg and precedutes regarding government 
contracting; a. describe general busi~ese objectives and managerial 
, 
ytF;-Iy- *..A c , v$ax!rl ?ocsammanCo nC km. i. - . +h- arrrvovad Citmp npr- 
ceivcd t,:eir present end future business prospects. A mecsuris oLz 
special attention wee accorded to exploring policies end prccedures 
relating to contrsctunl incentives and the?.r role in program planning 
and performance. 
The Queetionnaire 
In our research ve relied for data primarily on depth inter- 
vicva snd tvo questionnaires. One of the Latter vas completed by 
rndividuale and represented their own points of view. The second 
questionnaire, the basis of this repart, ve called a “Policy 
Questionnaire. ‘I* Urlika the first instrument, this one was responded 
to on behalf of the orgnnization, it having been made plain that it8 
content vauld be treated ns a statement of official policy (hence 
its title). Hov and by whom the Policy Questionnaire was to be 
-2 completed W Q  left to the discretion of tho subject organization 
vith the stipulation, howcvcr, thct it be revfcued and certlElcd by _ 
-c- _  __ .-. - 
* A copy of this questionnaire is appended to this YeFOrt. “‘.. . _  
3 
a reepano:?$t cmpsny official (usually 6omtmte at,a vice presiden- 
tial or cc&Arable level). For our part, ve a&ed to hold repLies 
ix I- 
in strict confidence. 
In cormnon with all of our methoda, the PoLfcy Qutstionaaira , 4 _- 
undervent an extended period of trial and development. We have 
described thio proceAA elsewhere Fn detail,’ but, britfly,, the 
instrument used consisted of four major eectians covering: A. dea- 
criptiva c%ractethoticA of the responding ffrais (e.g., sales, 
intermI orgaaieationul Atructuree , gcvtrntient contracting txperience, 
R&D involvement , policien regarding contzactSr,g goals and methodA, 
and views about Lnccntlves; C. a review of *Arious ffruncWL poli- 
cLee and practices, includtnk profit goal3 An6 uses; And D. multi- 
d$.monsic,ial ratings of present and expected hturc ocgroieatlonal 
etatus (e.g., profitabili:y, mArk+t opportunities, pXOgnOSticQtiQCtS 
of apin-off from R&D, etc.) 
Obviourly the Policy Questlonnairc WAS Lengthy 8aj sometimes 
difficult. Extended discussions betveen the te8earchcrs and the 
subject firm were common. both before and after filling it out. 
There convemstions helped both parties clarify purportr And pornts 
of interpreCAti.03. 
Responses to Gh guestionwaire. Structured a6 an Admixturt 
of prc-coded (i.e., fixed rltetnatfvc or check-list-type) Items and 
open-ended questions coLLfng for nitracive rteponseA, the Policy . 
. 
. ^ 
4 
Queatiomnnire raqdired coding cf the tatter Into quantifiable 
C6t6$3Ort@S, L.C., 
:, 
categories the frequency of use’of which couid 
8t least be counted. Accordingly, after a reconnaioance of the 
completed questionnaires, a detailed coding systam was devlsed that 
included both categories and inerructiona fat t,h&r use. A coder 
was trafne& to WC the code and then proceeded to reduce each ques- 
tionnsfre to a set of coded response catagories. As a check on the 
rsliability of this process, P second coder independently ciassified 
!I c. . _ . - . ri i~u.uuwr’ PLI1dL;A :z &dyrr; “. y”b”;*“...-i;c;. Z#L:uLf.-+ p;‘c 7 - 
. 
coded item, the two coders agreed 94X oi the time. 
Coded data were transferred to punch c4rds and thrir contents 
summrlzed. fnfzequently used code cftegoriea were identified, 
elimbtited or redefined, end the data re-coded (and re-punched) 
using a ntandardized computer routine. 4 Ln all but a few instances 
code catagories were converted to simple dichotomies for final 
an8lysie. No ra-evaluation of coder reliability ~36 mdertaken 6fter 
re-coding because th< greater simplicity of the final codes could 
only increase reliability and it already was more than adequate. 
Moat of the data generated by the Policy Questionnaire were 
categorical or nominal (i.e., they constituted choices from amon% 
:I 
two or more unordered altcrnatlveu). In severaL casee, however, 
they were at least crdfnnl, resulting from rankings or ratings. 
Al80 the form of rho questionnaire provided for the derivation of 
several eptcial purpose “Indexes” based on a priori (tsttonsl, 
-. 
i I -. . -..., 
cammolt serrae) combinations of cettefn of its i tems. 
, 
The Respondin& Organizations 
k total of 27 firms completed some or all oE the Policy 
, Queetionno~itc. The number rtspc;ndtng to any gfvcn item varied, but 
the modal N was equal to 25. All respondents, 2f course, Yere 
vokunteers, but a concerted effort was made to Include in the sample 
organiza*&ione of differing product lines, sires, degrees ot involve- 
ment in WL, ratios of governr,ent-to-commcrciat business, geogrnphic 
lo:ation, etc. Speaking generally, our resulting sample of contractor 
, orgenbzation9 was 46 fol2ows: _ >*- 
A* Produc; tin20 -.-.* Twenty-two of the orgssieotions studied 
were engaged in a nti!jor way in aerospace or electronfcs work; five 
were also involved in other nunufacturtng nnd ~2% were engineering 
or support service contractors. 
e- Sfze. Eight of the sampled corpora:iona employed more than 
12,000 people; seven employed between 2,000 and f2.000 and the 
remaining ten for which the fnfcrmation WRB available hod fewer 
II 
than 2,000 employees. As regards sales: eight companies were over 
$325 millfon arn;rally; six hed aalea betxeen $75 and $325 million 
and another 12 were under $75 ml.llFon in annual sales. 
c* A PC3 Spending. A majority of the firms fn the sample were 
engaged in R&D work to a significant degree. Nine annually spent 
$75 mlllion or more (from all sour:es) an R&O); two spent between 
$15 and $75 million, five betueen $1 and $15 mflifon and t;L’ other 
11 spent leso than $1 pillion a year on R&5. 
-!a-. 
- : 
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ia g. Lnvclvement 5 Government Contrscting. Of the 27 firms 
.icsponding, ‘19 were prime system contractors and the rast worked 
chiefly as suhcantrdctors (although nome of them served OCCa6iOn8l~y I 
as primes). Twenty companieo did bver 8CJZ of thei; business witi , 
the government (mostly with DOD, but with stryg NASA representation). 
.v 
E. Dollar-Valueo of Contract6 Held. Xore than half the 
sempled orgacizations held or I;nd held ifidividual contracts worth 
o-ver $10 million; just under one- third had had contracts valued Fn 
iixLlGrr?J - .-..A . ..F “I. y+uu I”LLrL:t,l. 
-/ 
,P. Fan5 ‘ia with eernmene Ruaiileks. Most of the firms 
studied ha< been doing business witr>thc governmeat for some time. 
7 ,/ 
Only four had enter& the government market more recently than 1957 
and fuily half had contrac tlng histories eating from before 1950. 
(?-The preceding descrip tioxx all refer to that unit of the company 
c 
vith which we dealt directly. Sometimes this was a division or sub- 
sidiary of a larger corporation. Therefore, perspective on our 
anmple is gained by knoulng that amocg the parent organizations of - 
: the units with which we interfaced, nine vete cl3j.q over 80% of 
: I \ .z.. .-- F 
:,, their total business with the government; six fell between 51% and 
.< 
-8UZ: five were between 26% and SC% and six otnero were doinq less 
than 25% of their total businese with the government (one vas 
unaccounted for). 
In suomziry, then, nearly all of the firms in our sample (which, 
incidentally, included four of the top five DOD contracto;; and 
, 
three of rhc top five ‘iQUA contracturs) were at least ‘tioderately 
involved in R&D contracting; many were engaged in volume productfon 
a6 uell. Some respondent6 F-ere little involved in govrrnmcnt work, 
-,. 
but, on the whole, the sample represented chiefly government con- 
tracting divisions of Large corporation6 ur government-oriented 
smaller companLes engaged in aeroopace/electrunics work, or else 
similarly oriexed firms pro;ridila& service dud technical support to 
government agencies. , * 
lhat 8ucn n sample may oe somevnac npec?sl in comprrrlson with 
industry in general is in<,icated by one firm’s feeling oblige3 to 
warn us that, “Our company is Jedicaked first (their emphasis) to -- 
the Government market -- therefore, our olrtlook reflects this 
attitude.” Prudence in genernlizing may be advisable, but Lt is trtie 
r.onctheless that a sizable 6nd useful, if tachnica:ly “accidental,” 
group of organizations was assembled for this study. It wao 8 group 
_ .- 
that included numbers of large experienced government contractors, 
9 
but which also ofEered opportunities for comparative analysis and, 
In any event, was on0 quite suitable to our purposes. 
General Results and Discu&im 
c *- _-s c I L ’ 
After seceding, all data cogent to the Bubstantive and procedural 
,4. 
issues r,atlined in our inxoductory r‘emarko (a total of 41 “criterion” 
or dependent Vartfrble6, each of which will be cited in the fo1luwir.g 
pages) werf ~6ystemsttcolly cross-tabulat&‘(apd otherwise analyzed) 
. 
again6 t eig& independent or “pred i.ctor*’ 
1--, 
variables, v?x.: - 
. e-r 
-. 
a 
1) The status of a firm as mainly a Prime or StibcontractoL. -- 
I. 
2) The Sales volus~ -- cf. the Parent company. 
,I 
3) The Sales volume of the respondin& organization -. 
(here called, Self). : - ..- 
4) The percentage Mix of sovernnent and commercial business 
in the Parent firm (called G/C mix, Parent). 
5) The #ix of business in the responding organizations 
(i.e., G/C six, Self). 
6) The volume of R&D investmen? (from whatever sources). -- 
7) The Number of Prime contracts held. -I 
8) The Dollar-Value of the Prime contr&c:s held. -- 
For supplementary comparative analyses, a sub-sample of five 
large and five small r’lras was selected from the larger group of 
respondents so as to enhance contrasts among them. 5 For this purpose 
a firm was classed as ‘rlarge’l If it met all of thede three crlterla: 
,-1) Parent sales of $700 mlllion or more; 2) Divieiorl ealee of $325 I - 
k : 
‘inLlti.on or more; 3) CrganizationeL R&D expenditures over $75 million 
annually. Conversely, a firm was called “small” when: 1) Pnrent 
sales equalled less than $75 million; 2) Division sales were under 
$35 million; and 3) Annual R6D spenrimg totaled lua’i- thiin $1 mfllion. , * 
As with other findings reported here, resulta ‘ir%. this sub- 
sample must be interpreted with aOne care both because of the 
limited eample ekes and the somewhat special characteristics of .: 
, -7 .,-;. 
;  
‘_ - -  
.  
9 
the firns involved. ;’ These came consideraticrts also zau6ed us to’ , -  ‘;” 
confine our statistica: Bnl!~~;‘.638 to relriivr!y Yimple techniques. 
-P ‘_ 
i;-*.c the sam;.time, however, because we werl here &ye &corned with ! ..’ \ 
“generating Ideas than with the$r formal iesc, 
, ‘\ 
ue adopted aox+hnt 
. - -  4’,‘. . 
lideral stamlrrds of htati&.;cal s ignFficav..ce.6 - W n5eqlrent ly  ,3~r 
.I 
findings should te v iewed a6 indicattve rather than sdr decfzi-re, 
, ; ’ I . 
Pc:fcy Questfonnafre chiefly  c6 a medrrs of decelopiag h.:gotheses 
._ $, ’ : 
rather’ than bs a way or verrry iig tmm, we (50 I;JI; coo;:dzr this a -/ . 
. very  serious caveat. 
Relations Among Predictor “ariahles. .-.-- UL‘ r:ntionk:d above that eight 
independent or predictor vtriables w>re definG  so that we might 
test against them fluctuationn in other measures. Before tur.Lng 
to those substantive analjaes ft>will be useful to re\icw the intet- 
relattona observable among the predictor var iables th--selves, 
camne.>ting only O fl those among them that were etatisticallv i.ign:fF- 
t: b- , _* !
, cant. l 
->, ,‘a, 
. . . ‘..‘?. 
I. The most striking thing about those relrltions uas that, based 
on the regularity with which it correiated with other of chc Lade- ,,, _ - 
Gender& varfables, sales stud out Cs  a d6miMnt element, especirlfy 
tales of the 3arcnt firm. (Thi6, O f CourIe, UC0 a majcr reason 
motivating selection of the large/Ube?l sub-sample.) If sales 06~ 
,’ 
be taken as a direct index cf organizar:icnal s ize, lt my :h*n be 
*. “. -  
aaLd that company ‘s ize cross-cute most other predictor varL6~~le.n 
and may generally be expected to condition their 6pccii:s: effects. 
I 
. . 
? 8. \  
L. . , ;  .  .  - ,  ._. .  ,  .  _ ,_ <, 
: - 
- . .r, _ _ 
n-1 
’ ./ 
10 
While this generalization will be seeo typically to hoid, 
other measures often have independent ef’ccts and so cannot be 
regarded as merely redundant with site. Horecver, in subs tnntive 
J 
1 
ma lyses . we shall see that size is by no means alueys the nest 
eensit fve pointer. 
At any rrite, when we separately tabulated the sales of the 
responding organization (i.e., Self) an+ those of tt: parents and 
comptred then, we found the two to be directly cssocfater; 
(Tnll-a=.:~ 3, X2=6.U3).7 Given that in some cases the re3pondir.g 
organization was the Parent, so that any comparison ot; parent and 
Seif sales would tend thereby to be artificially inf!at.?d, tL,e 
moderate tign?tudc of tnts corizl.acion can largely be accounted for 
by the fact that our sampirple included POW SW;I units of large 
firms. Othetwfse though the positive association between Parent I : a 
and Self sales bespeaks the general prirxiple that organizationa’l 
.- 
unit size tends to vary with overall organization sire. 3 aut, tilili 
essociatio~~ being less than unity among the companies WC studied, it 
beerned advfeable to analyze the data eeparately for Parent and Self 
sales. 
Lookln3 trr other variabtes: Parent 333es we found t;- be quite 
clearly related with the magcLtuda of a firm’s R&D ir,vcstce~.t 
(T.nu=.54, X2-7.32). R&D spending was also associated directly with 
Self sales, hut the relation WA6 net quite so strong (Tau-.48, 
X2-6.01). Thus, it was lergcr firms that spent t\w R6d money, 
.{ 
i .- 
_, . _. 7. -.’ 7- - - -“cc“ - -’ ~ . 
. . ,  
1 
/  
.  
L - 
I, nlthough, in ~llr saqle anyway, not all big companies spent on 
R&D, ncr were 811 the units of large firu& that spent on R&D 
s- 
i; ’ ‘1 I -’ 
11 
more clearly related with the respondent firm ’s own (Self) G/C mix .- 
themselves necessari3y large In terms of mles. 
The government/commetcfa1 business mix of the parent was only 
weakiy related to the status of the respondent organization as a 
prime or subcontractor (Taw.35, X*=2.90). This variable was much 
(Taux.56, X2=7.88). Tboae companies (parent? ofth a larger pcrcen- 
cage of government business (relative to co,u?lercial sales) tended 
to be organizations that handled larger contracts (Tow.48, X2=4.22). 
Prtme col,ttactora thus tended to have a lower ratio of comercial to i. 
government b\isincss, and the larger contract dollars were apent i 
with firms having a high G/C mix. Sucti findings, we might sFmpl:r 1 
1 
comment, are fully consistent with and confirming oE earlier demon- 
9 strations of DOD/NASA market concentration. 
Cmiract values also related with marginal reliability, to a 
firm ’8 status as prime or sub, indictlting that primes have larger i 
i 
f:ontracts (Taum.39, x2-4.22). Actcally, ft is noteworthy that the --’ 1 il 
relationship is not a very strong one. Obviously there are many I 4 
i 
very big subs. 
Finally, WC Pcund, too, that confract values tended to correlate 
i 
r 
with the number of prime contracts held bv fLrms (Taum.41, X2=2,84) -- i 
the more prime contracts a firm has held, the bigger those contract:. i 
_ - . ; 
tend to be, 
i- : f . ,’ 
12 
Doubtless at this poinr some recapitulation 2s 5n order. 
Uriefly, considering only our incependent or predictor variables, 
we have described carrel scions bctveen soles (either Porwt or I 
Self) and: 
1) Magnitudes’ of R&D investment; 
2) A firm’s status as a Frime OK subcontractor; 
3) The number of prime contracts held by a company; 
4) The dollar-value of the prime contracts held. 
The Mix of Government and Commercial business held by a firm 
(either Parent .x Self) WC found related to: 
1) Its status as a prime or subcontractor; 
2) The doilnr-value of prime contracts held. 
Contract Dollar-Values r-ere also associated with: 
1) Status as a prime or subcontractor; 
2) The number of prime contracsrt tlcld. 
In some tnstances these results have interest in their own 
right, either because of the magnitudes (high or low) of the rela- 
tions detected or because of spectai facets of the relationships 
involved (e.g,, whether parental or self size was the operative 
factor). We have tried to acknowledge these instances, but have not 1 i 
dwelt on them, for fn the present ccntext the reel significance of 
_- 
the analyses just reviewed ;ays in the fact that, for the most part, - 
j 
they revealed no large surprises. Indeed, they doubt less seamed 2 
P 
c&onrlace, even old hat. ‘It may sound rather Iilre meking 6 @maI 1 :! 
i 
I-- .., -_ --.- ,,‘_. I .-... ._, ., , _  -.--, 
I 
. . 
i Y 
? P 
/- i 
i3 
in the data we have been discussing is to be f,xnd in their femfliatlty. 
, F.ampant novelty in the outcomes fron! such analyses would have had to 
prompt aomc curiosity as to the adequacy of our research methods, 
or our definitions of the variables studied, or the modes of analysis 
we used, or the sincerity of the portfcipating firms. However, the 
patterns of empirical relations found among our predictor or inde- 
pendent variables, prrci6eiy because of their general familiarity, 
argue for the validity of our instruments, nethcds and data, even if 
thG?y can’t clinch the titter. 
ft also bears mention, a prapos vf this crucial issue of validity, 
.r* :-that our data represent the “testimony,” as it were, of participating 
firmfl. The data’s usefulness therefcre rests on t!le dependability of 
that testimony, aonethirrq not susceptible of :rinple test. That our 
subject organizations took the questionnaire seriously is attested 
to, however, by several points of cfrcunrtnntial evicicnce. First 
there wss their willingness to give the substantial number of cxpsn- 
sive man-hours necessary for its completion; secondly we would cite 
the levels of revieu it normally received; third, is the fact that 
exe than once the process of completing Ft became an occasion for 
setious policy reviaa on the par: cf respondents. Final!y, for 
what it in worth, there is O’S judgement, baaed on conversations 
with personnel responalble for supplying us with the finished 
questionnaire. 
Comforting as these cbservntisns eL’e, they plainly cannot 
1 . .,,, --. , -. I 
i ’ 
14 
. 
demonstrate by themeelves chat, even if it was taken seriously, the 
responses on the questionnaire cotretgond ~5th any “objcccive” 
reality. Often, of course, this is irrclsxu?t, as when the firm is 
being asked for its attitudes or opinions. Then their responses 
deff.ne “redality.” Other times, when behavior or Facts are at issue, 
’ 3 
this i5 a major questicn to which WC have m unequivocal answer. 1 
. . 
Hauever, we shall return to it several times in lacer discussions 
after WC have presented additional data, bemuse we shall rely 
UY we ~!dve JUYL rliusrrare-, or: cfhz pdrcerus oi r‘rnarlrga tlcevh Lyr 
to certiFj, their own rredibilitg. But later, too, r;e shall supple- ’ 
3. 
ment thene “boot-strap”’ operations with references ta crireria 
external to the qucstionnafre Ctself that czn help lend assurances 
i 
4 
i 
of the validity of its results. Xn any case it has turned time to 4 
i 
move to more substantive matters. 
Organfzat-on and Contract hdministration m -- 
Segregation of Government and Commercial Operations. Orgeni- 
zationally, approximately half the co,npanier ve studied at least 
partially separated their government from their conuncrcial activities. 
. And, in at least one inetance w!lere there was no “fundar~ental 
ae?aratlon, such as by diviston I’ there was separation by project 
organization. The firm that structured itself that way uas 8 1arSe 
company doing the bulk of its busincsa with the DOD. Those f i.rrilh 
> a 
that did not segregntc their government and their comercial business 
(anstdn~- they had any of the latter) tend& to bc slr:allor comronfca. 
Thfs uab true of the fir~ bn our spcclal t;ob-sample and it was also 
iad.LrateG by an ~verell relation betuc:&n sales (Farent) and ‘G/C 
I. 
separation {Taw-.97, S2m3.44). ,j 
7 ,4t least tuo(mutuaLly compatible) reasons can bc adduced to 
:j 
<. 
i 
account for this difference: 1) Smeller firms may lack the resources i 
(capital, personnel) to accomplish separation; 2) Slr.aller firms may f :;! 
have more gcxrnment involvement (proportionately) and/or less 
product-line diversity and hence a weaker need for separation. At 
Airy LOLC, 
1 . - . 
“LJ,a&%3 I. &“&,.a L‘I;,U L ,i<‘l,d.& ,z y..u;;;;lo 2;‘: ::.ct t:;is !;rr.r! rf 
0psrationnL segregation, u!rrn it occurs, “rises %inly in the form of 
\ 1 
an adaptation to -il.fferznces in conditions of doing business in 
i 
government as compared with ccinmcrcial markets, differences which 1 
1 
apparently have to do with zpecialized patterns of custoner relations 
(f;dcLblding I IC~CIS for more extensive contracts specialist3 and rcporLing 
facilities) and veriarions in que.lity control problems and methcds. 
Rawever, R&!: and project-related technological imperatives may i:, 
reality be more hosic factorx impelling _seg,rcaated as distinct 
from simply specfnlizcd or elaborated organizational ctructure;. 11 
In fact we did find G/C separation tc\ be strongly related ta 
R&II Investment <Tau=-.G2, X2=9.64). Evident:? R&!!-dictated “probleq- --- 
solving-types” of organization mix poorly with the more functiorrai? I 
I 
bureaucratic structures conventional in ordinary production-ortented 
operations (whether government sponsored or conmerciol). Suggescivc 
associations could also be Cound between eeprration and the G/C mix I 
i 
3 
,:.: 
. , 
> ’ / 
z 
! ! 
c’ 
- .- 
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of Self (T--. 33, x272.59) and Contract Values (Tb~s.37, x2=2.57). 
We conclude, then, that actual 6eparatbor. is chiefly a func- 
; ? 
v *_ tion of the KechnoLogical “tri~gcr”‘* .,,ctor of I&!! involvement, with 
size 0100 a relevant variable. BusFnesn eegregation may, 1.n other 
words, rcfLect a sire-induced organizational differentiaticn process, 12 
I 
the direction6 of which are technologically guided. T‘he suggestive 
relations between separation and the other variabP46 seem to imply - 
simply that there muat bc come technologically relevant oroduct- 
lf,a diversity and that increasing amounts of government business ,it 
” within the unit itself hastens the differentiation proctsa, as do v-p-- 
larger con!.rect do~l8r=vs~uea (by ‘providing resource6 to su)lport it), 
We might conjecture that were these latter rr?latfons contralied for 
type of businees (i.e., h&D vs production) the observed associations 
vould emerge more clearly. 
Contract Adminiotration. From what we have just said a tendency 
cm be inferred for the companies we etudied to hrve,ae minimum, 
. 6ome specialized edmfnistratfve appsratus for conducting government 
/ 
vork. They did. And almost aluaya this involved 6ome form of 
contract administration service6 if only in the persons of a couple 
cf ccmtrOcte administration specialists. Possession of such adminim- 
trotive resources amounts to a conditfon for doing bwinesb with tk! 
governmen~j Functional requirements for these resources are vfdely 
and - recognized “barrier6 to e,ltry” into the government market, 13 
organiratiorsl LLmitations on contract administration capabi 
doubtlcae vorks to Jincoursge bidding on certain contr8ct6. 
1itFeR . 
Our 
I-’ ‘. -- -r  .- ,  .-  I  . , .  
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imp reoe ion  has  been ,  however ,  thati‘necessary  a r  it m a y  b e  to have  
. them, the opera t ion  of these services, d o  not, excqt  in  obv ious  
ways,  va ry  mter ia l ly  a s  a  func t ion  of var ia t ion9 in  contract  
format .  ‘$  * a -  ,A . 7,. 
E ffect.6 0 ” Contract  -m?.  I*.‘was  m o r e  the except ion  ra ther  
than  the rule,  for ina tanee,  vhen  a  responden t  stated fiatiy chat  
they admin is te red  imeat!-.tit contracts, say, dif ferently f rc jm other  
vari lzt iee. O n e  f izm t’nrlt d id,  a  medium-s i te ,  R&D-o r i en ted  e lectronics 
company ,  sa id  tbt - Lag  Its operat ions,  “A  strategy 1s  esCab lLshed  
relat ive ‘7  < h e  ~ .ay in  wh ich  w e  wil l  a t tempt to ach ieve  the 
i-. 
msx lnum posi t ive inccr&ive.” Simi lar ly,  a  l a rge  ae rospace  pr ime,  
w h e n  asked  tf it e d m tnistrred e u m e  conr.racts dif ferently p r o m  others,  
answered ,  “Yes,  sprx ia l  adminis t rat ive contro ls  / ire p X e c e d ’j: o n  
incent ive demonst ra t ions.  Ca ta  log  prepsrc t ion /$er fo rmance  a n d  
.- 
schedu le  events/  a n d  app rova l  is / the7 m o for d i f ference.” A  tech-  -- 
n ica l  unft of ano the r  l a rge  ae rospace  p r ime  commen ted  that, “A l  1  
contracts a re  subject  to regu la r  per iod ic  m a n a g e m e n t rcviev. In the 
case  of incent ive contracts spec ia l  focus Fs g i ven  to status, t rade-  
offs a n d  profit  impace  unde r  the incent ive structure.” M u c h  nn re  
_*  
common ,  huwver ,  we re  e lq le  ste,.?.xnts P ike  that of still ano the r  
b ig  ae rospace  contrnctof:  “N O , p rocedu res  arc  thy seme.” 
Moreover ,  in  ou r  da ta  genera l ly ,  w e  found  tendenc fes  toward  
c loser  contract  mon i to r ing  a n d  coutro l  wi th re fe rence  to iwent ive 
: fo rmulas  o r  oppor tun i t ies  to vary with n o n e  of ou r  pred ic tor  var iab les  
s8ve Ll;r a suggestive association with Xuabber of Prime Contracts 
(TOW- .:18, X2=2.29). It sems Lfkely, in this ccvmection, that 
: 1. 
increooinp, numbers or’ prime contracts will be correlated L-ith in- 
creasing organizationa 1 exPcs ore to tnceacive-type formats and that, 
, 
therefore, firms simply sccoamodate tkiemSeiw% to thenr. t-n other 
word8 companies adapt their structures and operations to the condi- 
tions under which they regularly do business. 
Even ao, apparently incenclvas have ltttle r?Efect. Ize foun&i 
administration procedures in order to maxlaize incentive gain. That ’ 
. ‘OS, only ofis-third stated th?t lhey adJusted formal regulatory pro- 
ces~eu to exert closer monLtosing OS control ouer dimensions emphasized 
in contract Lwentive fo&uki. 
Severai firma did cornm&t, hoslever, to the effect that inccntise- 
type contraces tended to get somewhat more riunazeria; attention. 
One cospany, for example, in reply to questioning about diffmkmtia- 
tfon of administrative methods said that it practiced none, ‘:except 
‘._ pcrhapn mznagement is more Bcnsitive to the incentive prooisions, 
but the oame coat controls and progres a reporting to management is 
maintained ragurd:ess of contract tyre,” #-mother contractor . 
answered Ln somewhat the same rein saying, that very few actual 
adminlettative differences existeC, {;t “programs arc reviwed at 
.I’ * 
a higher Level moee oeten yhen incentives are involved. Additional 
detailed z+orts are issued to program managers.” And soswhat . 
-.~, : - \ 
’ . 
95zSarly, 8 Forge electrodes compiqRy, while professing to ‘<no 
L~sIsrc proceduraL dif ferencen” in cant&t admbistration, did note . 
thae, “Reports, however, are designed to refLect measurement _ 
/ggair.eJ-7 incentive opportunif: es .‘I . 
(Z. _ 
IntercotSngIy, none of the sn?sli contractors in our. selected 
-- . L 
sub-sample accommodated administrative procedures to contract 
forrats (it was the Letge contractbra -- although Still only 3 
t.t 
,P 
dr;ority of thea -- who mnre oLCten adjusted, JC tried to adjust, 
to ‘,ncentire fertita ix qqxxtunities,) Controlling for goverixment 
, Fn-.~lvement did not seem to offer any prospect of altering these 
basic rclotiori. 
_- 
Furthermore, contract incentLvee appeared to exert Little 
influence over organizatisnal resource aliocation. h’ear Ll a 11 
contractors responding (l.c., 21 of 23) asserted that incentives 
had no or minitil effect on resokce allocation. 
. ,’ 
Of tlie mere two 
;: 
finzs thot said Snccniiwes di d affect resource allocation, oae, a 
"major systems” uember of Jur S:large" sub-samQte, explained that 
“resimrccs may be adjustce to.resQond most eEfective:y to iecent:ve 
structures if potential eroutrle spots arise, Lkr~ever, incencivee 
use are not the only factoks in deciding resource allocation -- 
:’ 
program size /&I~ difficulty are involvec!.” Echoing these iknti- -- 
merits, another big aerospace prime aseerted, “Differing incentive 
otruceurce have Little, if any, effect CTI these Attets. Site ardor 
nature of the wxk or project primarily affects such matters.” , . 
” ’ 
. . , 
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1,’ .,, , 
1 
’ . 
;. : _ .’ > 
I, 
i- 
._ Is . - _ : G. 20 - I *.-A . 
7, ,l .f 7 7. .-I . 
Diffusion of Awareness & Contract Types. In a contest of 1 -_ ,- 
. IF‘ 1 
R&D work we inq~uired. too, ab&t the extent of awareness throughout 
. ’ 
‘ ‘-: ( 
+’ _‘Y’ 
a firm of the type of contract (CPPF,. FFP, etc.) under +ich work i 
‘\ . j 
was being done. By and large (i.e., in three-fourths of the cases) ’ t - : . 1 
awareness uns not presumed to extend below first-line -supervloion, , 
t . 
-. ~ . 3 
.J., . . 
and often not that ion, As one big prime put i~~‘awar.eness is 
’ . 
‘: 1 
“not necessarily wfdfspreado” . . This VJaS as true of incentivey,.as of 
&’ 1 
‘I- “..- 1 
cnv other contract feature -- wot~jn~-3~v~I yrsonnel =w~=lv WDt-0 ? I 
a-. I- .L ‘1 
made aware of contract POPPY, except perbps incidentally, One ’ ; 
-Lx* , .I smaller acrvicc co&actor, for exsmple, pofntei out thst, “Differ- 
enccs exist througsout the organization‘=- degree of awareness /z.sT a- 
detacmined by group operating managers.” , : 
--- .?. 
It was &tinctly unusual for a firm 56 &rive systemat$cally 
. 1 ‘- 
to exr&d.awnreness to operating levels. One that did -- a large 
*,! 
; 
-y 
service coeractor -- described itself as having an, “excellent 
communication system; personnel in the field receive written memos 
_. 
at short , frequent intervals. Nozz office personnel make planned’ , 
- 1 
visits to field offices each year and field; personnel visit the 
>ff _ . 
home office Ear one week each yeer for training and brieZing.’ 
*.’ 
gut limitation on the diffusion of awareness wss prevalent 8e:Ong 
contractors in general, as we have said, 
Any variation’ in ‘llevels of a:dAkenees” was ullrel6ied to any 
a- 
of our predl ctcr variables, although, ff artythi~~~- iimitstion on 
. --. 
a&rcncss w1S3 s’iightly mote pronounced among the small .+nu-‘,n our .- ~. -: 
,‘- _ P 
by _ . - . -_ 
- .- - . 
~ -.’ . 
. - . ..-. . 
- / ._ . * 
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p,:a _I ’ 
,oFlectcd sob-sample, perhaps because 3.hey h&dled fewer, diffe&t 
‘- I : ‘,,; .- -I “;.p 
{ 
type6 of contract. If many different types. & con+act% a:c handled “S:C 
: ;’ 1 I -. _ L :I J 
by a fix it is not unreasonable tb iuppose that mt?chanfsms will be !: -i: -\ . 1; 
. - 
developed to pa6~~ 
,,-. 
contract terms down the line, insofar as &is is ., I 
‘,* 
.- .=.1 Y , b 
,- 
pertinent 33 perforurnnce. 1E little variat%on in contract far&t is 3 \-.L*,. .j 
.’ - 
&countered it is only necessary for operations co be performed 
“+& ! 
1 ,.-A a .S’ : , s 
-zxrdifi:g to custom, :A:. The decisive consideratLon her:?-of course, is 
:*-. 
. . 3 . 
-?hethcr zwdreness of contract: 6~rm is deemed pertinent ta Derf& .GFce.. i 
; -. -- $$ : i;<. 
a; x 
Evident%3 uidespread awareness is not crmmonly so regarded: We .i i . 
surmir;e that this is 80 because v&iatfons in contract form are ‘per- 
: ; ; .I 
ceived to be pertinent to performance excegr as wz shall euggefit . ‘_ 
,- / 
j 
-_ 
shortly. - . .I, .‘;.. 
. 
. ^ 
Meanz of Inducfne !.zapness 
-./ 
;! +, _ .’ -- a --A-. 
To the extent attenpts xre made . . . .‘, 
I I . . ,a . . { 
; ’ to induce awareness of ccntract forms w&L> :he operating systems - 1 - ._ _ 1 :. - .I 
of companies, generally speakin&, Zf<~l cmunfcation (in the sbzpe : 
II_ --:-. 
of detiiled brlcfings andjor reviews,; 1 
:j 
J 
.contract-based program planning, -.; 
tr - ‘! 
budgeting or the like) and urrforma lized super visory-manageria 1 ‘: ,f q 3 _, -,-‘ ,” 
coot?lunicaZon methods uere relied upon about equally. Thik obaer&- .‘*.‘-, :- -: .s .a. i . f 
tion o~plies both to incentive features ani! to perforence ~aranr&rs, 
; 
-_ .I ’ j 
Illustrative of relatively formal methods were those employed 
i 
\.:.7 
-_ - ! 
by a Lange. oyctc-m prime: Yoncract briefs, inter;21 work a*lthoriza- * 4-c .“,,-.t ‘. 
: 
tions, cootract kickoff seosicns of project team,, i.nd te%Jbr project .- z . /- 
,? -j 
review nezisZons ,‘I More of n blending of formal and inton;nat metho& 
. . _- .- -’ 
was the description o<. “VCL,, y program rev&~3 of coot, scheduie and 2.1 
;, -1 
: . . . :1;‘:* -1 ._ *.. . .i -f < : 
.I -_ .- --I. . .:-- : *: _ ,. . . __ . . . . -i . . . ^ -_ . 1. .a. _ >-.. _ _ _ :. . ;;: . _ c -. . ’ 1%. =I _. ~_ t -, 
[-.- .- < ,. -: - .A 
._ 
‘_ -_ 
. -. 
‘! 
.:- _  1  
7  
- - ,. 
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and from thcsli peq?e filters &wt :hrough each fur?Lfonal organfca- 4 
4-I -j . . 
tion.17 Much more inforrrai, at least by implication, is the method _ 
sketcheo by a medium-sized electronic component nanufactuter which 
noted thae “supervfso~s participate In the contract and they have 
. 
profit and loen reeponeibility,” Final>; & sc;tll.R&D outfit relied . -- _ 
1 .f 
entirely on “supctvXsor~ cozmunfcetion.” 
The use of detailed brfefioqs and/or reviws (whether written, 
. 1 
- I 
or&l or both] t3 induce 8varenez.m cf contract prov:,oions varied 
suggestively uith Selea (Self) (Tau=,32 s‘ X2=2.35) 6 Evidently 
this clethcd is used wore often b) larger organizations (a t&dency 
we ohs II under&core momentarily). Contract-based program planning, 
Y. 
budgeting, etc:we found to be clearly asaocfaeed with a company’s 
-? rtatus an a prima contract-x (Taw.47, . . 4.34); use of unformslized 
aupervioo~y;~nag~~~a~ chnrmnication (including distribution sf 
memos, Itwslettcrs I etc.), on the other hand, GS might have been 
81lticipatad, shwed signa of being relied on more often ty smaller . 
contractoro (Self SaZco: Tau=-.31, 62.25). J’ . , 4 
Rcinforclng our inference that oizo makes G difference not only 
in orlJntations totiard the induction of awareness 02 cont:act fomsts, . . 
but aLso in the methods uocd for Its accomplishment, was ehe discovery 3 
1 
that n pronounced difference existrd between tke leege and snail . , -1 
r 
contractera in our selected aLbwaaazpLe: eha kxgc onecI relied 
,-. *_- I 
on;~ormal methodo of c~unfcation, whereas the small ones placed i -_ i 
I  
.  
:  
.-  .  
- ,  
1  
.  .  
_  .  
?  
_ .  L  
._  \  ,  
2 3  i . . .‘4  
m o r e  impor tance  o n  un fohacn l i zed  sup+- *  L. i i sory -ma;?ager  ie  1  c!!a,rqe L B , 
. _ ’ -‘ .- 
e ven  to the point ,  fn ind iwtdua l  cases,  of d e p e n d i n g  s o l & $ % n  such  
‘2  _  
m e thods0  ’ z , _, . >  _  T  
Di f ferences a m c n g  f irms 1 6  their  m e a n s  of fnduc ing  awa reness  of 
. 
contract  pro-* is ions r+e :e  not  so  sharp ly  e tched  in  the ins tance of 
1  d  
. I .* 1  
p roduc t ion  contracts as  they q e ? e  for R & D  (h igh l ight ing once  aga i n  
:j Z’ 4  
the contrast3 be tweev.  i&D  ak rd  p roduc t ion  env i ronzen to  t reated’. 
1  
. . i. ’ 
exi ier).  Dj. f ferekxes in  m e thod  as  be tween  R & D  a ’&  produc t ion  i l 
contexts s e e m e d  to have  to d o  most ly  with t he  inc lus ion o f - "more  5  
/& ternaL i  o rgan iza t ions  I8 in  the case  of p roduc t ion  contracts. 
2  . .1 
Di f ferences in  m e thod  e m e r g e d  cnly w h e n  contract  s izes w e r e  smal ler :  
contract  Do l la r -Va lue  w a s  cleax- ly assoc ia ted with R & D  c ,product ion 
. -  
d i f fe rence3 @ a u ”-. 50,  x2=4.96) .  O u r  da ta  contr ibute no th ing  to the 
; I’ c 
in terpretat ion of this result, bu t  ~ 3  a re  p r epa red  to g u e 3 3  that it . . . 
m e a n s  that smal l  R & D  efforts a te  hand l ed  infzmslly, rhexas  smal l  
r  .-i 
p rcduct ion  operat ions,  l ike l a rge  ones ,  a re  hand lecJ  t, .‘s tandacd  
opera t ing  p rocedures .  -. 
Focus ing  son;zs;hat m o r e  sharp ly  o n  i&ent ive  structures in  
t;ntrQcts, w e  found  that, bcross al l  contractors,  incent ive te rms 
were  l lyasscdlP th rough  their  o rgan iza t ion  (to the extent ' they were )  >  :. :-' 
*-. 
about .  a gOa l L y  o i ten by  o n e  of the  fo l lo-kng meshads :  l j  f> -  descr ib ing  ‘I- 
icceotfvc st ructure8 select ively o r  in  genera l i t% o e ; 2 )  Dy  deta i led  
r .- 
reci tat ion of incent ive structures; 3 )  By  mon i to r ing  pro jects with . 
-.* 
re fe rence  to  incent ive structure (usual ly  coup led  with per iod ic  
-, r,. 
rev iew m e e tings). -  _I 
_ -  
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One electronics firm, for exnmple, simply distributes 
“internal documents b’ufm3rizing provisions of the contracts.‘: . . 
Anathez, however, goes so.?te distance in explaining “hov targets 
: 
one budgets are determined and requirements of higher level 
supervision far operating levels to meet plans and budgets L;rg/ .- 
Ls 
established with full Lamledge of contract provisions.” Furrher- 
more, in this compsny, “key psrticipants are Invariably required 
to be fatiliar with contract pro=Jisions.” Xn a mejor engineering 
ztrrm, “lt Fe xi s complex inccnflve contract, functionai departments 
I / 
me informed, alozj;.~with others, fn briefing meetings. 12 it is .) 
\ . - $1 . I 
n sample Lncelrtive coptract o oicplez mc;%zs are used.” This same 
firm, hoxvec, noted thee budget ‘system, co&o1 system and . 
project meetings or reviews were the“‘aBin tool.” This third . . 
alternstive was aSed exctasi.vPly by the large contr.xtors studied, 
again suggesting that such orga>izatFons tend to accord somewhat- 
4 
.: k greuter emphasis to incentCve psovlsions andfor to be sonewhat 
. . 3 
bu-erer adapted organiz,.zetiunull.~ to actualize their interest, . 
1 - i 
Again, this time with particular reference to incentives, 1 : 
‘-4 - I 
we probed generality of at+areness -- whether incentives --lere *J *I.; 
i 
tcxoxtnicnted broadlg tkoughurt crgidzations or restricted on soms 
; i 
selective basis. 1;s might have been anticipated from our earlier 3 
I. I 
observations, ~~WBP’~XIQ~O of fzicentives was twice as iikely to be 
’ I 3 
‘- < selcctivety targeted a8 it was to be extended,generally or to be 
‘_ * . 1 ’ i. . j ‘L- 
nonapeclfir?lf y United, 
_.I ‘. :I I. 
~ : ‘A : . . -, 
a 
A large eiccttonice firm, for exampLeS2sraccd sirnp’;y that, .,. . 
. . : : / . _ ’ 
_’ 7 
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“The details of incentive strurturing are made known to department 
top-nv3nBgerrent levels only.” And a component manufacturer observed 
that, “Usually production workers are not aware of profit potentials, 
but they arlz aware of incentive pressures.” hob*vet, speaking for 
the minority, a large electronics firm aaid, “Qur production 
workers have been toZd how much a reduction in costs vi11 add to 
profSt8 in Borne cases.” SimiLarLy a big aerospace company answered 
that while “production workers are told /;;bout incentives7 ve make -- 
no special reports on incentives,” Another cssjor aerc,space con- 
tractor made the point that, “Emphac;:o is placed upon performance 
and schedule incentives to which employees can relate their efforts -- m-- 
(enphnein added) .I’ And, once more, larger fim showed a tendency 
towart; wider organizational jiseeminati.on of incentive features 
than ?id their ama 1 ler counterparts. 
As we shsll comment later, it is not aluays clear that effort 
can be unambf~uoasly releted to incentive structures, but it should 
not escape attention here that cost incenCi.ves (and surely iGmpLeX -- 
, incentive contingencies) were not cften counted among the things 
to wht c-h “emp Loyeec Can relate their efforts.” It seem likely 
anyuay that w:iat is being sought from the incentive is a generalized 
augmentation of effort and not some spacific decision-rule. 
Incenti.**cs in Subcontructin&. Not always impressive fcr their -- 
quality, studier SZ incentive cmtraczing are pzvertheless fairly 
Most of them, however, have focused on primer;. 14 numerous . Yet 
- . “_ 
‘- _ 
26 
.--‘. 
9..,(- a., 
twenty of the contractor3 ve surveyed aaid they had let ar‘urccivcd 
I 
subcontracts with Incentive provisions. Sixty pcrceat described 
their USC as “frequent” and 40$ x8 “fnfrequant.” Here especiel’iy I 1  
site appeared to be an important variable. All of the large firms 
surveyed had been involved in frequent use of incentive-type eub- 
4 
? 
‘r! 
! 
contracts. Among the fiva small contractors, tire had had no such 
experience at all and the other three had only infrequent experience. 
The wording of this question (f..e., “Uhen you subcontract, hov often -- 
arc incenifvea used?“) suggests that this result in not attributable 
af-mp:y ta differentfai amunts of subcontracting. However , it may 
ref !ect differences in contract sizea (i.e., ma jar 2~ minor pro- -- 
grams); from our data we cannot tell. 
Xllostrattng the policies and practices of the firms UC studied, _ -. 
‘_ 
one mediul-size xmpony, vhen asked if they had let or received, 2. ’ 
incentive-type con?racts, anr,wered saying, “Yes, but only under 
an incen:fve-type prime and w hen the nature of the supply cr ser- 
vice varrants such action. c)ccasion~lly sub-contracts are awarded 
vhich contajri e bonus for accelerated delivery where schedule con- 
siderations are paramount. The mobt fr?qucnt performance iwentis:= 
. - 
used . . . ia in the form of a penalty or ‘lfquidated damages,’ but 
only uhen schedule requirements arc critica 1 .‘I A eupport services 
-. T. 
contractor related that It uord “performance and delivery incentives 
to entince meeting crftfcrl dates in a prime contract.” 
Somevhat cv?>e generalized was the argument oE n large aerospace * 
I  -: 
7. ./ 
. . 
3,‘. . 
>.I’ ?’ 
I ’ ,, . . __ .- 
f !rm: “When appruprlate and reasible, Pirm fixed Price contract IS 
-;decd. If R&D is the esacnc2, a cost rcinborrtmeot type with 
appropriate incentives LP better c2Xculatrd to get the right jot 
done.*’ Another similar ccmp2ny also LodicsteS that “firm, fixed- 
price-type subcontracting !,a . . . preferable because this normelIy 
provtdes inherent incentives far suppliers to produce high; quality 
hardware.” This company did a l!ow, however, that it used incentives, 
"Wkre the subcontract ‘6 critico? to the p&e.” The response of 
- q-r - -z-b, -,----‘u ,--. aA.. ..,.~‘--“-..~ -we e-L :f -.,-.-_ -*lr- “.,~~~~^l~^ Z.^ ,-- ---%.r-qt.-l LL ,L * 2 __Cr -1.-y,. a_---,.*-- L--I- -_.__. _-_-_ 
~86 somzwhnt simpler: “To place /yh$ subcczractor under conditions 
similar to lxh:T prime -- make him recognize ye have incentives.” 
Taking rather a different, even blunter zack was a large elec- 
tronic systems firm uhich stated th2t it us& incentives in sub- 
contracfxs, “To enhance the opportunity for t& prime to Etoximize 
his profits .” A big systems engineering and software company ex- 
plslned its views on the subject in terms of efforts, “. . . to 
match risks and motivations 86 closely as por?Lble with the Frime.” 
Quite magnanimously, on the other trand, a Xargc aerosp2ce contractor \ 
ssid it hoped, ‘I. . . in 2 few cases, to redse ?iaka to the sub.” 
I_ 
We were able to classify the r8tiOW+its rqi,rlfed for us2 of . I 
p2.t 
incenti.:.‘cs on subcontracts into three genera: mMivatiOM1 cate- 
gories which, in order of frequency of occurence, vcre: 
1) To induce motivation with 2a express empbaric on 
performance quality and/or delivery (n-9). 
’ N’ 
.? 
’ ‘I I . 
-.-. , . . . .- , ^ ,. - I ,- . “_ ._- ,, , _- ..w.., - , _, 
28 - 
2) To fnduce gcnerofited motivation or operstionul 
i I- .1 .- ’ I.-_ 
discipline -- to indure that work receives the - 
attention of managetent (n-5). 
3) To distrfbc:e risk more equitably (n4). 
Mhtn large and emall contractor8 were compared in cur selected 
sub-sample it wa6 found that the large ones dL6tributed themselves 
‘1 
ncroes 611 three categories, 4th least emphasis on No. 1. Small 
cant cactors , however, emphesized this alternative to the exclusion 
of 1111 other*. Thus the em611 firm appeared to be more “performance- 
centered” whercaa, rela’ilvely crpeaking, the large one6 seemed more 
cc.ncerned to distribute ri6k. 15 
I : Of more than passing interest in this contex’: ore the comments 
of n sma!.lish arup;iort services contractor, more often the recipient 
than the dor.or of subcontracts; contracts it believed subjected it 
to a multfplLcity of wide-ranging organizational constrefnts arrlved 
at “6ubfectively” by the prime. This sub was persuaded that under 
Euch 8 sy~tea, “.You canno? exercFse good business judgement since 
you cannot find out which are considered the most importenc area6 
thnt affect your fee.” 
We ehould po.tnt out, since i,? my not be obvfou6, that in 
arking 6bOuE a firm’s rarionrlc for Ming incentives in subcontrac- 
ting (and in rciary administration program, about whjch we rhall 
6peak 6hOrtly) we presumed to tap beeic beliefs about the tuncttof:o 
and utilitier of incentive structure6 in tmtractd. In other words, 
1 
29 
we vent on the assumption that ch e reasons why firms ,yse incentives 
/’ 
in subcontracts -- or the condition6 under whf.ch)l;$ use them -- 
-,.;/ 
’ and the use of such provisions in thelr OVD internal payment 6chemeR, 
would tell 06 eomething about hw ihey cvaiuated the use of incentivea, 
c 
and also about how they themselves responded to’them in their own 
operations. 
We also explored certain other CompetttFoK fn Subcontracting. 
policies regarding cubcontracttng, at least as regards any dispoai- 
tions chat might exist taverd reli~ncrr on an “established group of 
I. I : , 6ubcor,tractots wi;h whca you've had L! long-term relationship involving 
the kind of wrk required.” A large aercspace contractor an8were.i 
thie question by saying, "No -- our uork it. open to all QU5lifitX. 
bidders." A support service6 contractor said, “Subcontractors are 
aclected on the basis of technical qualifications and 1~ bid,” I 
adding, however, that “diveristy of work requires this policy.” 
Such relatively unequivocel iayiscences on a consietently 
competitive procurement policy vere not the rule, hcwevcr. Much 
*pore typical are more quelifjed practfce6, like those of another 
bit’ aerospace company which pointed out that, “Generally a compe- 
titive philosophy io pursued in circumstance6 involving special 
skills, products, etc,” but, “continued sole source uill be 
permitted .” Another comparable company asserted, “All procurements 
are bid competitively" but then added the qualification, “except 
follouons,” :i,d vent on to note further that, "p&-t performance 
.,v 
I ‘. 
.- 
J- ,: 
.- 
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bears on selectLon.” Stil!. another si<;lsr iirm likewise said: 
“Subcontracting is Fttbjected to comp?ticlon witi: record of past -_ 
perfcmnnce a critical fuctor dur to the ‘righ reliability require- 
ments of aerospace programs.” ‘Going still a  further step do*Jn the 
pike, \‘I analler engineering-component organizeCoil explained that, 
Wherever possible the maximum practical ncmber of qualFficJ 
’ 
I : 
euppliers are solicited prior to award of ?  subcontract. Assuming 
eLfi+ -npq r~lntionahl~~ batic? b-p s~ti~~wtc~y. however. the 
eat&l:ohed cozEractor till be 6olici:e.d and hir perfornzxe will 
be comidered in the selection of the suppifer” -- oil ?:he while 
; 
I 
-1 
i 
rndctaining a “u3ximum” of competition. Working much t3e zamu way .i .; 
wns a czajor electronica company that described its policy thusly: 
Tubcoatracta are award& t’o t’ne most capable available source on 
I a  cuqxtitive baois insofar as practicable. Purchase orders, on 
the other hand, are mcst frequently awarded to firms with uhfch r;e 
. e, 
3  
‘.i 
:- 
-s 
have developed a favorable Lo&term relationship” -- bur again _ 
on a cmpopeeittve basis insofer as possible. 
*.- 
Several r&pondcnt:o expressed a more explicit reliance on 
en tnblished business relations. A big aerospace rnancfacturer stated, 
for instance, “Ycs, in boxe  considerable part,” they did use a 
“standard” list of subs. Their contention was that, “sssuCancc of 
competence ar.d dependability to produce what is required and on 
schedule Fs thus. cnhance2.” ConsLstent~with this philosophy ws.che 
. . -_ . : 
.A , ,  .  
,  - I ,  - ‘. 
,  I- - .- \.-- I  -_ 
.---. -- -- .____ _._- ____._- -_-, -_---- ’ 
practice of a medium-size component manufacturer that tcapor.ded: - , 
“t4a jor aubcontractz are released to subcontractors kho ‘arc reputable 
in hheir field and who can azest specif&tion and 9: A. approval 
rcqufre&nt6 .t) Fiuolly, a techatcal-engineertng outfit put it most ’ 
simply nnd dfrectly: “Yes o- to L?hsT nest efficient and usually 
qualified vendors ,I1 .’ 
P. 
I Tc r;‘- 
Reliance on “pwP competition in sub-coneracting vas thus 
cleariv attenuated umon~ our respondents, although most would 
‘ 
’ . 
probably endorse the principle 3 of a large support service contractor 
that Cencribed e policy of relying on an established list of subs, 
“but only to eho extent that they ian meet competition.” I?orecverS 
a big oystem/aoftiare prime undcobtedly Spoke for many ot!rera when 
it scld that; “new sources are constantly sought &I ordeE/ to 
\ benefit by the rapid advances tn state-of-the-art inherent .Ln R&II 
.- 
work.” _ 
The tendency to depend on eetablished reiattons, especfaily 
Ear on-going and followon programs was justified thts way b!t one 
large aerospace prime: 
I _ 
* 
L. 
JO The cost to the program cf providing tooling and 
test equipment to new sources, the cost of modifying 
existing tools and tesL equipment to fit the neu 
suppliers’ facilities a!sd the cost of supplemental 
tooling because the nw source do-s not have the same 
capital equipment reduces the savings .to the program. 
b) The cost of requalifying products m?‘nufactured by 
new subcontractors. c) The risk of schedule non- 
support an2 unocceptablc levels of performance and 
relinbil%ty due to the ned source’s unfamiliarity 
with the problems of ehc program.” 
.a- 
i’ _ <.A. 
.’ . -‘i’ . 
. _ ,. . . . 
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I.. _ 
EX~ISC, trust, risk and fami.liarity, therefore, anerg?-as prra;aures 
<’ ’ 1 
constraining sgainat emlustve reliance on the competitive eeiection _ 
- i 
? 
-4 
of subcontractors. ThLa be:ng so, cneuould surely be justified in 
;! 
‘j 
presuming that things would be little different in the selection of 
primes, procurement regulations and what not to the contrary not- 
withstanding. 
Use of Znceativez & Orp2nizetionaL Reward Systeas. -- For 
rca90n8 we hsve outlined in previous passages, our juentionnaire 
included the foIlWing question: “Does your orgarization employ 
i 
any form of wage incrntive plan (i.e., any system for providing extra 
, I 
monetary payment* or other conaiderationa convertible to money -- 
1 
e.g. Rtock -- in direct relation to individual, group or compa.~y 
1 
performance )?” Responses to this question were highly wrieci, but, 
; 
by and large, such internal incentive nystemswre confined to manage- j 
ment leve 16, often to executive levels. A component ;nanufacturer z t 
for example, relied chiefly on manageriai stock opti-ens, but added I 
that the “company hse awarded tc personnel bonuses for performance j 
. ?. 
or uchisv=ment,‘f bGt not at ievels below t:le supervisory. Fairly .’ -i ; 
typical was the response of a systems engineering/support cor&actor 
which raid it used 6 “management incentive compensation elan /In whicl~7 
approximately 2% of our employees participate. They receive incenc::! ve 
:: i 
i 
compensation award6 based on both orsanicational and individual 
performance a~ measalred against previously established goals.~’ 
5 
. 4 
t 
Along the saw lines was the plan descriqed by a major electronica i 
ri. ,,, -, 
1, .  
1  
3 3  
#  
,r, ‘. 
j:..- 1  
firm: ‘l~annog rman t  fncenttve compensa t i on  is a w a r d e d  a n n u a  1  ly to 
t * t op -managemen t  a n d  second -  level  umagemcn t  based  u p o n  corpora te  
i- 8  
(ou r  emphas i s  j  over-a l l  ea rn ings  a n d  contr ibut ioa by  the ind iv idua 1.” 
Partfal ly tnvert ing this Pract ice V C IS  a  b ig  ae rospace  c o m p a n y  
which  h a d  n o  inceil t fve p l an  for top m a n a g e m e n t, but  for m idd le  
m a n a g e m e n t: “A n  LncenL lvc  compensa t i on  pLsn  is u sed  whe reby  those .+  ?  J ’ 
3  
-. emp l o yee8  whose  pe r fo rmance  du r i ng  the p rsLous  f isceE year  ic exe? -  t 
t ional  a re  recogn ized  by  substant ia l  bu t  *.-tr iable xonctsrp increments.  
These  awa rds  a re  recogn ized  th rvugh superv isory  channe ls ,  r ev iewed  
,r 
by  Div i :on L G n n g e n e n L T , a n d  app roved  by  e: le G r o u p  Pret; ir :ent’s 
I 
’ ‘1  
3  .t 
O ffice.” This  firm, however ,  a lso  h a d  a  “select’ivs” stork op t ion  
pIon sr iented E O  “key off icers” a n d  des i gned  to keep  : hem vith the 
S o m e ,bnat  m o r e  invo lved vas tt:z s cheme  used  by  a  i a rge  company .  
aercspace  manzfac tuzer  wh ich  desc r ibed  8  “r yanagemen t  zncent ivc p l an  1  
for execut ives,  L e a s e d  02- j  annua l  ra t ing cf Ind iv idrqal  per fo rmnce;  
specfa l  aua rds  (bonus )  for m idd ie  managerr* tn t ,  L, lso dependen t  ~ 2 7  
ind iv idua l  per fo rmnce;  d iscret ionary stock opt ions  for execut ives;  3  
“j 
; a  sa ia rp  ad jus tment  p l an  invo lv ing mer i t  a n d  p romot iona l  inc reases  I .’ i 
for al l  sa la r ied  emp loyea ,  & L T  n o  g e n e r % L  o r  p roduc r fon  workers’ ! 
prop i t  shar ing  o r  p iecework  p lan.” I 
i 
Rev iew ing  the var ious  p lans  dcscr ibsd by  ou r  respondents ,  it 
-&Is ev ident  that they we re  fTt?q?lzn: ly  select ive and /o r  subject ive, i 
bu t  it was  not  a lwaye  c lear  just h o w  inCea t i?m awards  yerc cor re la ted 
1’ j’ .  
with d iscr iminab le  ind iv idua l  o r  wo rk -g roup  cffo:t e ven  tLou:,h this 
i 
crpr;ce prim eketched a generalized program consisting of a “performance 
bonus to all employees based on end ttem delivery.” An electronic $4 
j 
component msnufacturer said it used a, “1) subjective bonus pIan for 
division rtinrgers for sutatanding !M .vision fc6ulta;” and “2) cash 
profit shrrlng for the whole company.” Combfning nearly all the 
it 
featurea of noa-epecificity, selective targeting and aubjectivi.ty 
already noted was the prtrctice of a major support contrnctor according 
have thtr coiqm:y mstch it 5974. Senior executivea participate in 7 
! 
an annrrl suppls~entdf coapeosstion distributlan v;lich sveregee 
about 20% of their annuc! salary.” 16 
Some Conclusione and Judp,‘“mento RrRarding Lncentives, ---- P-I In our sample 
almost twfce YE many contractors (15 ~II eight) did not structure 
orgsnitational regulatory proceases to coincide vlth iwentive for- 
mat8 as did. Closer n5nitoring and control was not cowonly exerted 
in the direction of incentive Eormulos or opportunities. It slso . 
appeared that in practically no cases did inccativea materially 
’ affoce resource alloc,arlon. From these findings it seens apparent 
thrt incentives have titt1.a or no Sub4tanti81 effect on grr*:o ? 
4 
jmacro-rcele) orgauizational strrxturen cr procroses. 
Regarding the targets of incerti\~ea: in the m fority of caseo, ’ 
i: , I ,. - 
I 
f 
, 3 _- 
? .  
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levels -- incentives are directed at the contcaotor ‘6 tFanagetfa1 
/ 
personnei (where rhey 1~69 *have some real inforrnatlcnal or “attent ion- 
, ’ 
getting” effects about which more in L moment). Furthermore, this 
is aitogethe?= concistenc with the fact that most intra-~rganizat~or~~~ 
wage/salary incentive scheme6 fxile both looraiy and selectively on 
managerial, pcreonncl and it harscnize6, too, with usual policies and 
practices in :ho aubconttartunl uee cf incentives. Implicitly or 
i*xpPicltly, wittingly or unwittingly it ie the nlanagerial ;oule that 
5-1 beit:e orodded with the incentive 2x15. lloreover. it would annear 
that, to the extent ccntractual fnccnrivcv ore used to galvanize e:'fwt ) they are oriented more tmard schedule and performance thun 
toward co8 t pareneters. _- 5 
The pertinent qucetions then become: what sre tno fntsnded 
effect6 of contractual Incentives ou organizational and managerial 
I , 
perforrcdnce? In the firet plnce, it must be regarded as dubious 
that they vork directly to in&cc “co6t-conscfousnes6.” More likely 
:.hey work organizationalIy in opposed direction6 by mphaser on 
performance and schedule. For this to operate to enhance cost - 
.’ 
coltrcl, one would hava to 066ume i3 strong and well orchcstratrd 
usnagcrinl program in counter-point to tt. Second lg s f f lncent iue 
4 
rtruzturos ate intended to ‘kotivate” mnagers I)r to control thtir 
dec2aion6, it must be true that managers are evaluated with respect 
to their perforrxncc (or the perEormance of the orgaairaticnal units 
or P~oction6 for rhich they are reepontiible), not ju6t generally, but ; .- 
1: 
cn incenti~liited contractual dlrcensiotls. Eva bIttOh doe6 6hw 6ign6 
i 
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of at itabt apprnximste relevance to individual effort, but there 
are no real indications that this bears much relationship to incen- 
tive features of individual contracts_. -- It more Likely relatecr to 
:- 
overall performance. it is possible, of course, that incentivizing 
aspects of the rmnagerk tasks or work environment provides him with 
information useful to the effective organlzatfcn of his responsibili- 
ties by indicating things that his evaluators think important. This, 
however, is a complex issue that will have to zzaLt another time 
for extended discussion. For the prearnt we can do no more than 
hint at the possibi.iity that incentives serve’*=inly an “advisory” 
function influencing, but not controlling decision and performance. 
From such a standpoint tne effects af cnntractmL (or any ot?ier) 
incentive@ could only be evaluated Erom a Lno;Jledge of their relntious 
to contextual elements 2t the time of decision and action. 
17 
The broad situation regarding chr operatim of contractual 
incentives, including their sosceptibilfty to king “washed-out” . . 
by “extra-contractual influences” was nicely summarized in the 
remarka oE a large aerospace-electronics firm, which we quote at 
length. 
in revieving the events of the past few years 
;n;o;ving /Thei performance of major aeroouace con- 
tractors .-. T there Is one motivation tha; stands 
out above 211 others. Thfs is the deter?fnatian of 
a major defense contractor to design 2~19 produce a 
product, which, when held before the TV cameras and 
nevspapers of the netion, will perform ‘.O!Z the 
first time. This stems from concern over bis continued 
I 
, 
d -Y . . ,’ 
. : 
:” 
n. 
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success Zn tho defense msrketplace and the realization, 
in the case of many with conrnercial enterprises, that 
any tarnish on tha corportlte image may lead to a 
damaging dcLline in acceptance of the company’s commer- 
et81 pwoductri. Genuine concern over :echnologica 1 
leadership and the +Jlfty of the country’s defense 
copebilitics 22~ %lso major factors . . . 
Thrre is no cost Incentive which vi11 deter the 
contractor from incurring costs to assure succesfiful 
perfortixe; nor are the cost, perforclanctz and delivery 
incentives as strong a motivation as the contractor’s 
own dzterminatfon to achieve successflcl perforrrzince. 
Exemi.ned in the light of the cost target for any one 
contract ( this tiy appear to be flouting intcndcd 
COntnJis. Cons i&z, hwever , that a spacecraft which 
fcils in its m:seion and wastes a I-ooster has cost the 
Governear& m%r.-,- millions of dollars, Xn mcst co&es, the 
flight IISA to be repeated. The expertenced loss is far 
grester than the extra money that bight have prevented 
the failure. 
So much for contracrual incentives, for the moment at least. 
Contractin& Goat:. and Bunlness Ob fectivee -- 
In our questionnaire WC undertook to develop infortnstion about 
botrt concrete contracting (negotiation) goals and about more general 
business objectives, such as profit targets and related fin2nci.r: 
2. 
‘orientations. Whnt we wanted to learn more about were the general 
r.t:andards by whLch ccrmpanies evaluate tbemaelves and aloo the kinds 
of goals they generally set for thtnselves when negotiating specific 
contracts. 
General Dusineat Objectives: Profit Tase. . Among other things 
8 we were interested in getting some idea of the kinds of profit 
level% firms 6%~ to ba “high” or “low.” These had long seemed to 
ua “fuzzy” notforrs. Furthermore, Katona has pointed out the need for 
,- /.,,. , _. --_ 
more infcrmetfon about the profit and other standards around vhich 
b’usincsses organize their decisFon3, commenting on hw little is 
“knwn about preveiling group sttrndsrds end values (p.38).” 18 GP 
asked about both return on sales and return on tnvestment, but got 
little useful response to the !Rtte:, so fcr tne present we sha 11 
refer only to sales. Lcter we shall break again to the matter of 
,- 
ROI . 
When queried &our whet they conceived to be a “desfrable” 
~Oin~-GbZ pr04kt (after t6xe3 j: five tfrms said 3-X; eight said 
6-9X; and nine aaid LO or more percent (five didn’t say}. 
As ragdrde a 1w __ (after tax) ptcfil level, hwever, the mean 
figure vas 5.9x, !>ut with 8 st&nderd deviation @) of 2.2 and a 
range from a minimum of two tr, a maxfmJm of i2Z. The mean figure 
cited 8s representing a E&J profit level was 11.5X, vith a 2 of 
3.2 and a range from 6-20x. Obviously, then, there seems tc be 
nothing like a standard reference po:nt as regards “high” and “10~” 
profit levels. Variability of vfewpotnt Haa plainly the rule and, 
indeed, the aggregate distributions of high and low figures exhibited 
considerable overlap. One man’s elixer is plainly another’0 poison. 
Hbt profit one nanager might see ES high another mfght see as loo, 
and vtcc versa. 
As might be expect&, company eize vas a factor contributing to 
this differential profit pcrceptiorl. In our selected sub-aample, 
for instance, the rmatl lLrms rocrponding to the queotkon tended to 
look upon a going-out prcfit of b-82 and uward as “reasonable,” 
. 
. 
:. 
_ .’ 
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whe reas  the la rger  compan i es  thought  6 - g %  a n d  ds ; lnuard  wss reasonab le .  
B y  the a a m e  token, o n  the average ,  sma l l  c o q m w ’.~ rs  desc r ibed  
a  min tmum acceptab Io  pro-Ti t  level  a a  6 .2 5 7 . (wi th a  r ange  f rom S-82) .  
wh i le  l a rge  ones  sa id  they ve re  wi l l ing to sett le for  5 .31 .  ( range:  
3 0  7X) .  E v e n  m o r e  d ivergent  w e r e  compar i sons  for m a x i m u m  (or  h igh }  -. 
l imits of a n  scepteb le  profit  range ,  Al l  f ive smal l  f i rms lfsted 
1 5 X  & R  the npprox imte  up ,>e r  boundazy  of 8 n  accep tab le  range ;  the 
la rge  f irms ave raged  9 .a  a n d  r a n g e d  f rom 6 -  12%.  
Seeming l y  P  then,  l a rgua  contractors think substant ia l iy  “smal le r” 
abou t  profit  rates than  d a  smal l  contractors.  Actual ly,  in  ou r  da ta  
as  a  whole ,  c lear  re lat ion.3 be tween  accep tab le  go ing-cu t  profits (as  
percents  of oe lee )  snd  f i rm s ize (Paren t  Sales )  we re  G iscernob le  
( Tau=  .42, X2-3 .96) ,  Fi rm with h i gh  sa les p la in ly  vtte p r epa red  to 
accept  lmee  profit  rates (or  at least sa id  they were) .  Ve ry  
pcssibly la rger  f i rms with la rger  contracts, or ient  themse lves  less 
in  te rms of profit  Ta tea  a n d  m o r e  in  te rm of cbso lu te  profit  d31l i l r6,  .- 
vh ich vou ld  not  h e  6urpr is i r .e anyway  in  v iew of budge t i ng  m e thods  a n d  
the absence  of s tandard  benc’r.mrks for profit rates. B u t this ten-  
dency  w & s  still m o r e  p r onounced  a m o n g  f irms with a  h fgher  rat io of 
gove rnmen t  to comerc io l  bus iness  (C/C blix, Pnreut :  Tau=,F iO,  X 2 = 7 .46), 
a n d  a m o n g  p r ime  contractors (Fr lute ” S u b : Tuu- .S7,  X 2 = 7 .06). Thus  
not  on ly  d o  la rge  ffrm e  think smal le r  abou t  profits, but  ( and  w e n  
more )  so  d o  p r ime  contrnctors with heav ie r  retJti*re pe rcen tages  of 
,i _  ., 
. . - I ,_. _ : -- --*,-. : ‘i‘, _.,a -. 
Table 1 
HCan Rankings for Total S8mpk and Select Large ?>$ Srnd:l Sub-sample of Fuircf.fons 
of Profit ?. ._ ‘r., 
(LF2ted in Rank Order by Ovcrz?i ?feens) 
Function 
I 
Tote 1* 
Ti 
&3rgea -Sma 1 lb I 
S x s x S I 
Enir;rge capital base (grouth) 2.46 .81 2;5 .5 2.7 .7 
. I 
Pay stockholders and Rttract capita! 2.54 I.77 2.c 1.7 3.L 1.7 
F’ast ,-,,YILPPBC s.p..itpl rPy,,.fr-“6e+e 3 LO I 1r1 3 A  
-_-- -Wm.. a-- 
3.2 1 c 
-.a 
:.. . 
Fi~ccu in:ernal iEW 4.00 .;6 3.5 .6S 4.0 1.3 
rl 
M-sure overa 11 performance effectiveness 4.02 1.43 5.3 0 4.6 .7 
Other 5.11 1.52 6.0 0 4.6 .7 
L _I_-- 
* n = 22 
au= 3 
bn= 5 
I -: 
,’ ’ : 
1. 
.,- 
. . 
’ : 
i . 
; 
i. 
i. j 
governmat ‘bkioess. This may, of course, reflect an adaptatfon- 1 ; _.- . >,.” -a- 
tcvel-like ancnoring of expectatfon by previous experience, with 
profits earned in the past controlling standards for future expec- 4 
b 
tancice. Or Lt msy reflect a diminished need for high profit rates 
1 
and margins among large government primes, a Stdtc of affairs that .j 
could arise from their often favorable casbflow situation. Host Is :’ .1 
likely both factors are involved. 19 
The Xunctfons of Profit. Q~~o ioterczting things can also be 1 . ..I.. n 
discern-.< from the ordering of the func~lons to which profit i.8 put 
(cf Table I, where the listed means are average ranks). It vi11 be 
noted that growth is first in importance , paying stockholders zecond 
and providing operating capital third, slthough each cne crouos the 
other. ‘Mwever , there is much less variability in the rankings cf 
4 
growth than in those for payl.ng stockholders, suggesting that the 
fomer Is more consisten:- neen a6 important than is the Isttcr. 20 
1 
One large nercqace contractor declined to rank theee functions _ 1 
arguing t’hat they ut-te esscntlally “inseparable” aqd that, in any 1 
case, “priorities c%tlnuously change.” Now undoubtedly this is ! 
1 
true. Goals and other morlveo are dynamic, shifting in some degree 
with circumstance. Xwever , it is aleo true that some goals tend 
to be more important than other goals more of the time. Thus, in - 
general a particular pattern of hiertrclty of goals may prevail. . 
In fact we found, in the full sample, tbet the rankings of con- 
tractire goals “scaled.” Tkat is the correlation (or ,cuxordance) d 
/ ,. . I L’ 
across all rankings (i.e., raaking;\,‘ay firms) was suffici*ntIy 
high (W-.34, p ,001) to all& the conclusion that the hierarchical 
order of the goals libtad in Table 1 La a stabie one, even though 
specific averages might vary in a new eamplc. 
Still it is well to remain mindful of the dynamism of goal 
struc%urco. 21 The one we hsve described prevailed at a point in 
time. At another time it might be somevhat different. And, in a 
gtven situation, for a particular firm, “priorities” might indeed 
change. The patt.erne we are descrfbing, then, are necessarily to be 4 
?1 
undereto& aa relntlve to tine and circumstance. But, sine? the D :I 
firma doing the ranking represented eomcuhat varied circumstances, 
and since the interval over which the research extended covered a 
considerable period, ‘these patterns may be expected to be fairly 
stable, baring ca:as:rophic events, of course. 
Look,sg at our selecfed sub-samples of large and small con- 
tracfors the former can be seen to EolXou cLosely the pattern of 
the overall sample except for a heavier weighting on using profit 
to meet current capital needs, Nor arc the mall contractors -j 
I. . 
radfcaily different, although they put an even stronger emphasis .% 
on the monetary and growth functions of profft. Thus, al loving for 1 . 
the fact that diffsrences are not grest and that large and small 1 
firms may exhibit minor variations Prom the overall no&, it would 
:. I 
stem that needs for profit in order for firms to provide a return I 1 
to shareholders it not CJ prominent aa conventional bueiness rhetoric i *I 
might lead one to think. 
I’ I 
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Goals. Contractin In addition to :heir larger business objectives, 
we were hopeful of learning +hcr: the more r3pecifjc requirements 
--f4- $2 
comyonite 6ct for themselves in trtekl.cg government contracts. 
Therefore our questioanaire probed for the existence of ‘*any 
epecial policie& guiding the kinds . . , of . . . contracts” that 
might be sought or accepted, “or setting conditions relative to 
bid6 or propoaals *” FW were focnd other than the obvioue one 
.xyrcbrd ;, d ;Lf, ur;~“a,,-LC L~*~IL‘s-dLL”,.; ixg;ree oi r~ak urr6 job 
camp lexity.” Some firms, like one large ayrtems engineering firm, 
indicated, fur instance, that, ‘:If the customer is adamant on fixed 
prtce for R&D, tnea a no-bfd decision is a distinct possibrlity.” 
Also noted wttb. sane frequency was the practice of one support 
service contractor which required “rlifferez: oparoue.! levels for 
various types of contract.” An independent R&D laboratory, for 
example, atsted that, *IIf other than CPFP is quoted, special review 
at V. P.-level ia required. ADd grants require Chief Executive 
revier;.” One component manufacturer sounded another note, saying -. 
that Fts “basic policy would prohibit going after contracts which 
,:, 
would give the government unlhftad rights to design and mnnufac- 
turing.” None of our predictor variables was found to discriminate 
variations In these policicr. 
That contractors mount extensive “intelligence” and marketing 
effort6 with procuremeat agenclo* in respect to *program development 
and 0rt frequently disinslined to formulate ser!.ous proposato without 
.< 
h :.. 
‘I 
, .- .-e .._.,w L .-.^.. * . I ._ - -.-z -- -.. v.. ,..... --._ _ ,, - , _ . - ._I.. , , >. ,--.--n-w 
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Table 2 
Fruquexfco end Hean Responses of Total Sample and Select Large and Small Sub-snmple 
To Question: When Contracting, urrd Espcci:rlly for il&D~tytpc Work, tiw Important Does 
. Your Fhmgcment Believe .‘.t to be That The C:)ecific Cantract: (Reqpozses Liated in 
Rank Order of OveraLl Hea=ating on a Six-point Scale) 
5 \, - 
--.-- -...-.---I_ --,-~Torrl -. - -. _ 
-!- 
-bri3c -Small 
x - 8 X 6 X S 
.- --- - --.._ --- w-.-e- .-.. - - 
I Foster qua Lity performance I 
i 
EP18” D= 5 s= 2 
Protect the contractor against risk 
! 
Em16 D= 9 N= 0 
Safeguard proprietary interests 
F.=17 i-l- h N= 2 
I 
i 
Offer opcrsticn-l flexibility 
E= 9 D-16 
I 
PO I 
StFmu!nte high levels of contractor/ 
t 
5.00 1.72 
4.82 1.47 
4.4 
4.8 
= -i-i 
ii.6 
4.2 
3.2 
2.8 
3.2 
2.2 
2.3 5 . 0 
1.6 4.8 1.6 
I PR I.71 3 7 I h 
4.08 1.47 1.6 5.8 1.6 
I 
government communications -. - En6 D=l7 Na 2 
Engender high degrees of motivation to 
control costs 
F- 6 Ia D-15 N= 4 
I 
Yield a high profit level 
E- 4 D=19 N= 2 
Reduce government technical direction or 
survei 1 lance 
E= 2 DE?9 N- 4 
3.56 i.50 
4 
I 
i 
3.40 1.66 
! 
3.24 1.35 
2.92 1.13 
Footer program discipline (scope, methods, 
procedures) 1 
E= 5 D-10 N-13 ! 2.80 i.87 
1.6 
1.8 
2.0 
I.8 
1.1 
3.8 
2.8 
3.0 
3.6 
2.8 
* E = Essential; D .* Deslrnblc but not re:+lZy essential; H = Neither esseotiol 
nor even desirable. 
R.F.P. is widely recognized. -y‘2ut it happens, too, that contractors 
needful of sales or hopeful of followon work rill feel obliged to 
accept contracts they believe are undesirable (e.g., fixed price 
de*~elopment contracts), albeit sometimes uitb hopes of subsequent 
changes, As ~1 generality, oqe gains ths imprassica frc3 contractors 
of a relatfve paucity of positive policy planning or guidance in 
. . .,lG&L h&&O. . . . n.auc bwAU.0 ;.. . . - lx*%.-** LIWLL‘A ,..a ..,-, L. Y yIC”L.CCCL”” ;““a... 
taking oppor:unities aa t’.ey come, cauplsd perhaps with attempts 
to make them come regularly and palatably. 
Our questionnaire also coniained a secf:on WC) described 05 
j 
a 
T  
tapping “contracting gosle” -- i.e., what sorts of things people 
/, ’ 
i 
(firms j Chocght it important ts a-xomplish Whe; negu:iating individual 1 - 
contracts. The specific qwstiona s;.Z the ras?onsel? to then: are 
reported in Table 2. Notice that the items ate listc!d in order of I .t 
’ /- 
the importance attached to thex., on the average, by the total group, 
of firms that responded to this aet of iteE&. The prrc:erl is very 
it.teresting. 
_. 
For instance, ic will L?e seen that the most important single -- 
cxtractual objective SUKW out to be “fostering quality performance,” I 
fslloued Tn order by “protect the 
a 
contractor against risk” and i 
1: 
!:ijtEeguard proprietary Interests.” f xw _ 
: ?3 
At the bottom of the list in Importance one finds “reduce I‘: 1 
5 
goverrment technica 1 direction,” “Mstcr program d2eciplirw (scope, d 
I { 
.’ - -_ 
! ;  “) 
-I 
1  *. 
.  ,’ 
+  
Tub le  3  
Y e a r s a n l m  Xntercor rc l .a t fon  Kstr i .>- of Cont rac t ing Goa l s  (N=25 )  
- -  -  e ^  m- - -w . -  
C o a  l* 
. ..-... .-_.- 
(1 )  Protect  aga ins t  risk 
< -  
_  ” 
- _ - . _  -  ----...... r _ _ -  .-  . . . . -  - _ .  .-  . ., - _ _ *  -  - .  me . -  - _ - _  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
---..-. . . . ..e. .-.- -  . . . . ..-- * --  ,. . . . .I a..-- . _. *. . . .s-- .-----..- 
“W  0.13 .05 0 .12 .19 .20 .24 .23 
-.O l .27 .35_ - .35 -. i8 -.w - .u7 
-; 
-w  
I 1  
1  
i I (2 )  Opera t i ona l  f laxibil ity 
(3)  Disc ip l ine - m  - .08 -.I5 .04 7 3  f &  4 3  L _  4 3  d -  
(4)  R e d u e a  d i rect ion 
-* - 28  -.lO  .04 - .18 .29 1  
I (5 )  Propr ie tary  iaterrass m m  .07 -.O l  - .26 
1  
(6)  Q u a !ity per for t ince 
(7 )  Cont ro l  costs 
I.- 
-w  ,2b .lO  .18 ; .i r  d  
m m  3 8  7 5  2 -  L  
(8 )  Sr imula tc  commnlcn t ion  L W  3 5  L  
(9 )  H igh  proftt 
i : - - - - -  -  - -  
> ’ I 1  .i 
.’ . 
N o te : I tal icized coeff icients m e  rtacfstfc~lly si@ ficant at p = .O S  o r  ;csr. 
.L i * ..^ 
* S e e  Tab le  2  tar s ta tement  of goals .  7  f 
-’ .* c. : ‘/ .L~  ; 
: ‘, I’ 
: 2. . 4  
‘_  ‘_  ; - <  _  t; ’ . , 
1  7. \ 
._ j 
i 
,- 
, _.. >  
, ‘L  
: . 
r : 
I, 
. 
etc. ) ,‘I and “yield a high profit.” That the contract should “offer 
i. operational Cltxibfliey,~’ “atirculatc high levels of contractor/ 
; i 
government cocmwnkation,” or “angender high degrees of motivation 
.,-, 
to control :oete” were regarded aa Lntcrmediott in importarxe. It 
Is true that, on the werap, some importance was atto<hed to each 
of Che goats listed, rwt that’8 not really surQr!.elng since, after 
all, they all ore goals. Indeed what ia truly surprFaLng is that 
any ef Lhe mean ratingo were a8 low as 6omc of Chem are. 
Emmination of the item fntercctrelatio~ (see Table 3) yields 
some more interesting discoveries. For one thing, provision by a 
contract of operatdonal flexibility was positively (though not very 
strongly) related wLth safrguarding proprietary interests, but it 
was Inversely related with footering quality perfcrrnance. This 
“conflict” or auibivelencn in the relation between flexibility h.nd 
two other highly valued contracting ~oal.tl probably accounta fur 
its own racing no being oE intermediate lmportcucc. 
A second diocovary is that llStimulaft high levels tf contractor/ 
government couwnicatlon,” althuugh itself reted coqarativtly lou 
in importciact, was the item moat often entering derocfatlon with 
otharu. For l cootr8ct to contait? such features uao correlated 
with an arphasIJ on fostering program di6CiQlina and gaining high 
‘- 
profit*. *‘Xc ua8 Sk0 relrttd directly J3d COWQ 6tronqly with 
engendering high motivetior? fQt cdlt cont;ot. Thus, if a coraract 
hdccts high Itve?s of contraccor/gtwcrostoc comunkatian (u~t, 
I. . 
-. . . I_ . 
-1. I *~’ ,
_ 1: . . 
,‘. - .I 
4 :, _‘ 
, - -_ -/ ., ,.._,I . -, /A., -*a : - _ , 
45 3 - 
be it noted, government technical direction), it seems to be thought I 
that pragram discipline, cost control und profitability wil! he 
, 
anhsnccd. 
Actually, and this ia a third discovery, a :Sear comp:.ex or 
I 
cluster of interconnected contracting goals can be discerned: i.e., 
I 
3 
progtom disciplfne, communication, cost control and profitability. 1 
i 
!A When one is viewed as important so do the others tend to be, with 
1 A  
relations between dfacipiine and cost control, end cobt control end 
profit bainq cepecia?ly attong. However, it will be remembered .: *,; 
! 
ttst eq:h of thou@ goala ~8 individually rated a8 no more than 
intermediate in importance. EGXWRtL8lly, they :&stitu:e a coherent 
CbJSt&r of gcala to vhich thrs group of resyor.dbnt ccmpanies attached 
lcr~ importance (relative to other goals). 22 L 
It i8 possible to see emerging from these analyses an ovetall 
picture of risk-averse contractor cigasliz3tic-ns nat so much con- 
cerned about cost control or maximizing profits, but oriented 
strongly toward performance and the maintenance of vorktng relatiors 
with the cuatocter, wbfle %t the same tine hoping to sustain a 
separate “bargaining position” vis~i-vis the government (by 
controlling useful informetion). 
Factors Affectiq Contracting Goala. It should be noted tha* I-- 
there we8 a goad deal of variability in the ratings, thereby 
euwerrtfng quite estcasfve diversity of viewpoint. Anocg the 
things that may be rrlevrnt to cuplaining thfe dfvcrrity is 
.). --,-: , , . . . 
‘, : -. 
/ _ . . . . . 
‘.. 
. . . .- 
.’ 
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. 
company size. Our data ueri: not clear on the point, but, compared 
with small contracCors, Table 2 shows tba!. Large firms cculd be 
conatrued a8 somewhat more concerned vith proprietary Latereste, 
coriwntcation and coetf3, but leas performance-orfznted, less 
concerned 4th profit (as we have already deteceed) and also with 
hutoaomy (cf. “govcrnraent direction”). It is by no mans certain, 
because the relevant data are somewhat [Axed, es we Eha!l see 
presently, but one might still speculate thar the lerge firms iu 
“b. “A. d.+rz -zcrt . ..cx. :rh:~e~: :r:zrz D ____.. n n-. -__.__.._ _c__ --.-.*-- ,.....rc--rst ..n-_ 
tracts ~nnn were the emall oneo and therefore were more cost- 
conscious (in line with government expectations), more oriented 
toward proprietary m ttcrs as a means of securing tF,air -rrrket 
posiCfo2 via “knou-hoid,‘* and more disposed toward “reeponsivenesa” 
t.hsn tward autonomy. 
TakLng the several contracting go&l8 j.n individual rclatIon 
to our predictor variables, h-ever, indicated that diversity of 
viewpoint zias Purge ly in the nature of tndfviduaI differences -- 
fdioryncracics of individual firma. Out preCic:or varisblen pro- 
duced relatfvely fw discriminations among‘contracting ~‘~16. 
For inrtancc, “Protect egainst risk, “Gffer opceatiotul flexibility, 
“Reduce govcrment direction, “Forster quslity performnce, % rgender 
coat control, and YSttaulatr~ comunication” all varttd independently 
_ of any of our predictor variables. Thct f8, fcr twmple, :argc 
fire, a10 a total sreup. rospcmded no differently to these 
, . - - _  . - ,  .  -  _ . - .  r r z l r . f  -  .  - . . .  
4 7  
p a rti c u l a r i te m s  th a n  d i d  e m s 1 1  c ri e s ; b y  th e  o a m e  to k e n , fi rm s  
u fth  h e a v y  R & D  In v o l v e m e n t re s p o n d e d  i n  th e  s a m e  w a y  a s  th o s e  
w i th  l i g h te r R & D  i n v e n tn c n f, e tc . 
.I \ 
T h o s e  g o a l s  th a t w e re  a c n s i ttv e  to  O l l r p re d i c to rs  i n c l u d e d : 
“Po s te r p ro g ra m  d i a c fp l l n e ,” v h i c tr e x h i b i te d  a  s u g g e s ti v o  i n v e rs  I 
a s s o c l a ti c n  v fth  R & D  i n v e s tm e n t (T a u -C m .4 5 , X * = 5 .0 0 > . 2 3  F frm s  
w i th  h e a v y  R ;;D  i n v o l v e m e n t, th u s , a ra y  b e  l e s e  c o n c e rn e d  th a t th e i r 
c c n tro c ts  fo s te r p ro g ra m  d i s c i p l i n e . 
“Sa fe g u a rd i e g  g ro rr l e ta ry  i n te re s ts ” s h a re d  a  v e ry  te n u o u s  
re l o tl o n  w i th  n u m b e r 0 2  p r i m e  c o n trn c ts  (T a u 4 P .2 8 , X 2 -5 .6 9 ). 
W h a t g l v e o  th l o  fi n d i n g  i m p o rtn n c e  i s  s tri c tl y  th e  fa c t th a t i t 
fi ts  th e  l a rg e r p c o s S b l a  p a tte rn  d e s c ri b e d  a b o v e  ( i .e ., b i g g e r 
fi rm s  s h L w l n g  s to re  c o n c e rn  w i th  p ro p ri e ta ry  m a tte rs ). M u c h  th e  
m a m e  c a n  b e  ra i d  o f o u r fi n d i n g  a c m e th i n g  o f a r. i n v e rs e  re l a ti o n  
b e tw e e n  s tre s s i n g  th a t c o n tra c ts  “ Y i a l d  h i g h  p ro fi t” a n d  m a g n i tu d e  
o f F A D  i o v e o tm c n t (T a u -C -.3 3 , X 2 = 5 .2 1 ) -- It m a y  b e  th a t th e  h e a v i e r 
a  fi rm ’s  R & D  i n v o l v e m e n t, th e  l e tr c o n c e rn e d  i t i s  u ! th  c o n tra c t - -  
p ro fi t. A s  a  ti tte r  o f fa c t, h m e v e r, w e  o h 8 1 1  s h w  l a te r  th s t R & D  
fn v e rtr3 n t d o e s  s e e m  to  w o rk  a 6  II 1 ~ 1 6 F s  fo r p ro fi t fo re c l )s ts . 
,, c  
fn  a d d i c i o o  to  th e s e  d fre re tz  a n a l y ra r th rc a  fi  p r i o r i  i n d e x e r 
w e re  d a v l a e d  b y  c o n b i n i ;c g  re p ra c e  “c o n tra c ti n g  g o a l s .” S t w a s  th e  
p c rp o ra  o f th e 6 t In d e x e s  to  p ro v i d e  a  ro u g h  i s ? re s s i o n  o f th e  k i n d s  
o f g e n e ra l  e m p h a s e s  th a t m tg h t b t p re o s o t i n  c u n tru c to re ’ . ‘- 
Pearsonian Item fnccrcorri?l~tiona and Whole-Parr Corrtlatione for F-Index 
> 
I -- 
I--- 
‘Itoo* -.a...b.-C-------o--II 
(1) Rfak 
(2) Profptiotary 
(3) Control COB C8 
I 
(4) Profit 
(f’FCn8neiu 1 ConcertuP) . , i’ -..a--- -s-e --sm.- .-1-w...- c.* -w--e M.--I - 
z 2 3 I “4 “ TOf8 L 
_. _,.-..-_ L_.“. - _. , ,-...a.. ., .- . . . - -___- .---> _.- L-e. -- 
-- “X9 .24 .Q7 56 & 
wm 0.01 .24 57 L 
L’ . . - 75 I 2-e ?4 L 
“- 77 L. 
I .--. _ ^-- -- _ - --.--- -v-I_-- --de- --I --..-.. --*4-m.--- 
. 1 / j 
liots: Xta;Fcizcd coefficlentr reaefstfca?ly sign:ficont at p-.35 or 
leas @+25) . 
* Scs Table 2 for statement of item 
, t. 
,- 
-. .a I’_  
: 
. , 
-> 
., J . 
. . 
Ptarronian Ittm Intercortc1ation~ and Whole-P;rrt Correlations for p-Indtx 
(“Performnce Concerns”) 
/ j -. . . ..--..-..-_ -_I.* c _ .- . . . ._ .‘, ., 
I- -..w.- .- ---.- . . . . .r I . .._ se.- ..I._ 4.. ..v.v_..L”..--m.r.l_” 
(i) Fltxibil itv 
(3) Q*M If ty 
a _ - . -_ -_.- . . I 
Note: Itsliciztd coefficients atatistfcslXy signLffcant st n&r pa.OS cr 
lesr (%!S/.* 
1 
- 
* Set Tzblt 2 fst otstceat of Fcczt 
i ‘9 \, : 
‘1 
. -  . L  
i  j  
.- 
T a b l e  6  
_ . 
L  ( - j  
P c a rro n fa n  Ite m  In tc rc o rre l c tl o n a  a n d  W h o l e -p a rt C o rre l e tl o n S  fo r  R- In d e y  
( “ R b l h tfo n rh i p  C o n c e rn s ”) 
_ I 
_  s  -, .I 
v --a .-- -*I_ _ - m - w  -...I.- . . . -.-I --.s .-. -  - -  
Ite m *  2  T o to  1  
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The iodcxm deviead vtre: 
I ‘1 
2) a t,-flee-item PLrldcx Zntendtd to rofltci crnphaeck on “perfarmanct ’ 
1 
‘. 
gorlr;” and 3) (1 two-itorr R-index tapping sircar on building custoner 3 
f 
‘1rtLation8.” For each of these indexer item intercorrcldtionr ;ii& 1 
whole-part covrelatlons i.a 
,! 
., correlations of items vith the tom1 
4 
index ocors) are displayed in Tsblea 4, 5 and 6. It should be uoCcd 4 _ 
that the whole-port cotra?etions in these tabten are uncorrected for i 
1 
contrfburlono oi the individual iteem to the totals; ouch corrrction i 5 ,’ ! 
could be expected to reduce their magnitudea, especially in the ’ 9 
1’ 3 
Shorter indCXe8. As might be expeCted, as scales, them itiexea 
. *‘j 2 
.1 
ore heterogeneous; homogeneity rrthr calculated for each of them, 
for inntam+, rarely exceeded .25, indicating chat ariancrcs in 
tom1 scores art attributable to a pfuraiity of sources (i.e., 
8Pthough the P-index exprtorer conctra with financial goals, ft 
i 
is by no nntrns a “pure” mebmrt of such concerns). SaIDplC 8iZt8 
and other consideratiora did WC justify eearchicg attempt8 at 
1 
, ,< male awlysir of theee ioJexes, especially since the patterns of 
1 
! 
item intercorrelation and whole-part correlation wtrt, in general, 
~ 
ecceptablt au approxlfnatfons. Ihat is to say, a “good’* wale is 
, 
oat in which individual cogontnt itoms are uncotrclrted, but in 
vhlch ceeh item ir subetrnt?rlly corrcI.atcd vith scorta .based on a 
B I 
I 
a 
j 
. ,? 
IlJL!l of all IeE8. Thea it calf be fudged Chat each item contribuzea f 
!. 
uniquely and positively to t<l m?aourtment of 6otm sFngle broader -/ 
- r : . . -. ,i ._-. :: . ----I 1 
* ;I . . ‘2 >I - --.d 
vPrishle. The indexes we used’came close enough to satf.sfying ’ 
; .> 
%!lese condltlona to satisiy us of their provisional utility. i 
Expanding on this, inspection of Table 4’shws, wit:1 one 
rxception, a lnck of correlation betwee&) the four items definicg 
the P-scale: “Protect the contractor against risk;” ‘?afeguard 
’ / 
proprietary interests;” “Engender . . . motivation to contrci 
COStS;” and “Yield a high p&fit.” The exception is that the latter 
tvo items, as we already have learned, correlate significantly, 
The oth-r itema all seem LO be meaoulng different things; hwevar, 
-- 
each one correlate6 with a total s&&-e obtained by s~unxzfng responsss 
; 
to 811 tour items. This suggests chat, as a group, Che items nrt 
measuring facets of a common but coqlex variable, “financial 
gonls.” We shall talk Eurthar @bout thie index shortly, bat firet , 
we shall inventory the propw;tfes of the other two. 
The pattern of corraratfons for the ?-index rray be Found in 
Table S. Ciearly thir index is leas ret1 deflned than the F-index. 
For one thing the item, “Offer operaticstat flexibility” seems not 
to fit vsll with the other two scale contributoro: “Forter proeiam 
dinciplins” and “Foster quality petforman~e.‘~ Aa might have been 
anticipated, flexibility and discipline are ptrcefved as incompatible, 
if only modrrately so, and “qualli;y of performance” bore only a 
mtiaato rela+omhip to the total scorn.. Although- each was sLgnL- 
. i 
Scant and .pullad in the same directfob, discipline vas the onr of .- 
-, 
:--I . 1. I. > I ~ 
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Raw Scores, Means, !&dions add Standard Deviations by Company for All Indexs. 
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the three InJlvLduaL iterps contribdtfng most ,stron~!y to the “per- 
for,nance godld’ index. 
._ 
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Turning to the R-index, Tshlc 6 reveal? a lack oE rorrehtitm ’ . 
.’ ; 
I 
between the item dealing with governwent technical direction anti 
li 
J’ 
; 
the one having to do u?th conrwlicaticm. Kcwever, bath relet: ~11 
I j 
‘_ 
onotigh to ‘a pooled “rela;ionuhip goals” index. :. *- 
:.- I 
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Now anmc results frcw. ln&lyz%ng these $.ndexea: Table 7 LFstr ‘_ . ,I 
the raw score for eG.ch company in t.w eemple on each index :’ 
,! 
i ,- 7 ,/ l? 
i ’ 3 
vImed at Lcssr as “den5rabLe1’ fw cntracts to setisfy firwncial 1 
.I i 
obfcctives. The corresponding ac,sres for the -7- and F-indexas are f 
5 
‘) 18” ond “9 ‘I and a! 12” and “6” respect? vzly. ; , : 1 . 
;Jith rcapect to both rhe F- and F-indexes, more thnn 857. of ’ .‘$ J 
the respotidG::C* a- 5:. as 8: least “desirable” that &th ccrapany _ -.:r 
finaa<~al and perfurmaace goale be satisfied by contracts. Indeed. 
\ 
,._ 
9. I 
average scores on both ocaleo tended toward caximum (or “eceential”) I 
‘I .*: i ‘5 
va 1~58. , ,.I # . 
,’ 
Four firma, h-ever, dJd produce “1, scores on the C-Index. . 
1 
4 
Gf the four* one wag a 13rge aeroe+xi prime c-?ntractor; another ’ 4 
-I ? 
was a lrrge division of k mzjor aerospace-electronics prfme con- 1 
I’ 1 
tractor wit!\ 8 very strong coumercisl LvsFneas; a third was a -I_ 1 
‘2 , ! 
comparatlveiy emaIL, technically- !ovolvec; rervice division of a .; 
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much larger %ynergistically diversified” firm; the last was a 
medium-size, almost entirely commercially-oriented manufacturing 
division of d large conglomerate. Review of sales, earnings and 
growth figures revealed no strikingly obtious distinguishing fea- 
tures common to these companies, each of vhict. produced low P-index 
Scores. 
However, among the three firms generatirg ‘tlou” scores on the 
P-index were two of the four ‘Fitrm~ with low IT-*ndex scores (the 
first and last mentioned in the preceeding yarngraph). The third 
was a small, high-technology component msnufactorer. kgain no 
strik’ngly obvious commonatitics could be discerned among these 
three organizations -- but ve shall return to the matter shortly. 
In the meantime, the R-index: unlike the F- and P-indexes 
which, on the average, reflected about equal orga lizational interest 
rn satisfying broad financial and performance go8 s, the R-index 
suggested substantially larder concern with relati,:nal goals. 
Scores tended to cluster around the median. It s*,ould be noticed 
though that almosL all firms thought it at least “destrable” to 
achieve such objectives. Of the three respondents producing very 
low scores, one was the contzrcially-oriented manufacturing division 
mentioned rbove; a second was the small component manufacturer noted 
prevtously; the third was another somewhat larger, high technology 
component. manufacturer (with heavy R&D involvement). The two firms 
having very h%gh scores were both large aerospace-electronics primes. 
._’ 
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I’ 
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Thus, there were auggestions that &-emphasis on relationship 
objectives is associated with commercial and/or general lnanufacturing 
operations or status as a component sub, whereas emphesi s on them is 
associated with status as a large aerospace-electronics prime. 
Correlational analyses revealed no significant relation between 
R-index and P-index scores (rw.29, p>. lOj, but did reveal a signi- 
ficant, if low, direct relation between R-index ond I’-Index scores 
v-r 30 n/ n<\. The +intj,w nr,d F-frdrr- cnrrnln,lnn us- x .+.Ao..-rn .ew - 
.45 (p<. ‘35), ana u t-test of t’ne diffarence between their meany 
was non-algni flcant. The average I’earson t among the three indexes 
was .38, suggesting a general tendency for them to move up or darn 
together (altnough with a good measure of independence). Some part 
of this co-variation is undoubtedly attributable to the iqurities 
of the indexes used, specifically, to the presence of cross-index 
item correlations. The inter-correlation Jf the Indexes, in that 
sense, is partly spurioub. There in, however, sound reason to 
believe it not to be wholly so. Taken collectively, what our data 
convey is the message that contractor concerns with financial goals, 
performance objectives and customer relations are not unidisensional. 
They consist of ccncrete tactical components which interconnect 
in various , and probably variable, ways 4s means to larger otganiza- 
tional otrategic objectives. 24 We shall d iscuss  some further implica- 
ticns of the linkages of contractor motivaizions after some additional 
findings are reviewed, 
i 
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Doing BusFneos with the Government --w 
As regards organizational views, Jttitudes and intentions 
relative to contracting with government agencies, we inquired (among 
other things) about vhethez the firms we studSed were disposed to 
give more or less emphesis to government contracting than they had 
in the past. Only one indicated it was givirq more emphasis. 
Elevin foresaw no significant change, but 13 planned less emphasis “- 
(two didn’t say). 2 
. j J 
Desired Government/Comlercial DueIness Mixes ----• We also asked what 
these firms regarded as an optimal mix of government and commercial 
businecs and received highly varied responses, as one would expect, 
especially given that some of these organizations existed almost 
solely to do business with the government. ilwevcr, when be com- 
pared the high and Lw ends of the ranges mentioned, the tendency 
was clearly to select a8 optimal some amount of government business 
between 252 and 75% of total volume. 
Fsctcre Affectjflg Perceptions of an Optimal Mix. Since our -- 
questionnaire item dealing with optimal mCx called upon the respon- 
Rent firms to indicate a range of values, we analyxed separately 
the Low and I&& figures they mentioned. With regard to ih2 latter, 
the exioting G/C mix of the Parent firm exhibited a clear saaociation 
with the upper limits of the optfmal ranges specified (T-.54, X2=6.63). 
In other word@, If a firm’s current nix fa over SM. government, they 
tended to Bee over 5Gx as a good place to be. The G/C mix of the 
f‘ i : . 
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Self was lees clearly related (Tav.40, X2=3,64), but consistent in 
direction, 
Tuking thr Low figure of the cited range aa the criterion, -- 
some relationship uith Parent Sales could be detected (Tau--.40, 
.i 
X2-3.63). 
. . 
Bigger firma tended to view as optimal a lower percentage 
of government huaineea than did smaller ones. 
Finally, once again the current mix of the Self’8 business 
.I - “..“,,L Y ,...; - -,;;:‘,i.‘,.. -z:t:. ,i::; - - .,.. -a..- .s --r: -..- ,q-e.., 9, 2 v *‘a lL\ r-------- -r --... w.-. \-- - .-. , _- -_ -_. 
Focusing attention on the lub-sample, of large and amall con- 
tractors somewhat confirms the eize trend: a slightiy greater 
fraction of the smaller firms (four of five) Mere diepoecd to reduce 
their emphaair, on government contracctng than wae true within the 
group of large firms, three of five of which were ao disposed. 
However5 the four smeller organizations that wished to reduce their 
government cnntracting emphasis still considered an optimal goverr:mcnt/ 
comnerciel bbainess mix to be at least SO?. government. --- (In fact, two 
of the four coneid?rcd 75% or more government business an acceptable.) 
On the -ther hand, four or the five large contractors found a 
government/commercial business mix of less than 507, government ..- 
acceptable. Three of the five did not find optimal any mix that 
contained as much as 5% government business. 
Attraction $oo Government Market. Several points should be -- 
mede about these findings. Firer, no wholesale tendency for companies 
to flee the government market should be inferred from them. Such 
1 !. . I, ., - ,- - . . . I. .., 
- , 
.’ 
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lnc?inationc might charPcterizc an ocr:arri&naI firm, but most were 
oriented chiefly tauard reducing the proportionu cf their govera;nent 
business, pritrcLpally by increboing the compmrotlve amounts of their 
non-government (to be read, Federal goveroment,cven RASA/DoD) 
bueiueca. 25 Thue, except in a relative sense, contractor3 could 
not be described as Icoking to I eave the Pedoro1 market; however, 
they settnlnly were looking to reduce their dependence on Fr, vhtch 
lends us to a seccnd point. 
Smell firms evidently are more disposed to reduce their depen- 
dence on the government market than rare large ones, probebly because 
they atar: et a higher level OE relative involvement. Yet, the 
small comp&nies aeem uilltng to settle fcr greatet dependence thin 
are large ones, perhaps partly because they perceive themselves to 
have fewer alternatives (in our Cakier diScu88iPn Of Cnntractfng 
goals we perceived signs that smaller firms were more concerned 
wfth the autonomy issue), but possibly else because these kinds of 
preference& reflect a kind of incremental constancy of growth. 
That is, because thejt ster: with different values -- one lawer, one 
higher -- ~a11 and large firma may end with different values simply 
by subtracting a “constant” from their tnitial values. This, of 
course, would forecast a progression toward zero percant of govern- 
,- 
ment business , albeit. at diffcrent?y arrived-at polnte in time, 
This, for several rcdson;‘, ia unlikely in the extreme. 
One further point should be made, even at the risk of seeming 
, I , .  .  
-_--A_ ” ,, _ 
ceptiona to thr: rule, companies (i.e., as distinct from personrwl 
‘: 
p 
/ 
within compan!..es who IMY, as individuals, have differ&t interests), ’ ” , 5 
by and large necm not to fl.nd doing busi’ness with the’invernment I 
(or at leaa’; -with t&ISA and DOD) inherently attractive. Attraction 
aeemr to beI rr?~lnly extrfngic and dependent chiefly  on the availa- 
1 
bility  of; alternatfve msrkets (together , possibly, rith such subtle !I 
i 
predsurer, as patrioczsm, or sucn nok-z3v-2fwL~o ~~~~~~~~~ 2; ;,.,..i :d 
ment requircment.5). 26 e- 
c  
Contractors View their Status II 
.I 
v -  
3 
OJ~  questJ.onnafre contained a number of questions and racing t 
sca le; designed to help us gain an imptenaion of how the firms in 6 I 
our rrnmple judged their s ituations and their prospects. In one sense 
ther.e ratfngs can be thought to tap into ‘!:orpokzte seif-concepts;” 
in another sense they may be more appropriately v iewed as s imple 
1 
statements of or(tanlzationa1 perceptions ?f the “states of affairs” 
under which they presently operate and expect to operate in the 
Cuture, Both elements are doubtless involved and it would be hard 
to decide when to stress one and ;rhen the other. 5 
Xnvestment Levels. W hen asked about their levels of capital Investment 
relative to averages rn other industries for firms v ith comparable 
/b 
se les , seven coccractora in our aample descr ibed theirs as 
1’probably lover,” eight 8s “about the aa.ne,” and s ix  as “probably 
higher” (s ix  didn’ t answer). Thus comparing themselves with firms 
_- 
Table 8 
Item Intercorrelations and Whole-Part Correlations for I-Index 
("Aggregate fnvcstment”) 
L 
-.---- -W.-e--.- .* -.
I- 
--.a-_r.l -..-.._. - -,. .--.----.- 
Capital Per6 onnc 1 Tots 1 
Item fnveatment Investment Investment 
-..--- ___-. 
Capital Investment 1, e- .Ol 7 
_____- _ ____ - -_...--- - -_-- - d -. - .---.-e-e*- 
.g I 
Perannne 1 Inves tmen-C’ 
I I 
: 
.a .33 
\ --..,H.m-.-11.. V..C”..w.-- ---I-. .- - - . ---.-. -.. *A 
Note: Ittilicioed cseffic%ents statistically significant at..p=.Gi or .rt 
less (n-N) ,I( 
57 
in other industries in regard to capitrl iwestment, the cornpnniefi 
we queried distributed themselvee abwt evenly across ell three 
response alternntives. >. - . .- 
However, ratinga of capital inveetment and of personnel 
investment were uncorrelated (see Table a). When asked about their 
Cnvestrnente io technical/cn&eering personnel , Reven fi rl..s dFdn’t 
ansver, one said they were lower, and oue said about the same. 
+nr reuarvrrt~ iG oaici ~rvz'lc ~:I~~YLII~F:IIco WCC= i8i);iwzL. ~i:cait riwae v; 
I t comparable size companies in other industries. Thus, as a group, 
the organizations swv+yed saw themsel.vcs as having heavy personnel 
fnvestaentc, if not necessarily such heavy capital investments. 
As a result, a compos:t~ Xnvestment Index (cf, the I coIomn ---- - 
in Table 7) showed 857. of the contractors studied to believe their 
overall levels of investment to be above ‘,he averages for other 
industries -- and subetantiatly 80, for a score of “12” is the 
highest pwaible on the scale and a score vf “6” reflects a Judged 
fnventment level “about the same" as that of other industries. 
Obviously, though, this fudgement rests on a belief in much heavier- 
than-ordinary personnel investmenta, something not commonly accounted 
in reckoning investment levels. So strongly did one small component 
manufacturer feel about this that it feie constrained to comment as 
follows on the issue: 
Return on investment (current accounting deftoftions) 
is wt an appropriate measure of performance either on 
a prefect or in total and will not be until a mechanism 
-1 L _I _ 
_. I ,.-‘; 
Table 9 
Means and Standard neviotiono of Responses by Total Sample to Status Assessment ’ 
ItemF 
I Item 
1. Physical plant capability currcnely employed 
(relative to normn; operations): 
50% or lcsa -- mar total* 
2. Future expcctatiuns coucarning avaitabfllty to your 
industry of government business: 
less work -- more vork 
3. Fixed ovcrhtrad costs: (relative to tndu. try averages) 
lization 
relatively low -- relatively high 
4. Staff capability currently employed: 
eignificent under-utilization -- near total uti 
5. Payroll expense8 pertaining to technical petrsoww 
fixed -- variable 
6. Present :evel of competftLon from other firms: 
1: 
I other firms: 
very 1~ -- very high 
7. Expected future level of competition frof 
dccreazing -- increasing 
6. Commercial outlet. presently available: 
a lmos t none .- very orany 
9. Anticfpatej :uturc avsf lsbtlf ty of cotnrnel-cfaI outlets: 
decreas i 112 -- increasing 
10. Current relationship with agencies such LII N4SA or DoD: 
fairly poor -- quite good 
ii. Anticipated future relationship vith NASA and/or DOD: 
less involvement than now -- more involvement than now 4.62 1.18 
7 -*L- LI -- 
4.44 1.53 
3.84 1.43 
3.96 1.37 
5.04 1.02 
3.87 1.91 
5.32 1.07 
5.32 .8Q 
,I .;.28 1.28 
3.76 1.54 
4.92 1.02 
0 
I 
r.. 
Table 9 (Contim&) 
xteal 
12. Current sales level: (relative to Lnduetry avarager) 
rolativel:~ ac5a -- relatively high 
13. Anticipated sales level: (relative to current level) 
decreasing -- increasing 
14. Current profit levels: (relative to Industry uverages) 
relatively low -- relatfvely high 
1:. Expected short-term future profit level: (relative to 
current Level) . 
derrearing -- increcsfng \I 
16. Engecttd lcng-term future profit level: (relative to 
curreot levei) 
decrensing -- incxeaeing 
17. Pote:rrfal cmrcial spin-qff from gover.=ent work: 
lov -- high 
18. Current rate of technological change Fn your industry: 
Lov -- hiAn 
19. Expected rhort -term  future rate of techl*dlogicel change: 
accelerating -- decelerating 
** 
X -_I 
3.65 
4.48 
3.08 
3.78 
4.57 
2.30 
5.33 
2.19 
* Rating8 vtre on six-point scalen, the pales of which were as 
listed far each item. 
-1 I 
. . 
.87 
.90 
1.33 
.9P 
.92 
less Is its concern fcr performance goali -- perb%ps, ve might I:auard, 
is da&loped to assign some cnpitnl vaiue to a senior 
dtelgn eoginccr uitk something like ?!I year3 of 
direct product line experience. in a real sense he 
is a much more relevant capital asset thaz equipmcnr 
vhtch can he owed, Ieased, borrtrled, or obtiiRt.ed. 
Along with oensitfvities gener;ted by invidious comparisons of .j I 
defense induntry profits d6 return on sales and as return or. fw~st- .3’ 
ment ,2? these sentiments my heip explain the reluctance ve cited -1 
, 
earlier among firms ve encountered to discuss profit in relation ’ ; I_ 
/- , ,’ 
:i?e @bSLKUCC. 
3 , 
t.” J.“V=a~C~~r!r -- even ah L 5 1 .,-, 
J ;a., . _ . 
Ln any event, 
. . .> ‘. 
we also correlated I-in&w SCOXC+ vith other .I..’ ,r” -I_ I..-i 1. ,i 
derived index scoroe (see Table it) and found a wdcrtite, but statis- * 
$&“z + 
,;‘:,i $,. : , 
ticelly higkly significant inverse cnrreleti6o h*.tvecn it and the 
;; s-. ; 
; YL 
: --z 
P-index (r-- .48, p<.O25). Whs. 
< 
this :orrelation i.?dicates ic that i 
’ -+ ~ ;,j 
the hieher fe a firm’6 perceives coqoOite !evel of investment, the 
.*r f 
;.-y . , 
ic is preoccupied vith other matters like protecting itself egazeat 
risk. 3 
The Prerent and the Future ---= Our PolLcy Qwstionnafre included 19 
:; 
P 
rating sc4les reprcsentiag a variety 0 ! dimenstonn calculated to 4 
gtve an idea of now wr respondents viewed their present circum- - 
i _I I 
’ i 
stances and their enticfputiona of their futures. TIE itemr and the -1 2 
group ment. rcsponoe (witit its standard deviation) t(r 8ach .tiy be ? J 
forrnd in fable 9. Using these avereges atid taking the pres..tit first I i’ /1 I ’ d 
ve can nay the EollovLng general things shut the organitatfans ve ‘. : 
studied: 28 
., 
59 . ’ I, ; 
it) They had come unused plant capacity -- probably more than 
desirable, but this was quite variable. Unused cap&zi:y was veakly 
related with Sales (Self) (TRIP-.35, X*+.97). 
. . J . 
h’oc surprisingly. 
the more a coyany’s sales the less its unused plant capacity; but 
in this group of firms rhe relationship was remarkably weak. On + 
the other hand, tendencies for Parent firms bith a high percentago 
of government busl~~css to hove more *Inused capscity was ratt,er 
stronger (Tau=.itO, X2=3.79), as was a simFlar trend among firms 
with ldrger r&bers of prime contracts (Tau=.45, X2=3.60). 
b) They were experiencing little under-utilization of staEF; 
no variatiors related to our predictor variables were observed. 
c) Their fixed overhead costs vere not perceived to be materially 
different frm industry at lzrse; but there was a clear positive rela- 
tir.. oecdeen the percentage of government busiress held and low 
overhrsd (G/C cix, Self: Tau=.t6, X2=5.26). 
d) AR a group, the rigidity of their payroll expenses for 
technical personnel vat; indeterminate -- about equaily often ECxed 
and vsrlable. Variability by conlyeny, however, was marked and . 
“ clearly related to sables volume; hi& Sales (Self) WLS associated 
with a variable payroll for technical personnel (Tau=-.46, X2=4,70), 
. . 
and a comparable, but weaker, trend vas observed in rclatton to 
Parent Sales (Tau--.35, X*=2.81). 1 
c) They felt competition from other firms to be intense and 
this was clesrly related rlth Purent Soled volume. The hi;;her 
. 
i 
I- -_ - - -^ ,,; 
! 
I 
, 60 I:‘.‘ ‘3 
:. c 
were sales, the more intense was competition seen to 3c (Tnu=-.43, 
X2=4.62). ’ 
f) They apparently perceived themselves to be m&erately 
“locked-in” to government contracting because of a relative scarcity 
of commercial outlets. Some, but not a great deal of variability 
existed in such perceptions. To some extent variability was 
associated with the Parent’s G/C mix -- the higher the percent of 
government business, the fewer commercial outlets tended to be per- . 3 
ceived (Tau= .35, X2=2.88). It is at least mildly intelestLng that j 
this relation was no stronger, for it seems an obvious, one. The i 
same is true of Contract Dollar Values, which also only showed a 
i 
tenuou.1 linkage with perceived availability of commercia 1 out lets 
(Ta u=- .39, X2=2.96). 
g) Relations with agencies such as NASA or DOD they viewed as I t ! 
good, but not glorioue. Some tendency existed fcr firms with ,I 
higher sales (Self) to regard these relations as good, but the 
i 
:. 7 
relation was not nearly so pronounced as one might have imagined 
,*’ .; would have Leen given the likelihood, in our sample, that most -. 
sales were to the Government (Tati*-.35, X2=2.85). Soee suggest ions 
of relations between perceiving good relations and holding larger ; 
numbers of prime contracts could also be found (Tau=.35, X2=2.25;. 
But here, too, the surprise was that the relations weren’t stronger. : A i 
h) Their current sale6 lev~26, with som? variations, uete about 
-, . 
,_ \ .  
.  _‘- ‘, . :  -1 
/ 
- : - ._. /
c: 
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average for industry. And high sales were associated with haviug 
many prime contracts (Tau=.45, X2=3.60). 
I) Profit levela were seen to be near industq averages, if 
sltghtly on the lm side and a bi.t more variable than sales; they 
were unrelated to any of our predictor variables. 
j) Commercial spin-off from government work they regarded HE 
low. Like profit, this perception, too, failed to vory with any of 
our predictors. 
k) Finally, the rate of technological change in t:leir industry, 
uith little variation, they rated a9 very high. In this instance 
it was firms with high sales (Self) that perceived rates of tech- 
nofogice! change to be highest (Tau=-.45, X2=4,13). 
As for the future: -a--- 
a) They were uncertain about the availebility of government 
work, and a good deal of variabiLity in viewpoint existed about 
the issue. These expectations sha:ed ;ome relation with the firm’s 
G/C mix (Self). Those with hFgher percentages of government business 
were more pessimistic about future prospects (Taug.35, X*-3.11). 
Some suggestive tendencies far more optimistic appreinals could 
be seen among companies with high sales (Self) (Teu=-,.33, X*=2.59). 
(Evidently firms are inclined to assels their frrtures in terms of 
where they are, which seems reasonable if not imaginative.) conris- 
):cnt with that idea, companies with lower dollar-value contracts aIs. 
tended to expect less work in the iuture (T=.37, X2=2.57). , 
I 
b) With little vctietton they looked for pronounced increases 
in conrpetftion from other firms. ‘Ihis was a gencrnt outiook 
unrelated to any of the predictors. 
c) Again, they were uncertain and highly variable in their 
expectations concerning i!re prospective avnikibilitj of commrcfol 
markets. And also Egain there wz.re no 1Lstinccrve variation? of 
*.!mv s? P f**p-ric- .9C thr Ljnclq nr h*-=i n-cu CtrrlJnlctan-*es indti.xed 
by our Ftedictors. 
d) Perhaps because of (c), they looked for a slight increase 
(whether they Iike it ct not) in .beir involvements with IUSZSA andjor 
DOD. However, among firms (Self) kith an already hi;;h p~rccnt~l;~ 
mix of governmcu: huSinesS a tcndc;.cy ccclld be fWnd to expect icss 
invclvemeot in the Future (Tau=.33, X’~2~67), a 
-; 
condition reminiscent n 
5 
of those described in our srr,dy of advertisicg patterns. 29 And, US $ 
f 
the results of Chat study would lead one to predict, complementing 
! I 
, i ., 
.this trnr,d was an opposite expectation of more inr:olveqent an the -- 3 
part of those firms currcntiy havlrlg fewer prise contracts (Tau=.57, 
X2=2.i9). 
,’ _ - *.s _ . .- 
e) Overall, they were generally’ optimistic about their sales 
out look. (This seemed especially true of firms holding mo-e prime 
contracts (Taurr.35, X2=2.25).) . . 
f) They were unsure about their short-term profit prospects. 
However, t!le higher was a fj-rm’e R&D Investment, the more dfd it 
expect short-term increases in profito (Tau=-.40, X2=3.6S). 
. __ :-* - : _ _ ; .:- 
/  
I _  . .- . .  I  .  .  _  
6 3  
p,) A l t hough  f rankly uncer ta in  abou t  the shor t - term profit 
picture, they we re  qui te  opt imist ic abou t  their  lorx- tern 
profitabil i ty. which,  because  of the  Inherent  ambigu i ty  of the  
“long- run ,” is ea6 ie r  to be.  S a n g u i n e  0Jt looks we re  espec ia  tly 
ev ident  a m o n g  compan ies  (Patent )  wi th h i gh  sa les levels (Tau=- .42 ,  
X 2 = 4 .11). -  But  this opt imisn was  apparen t l y  cond i t iona l  u p o n  t ho6e  2  
~s lw=  n-t hm i nq  gove rnmen t  sales. for nllr,etif i t iqns e;sfsted that 1  .’ -  -  
~  
f i rm6 ho:. l ing la rger  numbe r s  of Fr iar  Contracts cqccted aec r~as ing  ,,*.i -: ‘- . _. ,
l ong- te rm profits (Tau=- .34 ,  X 2 = 2 ;5S).  W e  might  I:ote here ,  too, ~  
‘_  
that zppurent ty  pxfit forecasts e re  based ,  for o n e  tn ing,on sa les 
a n d  for another ,  in  this samp le  anp lay ,  o n  R & D  Loves tment  (s re  the 
prev ious  pa rag raph ) .  
h )  Final ly, they j udged  rates of techno log ica l  c h a n g e  to b e  
l ikely to accelerate,  but  no t  rapidly.  He re  aga i n  ou r  predic tors  
d iscr iminated n o  di f ferent ial  expectanc ies.  
Inspect ing Tab le  $  prO;i ;) ts s o m e  other  observat fons wor thy  of  
_ ._  ‘. I . .._ 
note  I For  0t.c thicl;, m e  can  see  ttct w d B u r e 6  -of.driabi. l i ty 3 0 2  
. I I -  , \ \ ’ / - -~_  .A . __.  
genera l l y  smal le r  w h e n  they refer  tc’op in lons  ab :~uC  E h c  futl:r? r::iiq 
s ’ 
1  
w h e n  they refer  to p resen t  condit iors.  In other  words,  ag rccmenc  ! 
1  
a m o n g  compan ies  is g rea te r  as  rega rds  lu ture prospects  than  it is :. 
. i 
i ,A  rega rd ing  current  states of affairs. O n  the o n e  h a n d  this p robab l y  
1  
reflects a  8:: to  th ink in  te rms of “c o m m o n  fate” o r  pro.spccts for I 
the  g r cup  as  a  who l e  coup led  with a  un i fo rm tendency  to look  at i 
f. 
Table 10 
I 
Pearroaian I.~tercorrclation Matrix for Status f 
&f--- 1 2 3 d 5 y?----:z-j-ii-” 13. 14 15 16 -27 18 19 1 ’ _ ’ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
_ .I1 . _ 
.2 
13 
14 
?, _- *.-, 
-15. . 
16 
‘17 
18 
19 
mm -081 069 442 185 318 186 255 011 307 072 367 -07? -212 -186 -132 Q21 214 -115 
sm 082 176 -441 -135 191 -248 077 -108 173 - I40 231 069 539 194 134, 158 -189 
..r -059 -274 -560 -367 007 -044 -005 397 .!68 017 222 149 -161 -164 081 -154 
_.. 
050 179 035 215 193 -209 036 :!61 169 177 375 572 010 -032 -154 
-- 38s 287 -218 -230 531 274 l)Vt -310 364 -177 -072 -443 132 -291 -- 
-m 4F3 _) -Q?O 266 -202 -160 -1132 -074 060 186 186 -120 292 -139 
-213 -104 084 141 - 48 -170 086 157 250 -077 440 -412 
41s -ok -214 ’ Ia 43 361 -478 -122 -1y/2 212 -222 280 
-- -162 -065~ ii! 308 -337 OsS 317 428 OOC -- 16s 
-- 3si :‘2L 189 308 148 -080 -5(s3 -052 029 
-. _ 
W” 2 9 L 101. 465 397 -1112 iS7 -472 -472 -- - 
.” 450 266 167 -212 -137 211 -134 “I 
se - :cx! 474 081 011 021 030 -- 
! ’ 
!- -- m- &69 323 -338 029 -259 
M S  574 -003 132 -060 
W” 041 260 -338 I 
-a--- ..----- - 2 ‘7’ ---c--m ki 1 
: 
Note: Italicized coefficients statistically significant at pa.05 or 'Less., ‘Cslunns headed ?,3,4,4,7,8,9:13, n-25; 
COhnnB headed 13,11,l4, ~24; columns headed S,12,15,L6 !7, ~23; 
var); bctueen n-15-25. 
columrm vzaded 18,14, w21; Fndlvfdual cella 
* See TeSlt 9 for item statement. 
_., _ . . .-.z -. 
r*L.rl&.&~~.~:~,~d+~-. ,.&.&L. - ,--.-Lb--. -.. L -- .‘h- .., L L, _ _ _ _ , -. _---~ _.a, . Ad i-c.- - 
. I, aptcies of optimism G detectable, es we have noted and eball note 
?.- ‘1 ,, 
- ; i b 
I:: : , : :; , ;,’ .a a’-‘, :‘/,, 
-r . .., ,. : .,:‘!! . >. , : 
f, ,/ ’ 
r ‘,~,-~.~., ---1 1 
I , , ,.: , -. _ a;ain ;;hdrtly)‘r ’ On the o&e& ‘hand, current appraisals are ‘more ;,, ‘ > , , ,>‘I ;;, 
<?’ . ,’ ‘/ , . , ‘.. -_ “_ ,. . i r; . . 
.d’:i’ likely. deicrlptive ototercerrk cf reality, wheren~“Pucure projections 
‘I ‘_,,,.:.-- ,-\--A.-~ .‘- z ,:‘I , 
-- >. _. ‘- i ‘\- 
; ’ 
. : _I ” / _ *,I 5 
I literally are opiniona reflectLng bcth the cond?:tioni’ng of ‘txpec- f 1 . ’ ;I -I , -9 8, . 
, titian by usual business espiratfma and the mutU8lly rcLnforcing % ‘/ 1, ‘\ . . 
scntimbnts of 6 businese community ts the effect that the “system 
>ij 
’ M-m - ! 
\ . ~ -- I ‘.’ - / -I- ” , I 
l. uill.Wcrk out.” -. \ L . . * 1. , i L . , -e’, _- ; 
. ‘-’ : ,, ’ ‘-’ -4 _II^’ / . Another feature worth oentioniag about’ Tad16 9 is that it spdaks . L . --; I. I _ -.__ ! 
OP at lcaat en the btoadiy 
,: l._ .r_ ii _ 
,I ,” sgnln to the “vali3ity” of the deta, 
’ ‘I 
._r -; -\- - : - --“r 
. * 
“t&l’* 
- - : . -; II \.S, I 1) 
nature of our slrple of teapondents and, therefore, to / 
the genaralizability of the results of the survey. 
j 
i 
The point can 
-_ I i I r I be &sped by notising tlxt each time companies were ask,: ro judge z 
‘? 
thermelves relative to “industry averaget? the rerrultiq means vere i ! 1 , 13 I 
near the midpoints of the ocsle. In short, they were where one .; 
,. > . 1 
would expect they would be if one Hera dealing with a reascrably a< 
3 
, .I 
,’ . 
reprefJentativt group of fix-as from the reference industry -- sume .j . I s’ 1 
- of ‘which. would be above and sme belw average. .\-, 
. ; 
. 
. 9‘ , i 
L / ._ ., ._.,_. -.., 
(.I - - ~. ,. , . :j -- ‘I __ .I 4. ~ 
*, With that observation we can go on to mare detailed anaiysts . . 1 
i - . -- . . 1 _ 
’ of the several diccenalonr included in our organization status ! I - -4 
a83!@8sm8EtP. ,, . 1~ 
Wntn we intercorre2a:ed the reaponoes to all of the &ales 
1 
.: .2 
dercribed in Table 9 we discovered by simple. inspection 2%~ ” - -1 
intereating clustera of iteocg (cf. Table 10 for the full inter- 
1 ‘_ 
( correlation matrix). ,. ,<‘X. > 
_- ,. __I-- : 
__~.- 
’ 1:. I __ I_ , ,- .- PI_ - . . . ,. A_ ‘1 . -_, ~_ _ -“_ i. 
i:‘, i 5 
I  J 
I i 
The first revolves about doin<‘ busLncss u; th t%c svcrnment, i --4 --- :f :, 
I 
which we found to be associated with: ‘1 
1. fixed pcrnonnel payroll expcnve;; 1 ‘. 
-., . -2 
i 
2. fixed ovexhcad; - - 
4 
3. low currcnf profit Tevels; but ,;j __I-- __- -. It 
4. Lncrekls in _s sbott-term (ttol?gh not Ior.g-term) profrtfi. ” 
-4 
Thus dc:ng business wfth the goverrcenr scms to bz looked upon .I ; 
66 requiring CnElm?b!c burden ard lov profits; but a note of optrmrsni i 
‘t ; 
was ;?KeCent a6 resards profit c.xpec~tations. ! 
i 
Turning explicitly tu profit, we found ia a second cluster of I ; 
t 
inter-related items that: 
1. current profit levels wcrc asGOCidteci uit!l short-term 
I 
expectatio,xs (hut i1OC long-term iorecasts, even Liiouxtl 
:he trend vs.3 the saae); 
2. expected short-run profits ver? assoc*ated with expected i 
.; 
. 
long-rim profits; j 3 
3. profit6 were associated wirh the nvailabilfty of 
co~~-cia I out Lets and spin-off prospects ; 
4. expected s!\ort-run pro.- =‘ts Vere Gssociated with antict- 
‘ psted sales; and 
5. current employment of staff cepahility uas associated f - . 
. - 
. with la:lp,-terf orofit e~pectatxons. 
We take th:s pattern to txmn chat firms tend to orient them- 
sC lves rnos t 1) in tho short-run and to forecast prOgKc66iVety frm 
. 
, 
/ 
, . ~. r,. ’ 2 --_,.-- -a- 
-. 7 -1 
,’ 
.j 
i I 
I 66 - 
.; 
the present to the short-tarn to t’le Jong- term. UC fi*rthnr infer -_ 
that sales tends -- to be a prime has:s for assessin; r.he or~~nization’s 
. 
prospects. (One mfght call to minr. our earlier :~scu6sion of correls- 
tions bctuec.r profit expectations and sales. > 
IF ve relax somewhat the strisqency ct our criteria for 
as60cfation, 30 
! 
five other meaningful item-clusters can be formed, 
I 
I 
which WP shall simDlv ioventorv ruicklv.. 
Cluster I, conrLs:Fcg of Items 3, 6 .‘nd ?, suggests an 
inverse determination of the fixity of overhead costs by 
the fntewity of compet?tFon. 
Cluster ST) consistinp of Items 1, 4, 15 and 16, implies \ 
a tendency to base -refit projections on capability utile- 
ration (and hence, by inference, on sales), 
Cluster I.=. r xnrfsting of Items 6, 7, 18 and 19, suggests i 
I 
an associattcjn bctcaecn competitiveneso vFthFn an industry 
and rate2 of technologico 1 change. i : 
Cluster iv, consisting of iters 10, 11, 14 and 15, rein- __I- 
for:es the fdea of a lfnkqe of NASA/DoD-contractor 
rc!atio& and rhe prOfitability of the latter. 
Cluster V, consistitlg of items 11, 18 and 19, tndicates a 
somewhat surprising inverse determination of NASA/Dad con- 
tractual involvement by patterns OE technological change. 
.- . 
‘, -\. 
., ’ ;. - 
_’ ‘: ,e.. . ’ 
Item* 
P (1) (3) I 
1 (A) 
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Table ii 
Item lntercotrclations and Whole-1 art Correlation* for C-Index 
. (“Current Status”) 
I-C_--p-...o---m .1--...-- .  .  -_... -.-- --, .  .  .  .  - ..-a ..-. - _- .-.. ---me.- N-d_ 
1 3 4 G 8 10 12 14 Tota 1 
~-r_C”^ II,--U.--LI-.--.- -..- ^.--^.-s...-_ - . . . ---._.----- .---.e---. -- 
..w -.04 .* -.32 -25 .31 .x -.21 .s 
-m .I6 -.?;r -.13 -.x3 -,23 -.09 .Oi 
.- -.15 .22 -21 .26 .1a .z 
mc .lG -.2b .16 .C7 -.09 
-- -.08 .44 -._4_8 ?9 -- l 2L 
s- .32 .31 .s 
c- .26 .E 
w- -26 
-.---L_I--- I_-.---.-*-- 
Note: *,talicized coefficiecte statistically significant at p=.G5 or leas. 
Columns headed 3,4,6,6, n=25; columns heeded 10.14, a-24; column 
headed 12, ~23; column headed Tot al, n=22. 
* See Table 9 for utatenent of i~ms. 
_., - 
_, 
. . 
_. 
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C 
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Table !2 
, c 
-, 
: I 
‘, 
‘. 
i 
I 
c 
Item Intercorrelstions and Whole-‘art Corralntions For E-Index 
(“Future Expec tntlona”) 
-- .lO -.14 .:7 -.i9 -.25 .oa .g -.lO 
I ww -.O7 .31 .06 .O2 .g .I6 .2? 
-w .iO .g .G7 -.lG -.47 .02 
I 
- 
-.. l !3 -.Cl -.05 -24 
*- .04 -.s .22 
se -06 .s 
-- .O?. 
-- -_- .- ----_I_- 
Note: Italicized caefficients s+.atistic;+lly significant st p-.05 ar less. 
Columns headed 7, 11,13, ~25; col?lmn headed 9, ~24; columrn headed 
15,16,17, a-23; ccrlunn headed 19, n-21; column headed Total, n-19. 
* See Table 9 for statement of itm. 
-- 
-. 
-- 
-- 
- f 
IT 
’ i 
._ 
-;. .‘,I . -_ 
Table 13 
Item Inrercorreletioas and Whole-l art’ &zrclntions For H-Index 
(“Market Prot.pects’ ) .’ . 
-I-s- f ---..-v----s. - ------...C-U.-...-.- e--e..- - I... . .-..*-.-. .., -..- -,--,- --...- - 
I terfp 2 7 9 17 rota 1 
--Ln _u_--IIcv s*.e--L..._C-.r. ---.C.--.l.--.----.--_I- 
(21 mm . 19 .23 -.lF l x 
(7*) -w -.I0 -.41 -- .E i 
(9) “a. .I6 . . l E 
I!?! 
_.)- -.-. 
-- 
“--~-.....-v- 
Note: Italiciscld coefficients ststtstically significant at pp.05 
c-r less. Colums headed 7,9, Total, n=?S; column hirrded 17, 
n-21. 
* See Table 9 for statement of item 
* Keying of this item reveraad lrm E-Index. 
__. hbLe 14 ’ , . . 
Item Intercvxeletions and Vhole-Part CorrelaUow For H-Index 
(“Financ:iai Health’ ) --A C-.- ---..va--r”-w- -A -I_ 
14 15 16 Tota 1 
-I_--.--.------ -I--c- _--___,_ .~___ 
SW .s .OE .32 
Nate: Iraiicizcd coefficients statfodcally ejgnificant at ~1.05 
or i.?sa (n-23) 
* See Table 9 for item statemat 
. . _ 
,_‘- , : m,,..- 
\. . _ :+,, v-p, -:- -. . - L 
Table 15 1 
Item Intercorrelations and Whole-Tart Correlations For D-Index 
(“Government Dependency”) 
-- .03 l I2 
me .5lz 
.-- - + 
5 
Note: Italicized coefficients significant at g=.O5 OT less. 
Coiumn headed 9, n=25; columrsheaded 11, Total, n=?4. 
* See Table 9 for item statement 
* Item reverse keyed 
? _ . 
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In addition to the preceeding analyses of individual items, 
.-- 
three 2 priori global indexes were defined (see Tables 11, 12 and 
15). The first of these pooled eight items (1, 3, 4. 6, 8, 10, 12, 
14) and was labelled a “current status” (C-j index. The second was 
a nine-item (2, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19) aggregation called a 
“future expectations” (5) index. The third was a three-item 
(8, 9, 11) “government dependence” (D-1 index. 
.‘q -,‘,r, t:cllc. cf o’-‘- 9th.r :: ~-4-r-i !--‘-yer, t+“? rhy”‘: yy,-:-’ 
to be of uncertain scalar purity. Regarding the C-index, item 
intercorrelaticns and whole-part co,rreiations indicated that items 
3, 6, and 14 contributed little (although they didn’t seen, to vork 
against the other items too seriol1sly). Omitting Item 3 and changing 
the keying for Item 6 had only a negligible effect on either the 
item intercorrelatioua or the whole-part correlations. Therefore, 
the index was allowed to stand 9s originally designed. Warts and 
al: we deemed it adequate to our present purposes. Hudeve- ., one will 
wish to keep in mind that as assessments cf “current status ,‘I over- 
head, competition and profitability do not fit well with the others 
(and availability of conmercial outlets fits only somewhat). It ie 
apparent then that tais index is multi-dimensional, possibly reflecting 
on the one hand “financial status” and on the other “sales.” 
In t!le case of the E-index, a aubstantial number of significant 
Item intercorrelntions was observed and only item 17 exhfbited 
even a moderately strong whole-part corre;atim. Omitting Items 
68 
11 and 19 from rbe index and changing the keying of Item 7 improved 
this situation somewhat, 
By excluding Items 13, 15 and 16 a satisfactory “market Frospects” 
(M-) index could be generated. Scores on thin index also art? listed 
in Table 7 and tbe intercorrelations in Table 13. A m2xrmum score 
on the M-index would be 24; scores betveen 12 and 16 define the 
“uncertain” range. The overall mean or‘ 14.84 (@=2.43), therefore, 
indicates a pntterrr of uncertainty among our respondents as to 
their market prospP:ts. 
We then combined Items 13, 15 and 16 into another “general 
financial health” (H-) in&x with the properties described by the 
intercorrelations in Table 14. A score of 18 was maximal for 
this index, the uncertainty range being between 9 and 12. The group 
mean of 12.16 @=3.CO) suggests a very slight tendency toward 
‘~timism on the part of our sample of respondents, but uncertainty 
would still not be far from the mark ec’ a characterization. 
The D-index was relatively clear. All three itc3s gave rvi- 
dence of contribution to a total score. Nevertheless, however, 
one must remain mindful that results Erom these scales are to be 
treated as suggestive, not as decisive. 
With those prefactory and cautionary notes we may observe, 
u!th reference to the data in Tdble 7, that for the C-index a 
score of 32 or atove would indicate a favorable appraisal of a 
firm’s current stntus. A score of 24 or below would be unfavorabie 
I - 
1  .  
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a l Id  s ta y rh i n o , b e tw c e .1  2 4  a n ti  3 2  w o u l d  b e  u n c e rta i n . In  th e  c a s e  
o f th e  o ri g i n a l  E - i n d e x , th e  c o m p a ra b l e  v a l u e s  a re  3 6  (a n d  a b o v e ) ’ 
a n d  2 7 . R e v i e w i n g  T a b l e  7  d i s c i o s e s  a  to ta ! o c  fi v e  fi rm s  (a m o n g  
th o s e  re s p o rk i n g ) d e s c ri b i n g  th e i r c u rre n t s ta tu s  a 6  “g o o d ” a n d  tw o  
d e s c ri b i n g  i t a s  “p o o r;” th e  re s t fa l l  i n  th e  “u n c e rta i n ” (o r 
p e rh a p s  “s o -s o ”)c a te g o ry . S ti l l  m o re  n o te w o rth y  i s  th e  fa c t th a t 
t--a  c ,  x 1 ? :,- -  ^  _  _  -1 -c  J p c .--i h A  * h e i r fl l tl tre  n ro s p e c ts  a s  ~ ‘~ o o c !” w h e re a s  
fo u r d e s c ri b e d  th e m  a s  “p o o r,” th e  re r & i ;l re r a g a i n  b e i n g  u n c rrtu i n . 
(T h e  C - a n d  E - i n d e x  a v e ra g e s  p o i n t-u p  th e  re s p o n d e n ts ’ g e n e ra l  
IJ n c e rta i n ty  a b o u t th e i r s ta tu s .) ? h u s , o f th e  fi rIn s  i n  o u r s a m p l e  \ 
L o - w h i c h  s c o re s  w e re  o b ta i n a b l e , n o  m o re  th a n  l j ? . d e s c ri ’b e o  th e i r 
p re s e n t b u fi ;l e s s  s i tu a ti o n  a ~  c l e a rl y  fa v o ra b !c . A n d  n o t e v e n  1 5 7 , 
s a w  c h tri r  fu tu re s  i n  u n a m b i g u o u s l y  fa v o ra b l e . C .c rm s . 
In :e re s -i n g l y , h o v e v e r, th e re  w a s  n o  s u b s ta n ti a l  c o rre l s ti o l b  
b e tw e e n  th e  s a y s  c o m p a n i e s  e v a l u a t-d  th e i r p re s e n t c o q d i ti c l n  a n 3  
th e i r fu tu re  c x F e c tz ti o n s  (C -i n d e s  x  E - i n d e x , t= .2 S).  M o re o v e r, 
s c a n n i n g  th e  M -i n d e x  s c o re s  s h o w s  th a t e i g h t fi rm s  j u d g e d  th e i r 
m a rk e t p ro s p e c ts  a s  “g o o ?  a n d  o n l y  tw o  a s  “p o o r” (th e  m a j o ri ty , 
1 3 , h o w e v e r, f e m s i n e : c n c e rta l n ) . In  th e  c a s e  o f th e  + i n d D x , o n  
th e  o th e r h a n d , 1 3  f< rm s  a p p ra i s e d  th e i r E In a n c i a l  h e a l th  a s  “g o o d ,” 
n o n e  d e s c ri b e d  i t a s  “p o o r,” b u t a  s u b s ta n ti a l  m i n o ri ty  o f 1 0  s ti l l  
v i e w e d  i t a s  “o n -th e -fe n c e .” 
T h u s  u n d e rs c o re d  i s  a  g e n e ra l  a tm o s p h e re  o f u n c e rta i n ty  a m o n g  
. I .  . ,- . , .- .  . _  _  
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. -__.  ---It 
, I , 7 9  . . 
I i’ .- 
: ! 
the  oc rveyed  corpan ies ,  & t wi th t?.c a d d e d  no te  that organ iza t ions  
p la in ly  di f ferent iate Ct-e i r  j udgemrn ts  of tbcIr prot ipects. That  is, 
-  
the  f i rm that says  its marke t  prosper :s  at i? poo r  or  uncer ta in,  n e e d  
no t  v iew its bas ic  f inancia l  hea l th  in  the smc & m m . This  fofnt 
Ls  exp ressed  in  the abseccc  of nny  coi re lat ion be tvcen  the H-  a n d  
H- i qdewes  (r=.  14) .  ( fde Fight  note,  coo,  that the E -  a n d  H- indexes  
corre lated,  r= .C& a n d  .15 retpectively, wi th the C- index) .  
T h e  lack of substaat lzt  cor re ia t ion bc tweec  the C-  n n d  5-i : ldexcs, 
therc ior  e, necc  not  l ~5  seen  to cont rRdLct  o u r  eer; ier  a lscrvat ions 
abc-ct  the  depenzence  tif &cu re  pro ject ions o n  p resen t  condi t ions.  
Fo r  o n e  th :ng  t5e  heterogcncfcy  of the  E -  Index  wog l d  tend  to a t tenuate  
any  correlatfo:.s. FOL -  znother ,  the  comb ina t ion  of cur rent  unccrtafnty 
a n d  : c?ndencLe8  to d ’ cc & , ierentFate eu~ lua t lons  JP  o tgnn izae lo7a l  status 
vou id  a lso  in t roduce varinbi l i ty Fnto  rclatisltis be tween  such  gross  
measu res  2 8  ou r  overn i l  idewes.  Ffnally, w! shal l  see  that t!lerc 
is r eason  to be l ieve  that firms, in  appra is ing  the i r  status, tend, 
as  it were,  to g ive  themse lves  tne benef i t  of the doubt ,  t ! lereby 
art% ficially r edw ing  in te r -o rgao% tstfonti? veribbi l i ty a n d  fur ther 
u ikemat i ry  estic@ tes of corre lat ion.  
Turn ing  to the D- index,  scoceb  of “? 2 ” a n d  over  indfcate 
F’L:c tong” govcrment -marke t  dependence ;  scores of “9 ” a n d  be lov  
ind icate “Iov” dependence ,  a n d  scores bckuaen  9  a n d  1 2  snn  bc  taken 
to  & n u te “mode ra te” deptadcnce.  T h e  uve rege  scores for r he  g roup  
o n  this index,  therefore,  indfcatc low- to -modera te  dependence .  
-  
I 
.- 
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Table 16 
. 1 
Dioplay of Firms !.bove, At or Below the Group Hedfan on Each Index 
e__.-1_-_1----- - 
Index 
Firm F P R I c E D H H I 
28 
IO 
30 
39 
26 
36 
15 
1: 
2’J 
31 
41 
7 
11 
18 
24 
29 
33 
34 
35 
40 
42 
43 
,r I . 7 
6 
32 
38 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
H 
M 
M 
H 
24 
H 
L 
L 
L 
H 
M 
L 
H 
L 
n 
L 
H 
x 
H 
H 
H 
L 
H 
H 
L 
L 
El 
H 
# 
H 
n 
n 
H 
L 
H 
H 
L 
L 
H 
M 
H 
M 
H 
Y .L 
H 
H 
L 
H 
t4 
H 
M 
H 
ii 
H 
H 
L 
l-l 
H 
L 
K 
L 
R 
L 
T u 
H 
n 
L 
H 
n 
L 
R 
x 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Ii 
L 
H 
-d 
L 
H 
H 
H 
L 
L 
H 
L 
H 
H 
1. 
L 
L 
H 
H 
L 
H 
L 
L 
H 
w 
M 
H 
fi 
H 
H 
H 
L 
L 
n 
H 
L 
M 
L 
H 
L 
H 
L 
L 
L 
H 
L 
L 
H 
R 
-x L 
M 
M 
H 
M 
L 
54 
L 
-c.. -.-.--- 
Note: L - below group median; M = group median; 9 = rbove grcruy median . . 
I 
Only three companies described their dependence as high; five 
deucrfbed it a6 mou’erdte and 16 as low. Ln vieu of the organfza- 
cions represented in our sample, it would seen tinat these fiaureo 
underseated tl.e reel dependence present. k’hat acems plain is that 
the obtained scores refer to company-wide conditions and not solely 
to those of the responding unit. And, too, some whLstling in the 
- .- dark IIGUJ- be -oLved, ’ 
The D-index also shows Little tcndecc- to correlate wit!> any of 
the other indexes derived frm. the status assessment ratinae. Its 
correlation with the C, E and H-indexes was .24, -22 an3 -.07 
respectively. It did exhibit a weak posLtive relation with the N- 
index, suggesting some tendency for firms with hfgh goverwcnt 
dependency to look Co (hope for?! impr0vir.g ~rkct prospects. 
After these segmental analyses jr vlll bc useful to look at the 
data in Table 7 as o whole. To facilitate that, Tuble 16 was pre- 
pared by classifying each coqany for which c’ata were available as 
to whether it fell at, ubove or belw the group median on a given 
index and then entericlg the corresy-Inding cede letters, M, H, or L, 
itl the appropriate table cell. Scanning the re6Ultfng display 
prompts again the observation with regard to the “motivational” 
indexea , F, P and R, that theme tend to go up and dovn together. 
Firms ten6 to be high on all or lclv on all. In ather words, the trend ’ 
seems to be for goals to bcccme eneagcd zcnerally (the czwrelotions 
among these three scales, it will be recalled, actually ovctbgcd .38). ,, 
., 
;-‘ < 
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Lndex 
-. 
P 
? 
R 
I 
C 
E 
D 
H 
A 
Table 17 
Lntercorrcletioz3 of S.aCt:.ts 
-- -4 , .--__I_ 
F P R 3 C E D H H 
-- .s -29 0.13 -.e -.13 -.z -.s -.04 
..m .3J -AS -.Ob -.25 -.!I5 -.g .03 
mm -.24 -.lS -.lS -.14 -.26 -404 
-- .2b .19 -.24 .07 -.22 
-- -28 -24 .ori I< 
-e .22 -- -- 
-- .E -.09 
em .16 
-- 
.MI_.__ 4II__ --_-_- .-- ----e-m.. -- -- 
Note: Itslicitcd coefficients significnnt at p-.5S or less. Columns 
herded ?, R, M, H, n=25; co!uan headed D, na24; CO~U~IX headed 
C, E, n-22; coiumn headed I, ~211. 
I re- .  ---  --  --  - .-  /-  - . .  _ w . e  --:  .  -~  .  .  .  _ . ,  . ,  
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,Morcover ,  those with h i gh  m o tivat ion scores tend  to b e  f irms 
with un favorab le  status assesGm!nts .  Thocc  with ?osr  scorcs3’ tend  
-, 
to see  themse lves  in  at least modera te l y  favorab le  condi t ion;  but, 
F f they d o  look  u p o n  their  c i rcumstances as  poor ,  they tend  a  Iqo 
to descr ibe  themse lves  as  low in  investment  ( r ray W C  infer, as  hnvfnp,  
little to lose).  E v e n  the appa ren t  except ions  to this ru le  (e.g., 
c ompany  41 )  wil l  b e  seen  to fall in  the uppe r  r ange  of the  “low” 
g o 8 1  o r  m o tivat ion g roup .  
T h e  intercorre lat ions a m o n g  a l1  the indexes  de r i ved  he re  a re  
s hown  in  Tab le  17.  Express ive  of the  tendency  toward  a n  inverse 
re lat fon be tween  “m o tivntfon” a n d  “etatus” is the ave rage  of the  
corre la t ioes of each  of the  F, P  a n d  R  indexes  vith each  of the  
C, E , D, M  a n d  I: indexes,  wh ich  is a  va lue  of r--.24. O n L tt i ng  
the H- i : rge.~ this inc reases  to -.29. Inspect ing Tab le  1 7  tt is 
ev ident  ;:lnt especia l ly  s t rong negat i ve  re lat ions preva i l  be tween  
cu:rrnt statw , d e g r e e  of gove roqen t  dependency  a n d  perce ived  r rat%ct  
prospects  o n  the o n e  a i de  a n d  conce rn  with ho t?  f inancia l  a n d  pe r -  
f o rmance  g O a l 5  o n  the other.  
T &  Arousa l  of  Orp,an iza t iona l  Goa l -Scek ta .  It is :enlpt ing to 
infer f rom al l  this a  fern of “act ivat ion” effect inet iaqted by  
organi ta t  i ona  1  threat. Opera t i onaL ly  this act ivat ion wou l d  then  b e  
msnlfcst in  a  $snera l l sed  mobi l iza t ion of system rcaources  a n d  a n  
ac ross- the-board  inteosi f icat lon of o rgan iza t iona l  goa l -seek ing .  fn 
ehort ,  st least 8t o rgan iza t iona l  levels, f i rms a p p e a r  to react  to 
their  c i rcumstances by  a  g e n e r a L  manage r i a l  “re’laxstfon” nr’“arovccsl ,” 
; _  ’ 1. 1. r  
-  
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depcndfng, of course, on whether t)lose cfrcumstauccs ore pprceivcd 
to be “gcod” or “bad” respectively. 
It need not follow from this t;;eeis that enzngtog one motive 
must necessarily result in the engagement of ail. k’c need posil only 
a considerable spiI;-over that would make cxtcedenply onllkelv the 
singular erqpge:~,ent of goa 1s. Our thesis, L: other words, rests on 
the prcraise that activation of a goal .mounts to the activation of 
a much larger nystem that includes among its aspects cthc r inter- 
dependent goals. Switching on such a system sets loose a continuing, 
dynsnic, cnly partially predictable process invoi\lny an interplay 
of interests, with new ones entering and old ones changing. To 
open the motivational gate is to loose the flood and it would bc 
foolhardy in the extreme to assume brfore :hc fact an ability to 
anticfpate the courses down which ft. vi11 run. In Its face, only 
a rapid retreat to high ground or else a progra- of adaptive manage- 
ment could be regarded sensible. 
Ye must emphauize, too, that our thedts should not occasion an 
infelencc that all organizstiots ~111 respond to arousal in the same 
ray. Like its outcomes, thp_ form of response will bz hard to fore- 
cast. It wtll depend on a plethora of factors: the otart;ng peil,L 
of the system, the size of the organization, it8 structure, nanngerial 
competence, market environments, and heoven knous ohot else. 
Furthcrmorc, in this hypothesis WC would stress the role of 
managerial perception and belief, orguing that while these may be 
P 
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:t Table ;a 
Hean Scores on Each Index of Pirr~~ Above end Eeicw 1969 Fortune Magazine 
Pigurer on Growth, Return on Xnveotment 
end Return on Seler 
PfWttUr.tZ 
fndcx T 
Grovth -- 
w 
T 
t I 
--.---a- 
Rcn 
xttm 
P 'I P R I C E I) H H 
--- 
15.14 10.42 7.00 3.117 29.03 30.83 8,00 15.33 13.17 
14.69 10.89 6.78 9.75 28.86 30.43 8.56 15.14 12.86 
17.20 11.83 8.00 9.hO 29.60 29.80 t&c 15.00 12.20 
-- 
Ros c _a i. H L l6.80 13.11 11.00 6 6.80 7 44 9.38 20 2?.50 30 0 29.M 30 60 9.33 7 20-- 14.85 5 40 i2.14 13.20 
* H - above lxdian; L P belac medi.cn 
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col lst ta ined by  teaiity, they n e e d  not  co r respond  c losely to it. 
S o m e  m a n a g e m e n ts m ;ly characterist :cal ly ho ld  por ten tous  v iews of 
their  cond i t ion  a n d  chronica l ly  ‘L u n  scared;” others,  l lke the 
p&rrb ia l ,  donkey ,  n lay  n e e d  s o m e  he lp  to base  their  e tecn l inn  got. 
O ther  S tatus Indicators. --  Final ly, in  o rde r  to exp lo re  these m a tters 
fur ther a n d  a lso  to gather  da ta  usefu l  to the va l idat ion of ou r  
iadexcs,  w e  classi f ied each  of the  f irms in  ou r  samp le  l isted n m o n g  
the “Po r tune  S O W  as  to whe the r  it was  rbove  o r  be lw  the industry 
med l uns  o n  “re turn  o n  sa le~~ ,” “re iu rn  o n  investwent,” a n d  For tune’s -- 
“g rowth  !:a te index.” 3 %  W e  t hen  compu ted  the w e a n  scows  for each  
g r oup  of f i rms o n  each  of ou r  de r i ved  indexes  ui th the rasu l  ts 
d isp layed  :n Tab le  18.  First of al l  It wil l  b e  not iced that ,a l though 
the ddf fe renses a re  not  great ,  there  is a  consistent  tendency  for 
f i rms fal l ing above  o r  be l ow  the m e d i a n  o n  Crcwth (de f ined  in  terms 
of ea ra ings -pe r -sha re  of c o h m o n  stwk! a n d  R O I to exhibi t  un i fo rm 
di f ferances in  their  m e e c  sco res  o n  ou r  indexes,  This  t rend is not  
so  c lear  w h e n  fitms  a re  d iv ided  at the  Industry m e d i a n  re turn  o n  
sales. 
I .’ ‘.. 
C, Now,  for o n e  thfng, thic speaks  to the val ldl ty of ou r  de r i ved  
a  p r i o&  indexes.  Unre f ined  as  they m a y  b e  as  scales, they a re  
ev ident ly  capab le  of di f ferent iat ing a m o n g  compan ies  -- o n  the ave rage  
at least -- a l ong  otgsnizat ional ly  mean ing fu l  d imens ions .  In the 
second  p lace,  it wfll b e  seen  that f i rms h i gh  o n  R O I a n d  o n  Grow th  
?  1: 
* ; 
/ , . .-_ . 
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(which ie related to X01) consisrertly score lower on the F, P 
L and R-indexes (the “motivation” pointers). Averaging across the 
three indexes, the mean scores for companies above? and below the 
grmth median were lo,85 and 11.90 respectively -- a difference of 
more than a full index point; those above and belou the ROI median 
overage< 10.85 and 12.33 respectively -- an even greater spread. 
Return on sa 1 es, hawever , p reduced an opposite pattern on two 
nf c’or yhrep i”*j”y-‘- TFo 4-!TT?- -Ifff?fy-,, yes fye +k- !y-.-” -_.- 
direc. LXI as before, but firms with high return on sales scored 
bigner on the P and P indexes and, averaging across all three in- 
d e:tes , the companies above the median return on sales had mean 
scorea of 11.73 nnd those irlow it a mean of 11.18. 
lt may he inferred from these findings that return on sales and 
return on investment have somewhat different associations with organi- 
zationtl motivation. Unfortunately the size of our sample would not 
support the kinds of controlled cress-classifications that would 
be necessary to searching analysis of the matter, so we are unable to 
say much more shout it. lie uauld sate, however, that since the 
questionnaire was a corporate responst; it is possible that it reflects 
something of a financial bias, making such factors smrvhat more 
sensitive irdicstors. 33 
Be that as it may, looking further at Table 18, another 
instance of the “vhistling in the dark syndrome” can be seen: 
firms beler the median on growth, ROI and return on sales, regularly 
._- -. -. I -. ._ 
0 i I  .  .  ,  
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describe theLr "current status“ as better than do those above those 
medians -- and substantially so in the case of sales. Xore generally, 
however, the validity of the “status” indexes is supported by the ! 
: 
fact that on the E, M and H-indexes, firms above the medians descri!c I I 
themselves more favorably (especially on the R-index). 
Further, it will be noticed that, in general, groups of firms 
that, on the average, score lower on the motivation indexes, score i 
; 
nigner on rhe status indexes, thus contlrming the inverse relations 
described earlier from the index inter-correlations. 
Also of interest, as a concluding observation, is the fact that, 
on the average, those firms classed below the medians on return on ! 
sales, return on investment , and growth (particularly the first and i 
last of these) all have high government dependency indexes. 
f 
Summary and Conclusions 
What finally can we say in surrmary of the many, often complex L 
i 
things we have seen during this wide-ranging empirkal excursion 1 ! 
through portions of the Federal procurement and related industrial I 
wor Ids. At the risk of some oversimplification and keeping in mind i 1 
that each statement is, for the present, more hypothesis than fact, 
we may hetard a number of generalizations. To wit: 
Xany of the firms surveyed segregated their connercial from 
their government business. h’hether they&d so or not, hwever, 
had to do with their size and the extent of their involvement in 
: 
R&II work. This finding illustrates a much more generel tendency 
77 
for the things that organizations do and the ways they do th&n to 
vary as A function of both size end technology. 
The bame phenomeac.3 -- separation of government from commercial 
operations -- also illustrated a tendency for firms heavily involved 
in government contracting to differ in important W8yS from others 
less heavily engaged. By the sdr?e token, those companies serving 
mainly as prime contractors commonly Contrast with their bubcontrac- 
ting counterparts (elthough this seems to depend heavily on the 
dollar-values of the contracts involved). 
Most of the firms we Surveyed were disposed tower-d reducing 
their dependence an the gcvernmcnt (i.e., DoD/NASA) market, usually 
by the mechanism of increaSing the proportions of their commercial 
sales. There was, however, no great optimism about prospects for 
achieving such a re-distrfbution of sales, and especially not 
among those corporations already heavily comnritted to the government 
rn8rket. In any c85e, one Would have to infer some current lack of 
- 
inherent attractiveness ebout the government merket. It is-widely 
perceivsd to be burdensoma, uncertain and unprofitable, as well, 
apparently, as necessitating a strong dose of organizational 
specialfzation as a condition of entry. . 
, 
In this connection, interestingly, we found c'hat the firms 
studied, although they regarded thomselverr a8 havLng the advantage 
of lawer than average capital investments, neverthelees perceived 
I 
- ‘,) 
their aggregate investment to be greater than average because of 
very heavy investments in technical personnel. Indead, one of them 
sternly criticized conventional accounting definitions of investment 
for their failure to take such factcrs into accp*nt. 
As a group, despite some Pollyanna-Like manifestations, the 
companies in our sample evaluated tt efr statuses as “questionaSle,” 
as well they might have in view of thr events of the past year. Still, 
thev were able to differentiate various faceta of their cnnd(ticnc 
with the result that outlooks were not uniformly “sour,” even if they 
typically were guarded. 
We have said that firms tended to see government contracting 
as “unprofitable,” at least in the most direct sense of that term. 
Yet we were unable to discover any clearly defined universal 
standards of high, 1~ or even “acceptable” profit, Ue did find, 
however, that large firms and firms heavily involved in government 
contracting were likely to think “smaller” in the matter of profit, 
and we offered some reasons for that. Furthermore, WC learned that, 
by and Large, profit tended to be thought of mainly as a means of 
achieving organizational growth and only secondariiy (albeit a 
close second) as a reward for shareholders. 
’ 
‘_ . 
From a review of the conditions companies sought (cr did not 
seek) to satisfy when contracting, we inferred that on the whale they 
could be characterized as risk-averse, intent on preserving their 
bargaining position relative to the government, and strongly oriented 
. _, _;. , . ‘> . 1’ -, 
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touard quality performemu and the pr@servotLon of working rclrtions 
wit;? the customer; the;* were not so po:nted!y conccrncd with costs _. 
‘. 
nor vi th rra,ximizing prof itr. 
Using similrt date we were led to the further fudgenent that, 
very broadly speaking, organizationaL motivation tends to be 
$encralized rather than highly specific and to be aroused by adverse 
managerial perceptions of organizational prospects. At the same time, 
;c. cun t CC? auia tnat neorl!y ai L tnc firms surveyed emned rather 
high scorts on our “motivation” indicators. 
Revieuing varLour aopcxts of the subccntmcting practices OE 
the companies in our sampLu, we found, among other things, a clear 
trend tuward limltfng com@zltion. The reason8 gigan for such 
policies gave rise to sunpositions that the same cond1tio.r were Likely 
to yrevaf: in awarding prfac con:racts and that, at least where B&D 
. _ 
ie involved, thurc are definite constraints upon the feasibility of 
ccmpctitlve procurement, fn its turn, thfs conclusion prot..pts the 
idea that real need exists for devising effective alternatives to 
competition in I’tdcr81 procurements. 
. Finally, despite repeated and varic: attempts, we vcre unablt 
to develop persuasive evidence thnt variations in contract fcrms 
materially affected modes of contract or project msnogemcnt or tt-t 
a Llocotion of organicatioaal zcsour:::, Nor could we find much 
ttnphaaia on targeting inccnrLve8 rf other than uunspttiaI levels, 
and then with but little indication of mtanfngfuf subsequent ._ 
. . . __ 
I 
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, f I 
t ’ 
contract-based managerial performance evaluation a& reward. 
Conrcqucntiy we were moved to voice reservations about the impac+. 
and usefulness of incentive arrangemente, except, pnrhaps, for 
advfoory puTposes. 
It PI our anticipation, of course, that we shall have more 
to say on thcoe snd other subjects in future reports and papers. , 
1 
{’ : . . 
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Appendix 
STATE UHIWBSITY CF NIEW YCRK AT FU?i%lLC 
Contracting and Motivation Study 
Questionnaire Policy 
This qxstionnaLre is conconled with your flrmfs experiences, policies md 
procedure-es regarding federal gcvcrnmnt contracting. It COnSiStS of five 
parts, the last of which, mConrinents,l' invites pertinent observations addi- 
tionail to those previously made. It also pravides en onportunity for clari- 
ficntlon or amplificaticn of earlier answers. ,f 
Pull or partial b.swers to certain quustions rnw be canttied in existkg 
brochures, reports or other dcs-uiento. If 80 please attxh then hereto and 
indlcxte appropriate references at suitable points in the questionnaire. f 
If not already matters of public record, all information contained ir t3 : . 
qrestion.nairs, or othen&se furnished by the subject organization or itrr _ 
employt'es. is ccnfi&ntial both as to organization and inditidual. No ;:'.;.:- ‘ 
lit sttrtbutlon will be made w!thout express written porrrCssion. i . + I 
In 'the arca it surveys, this queetionnaire is intended to cmstitato a 
statement of organizational positian , a3 distinct from personal viewpoint. 
Thersfora, care should be exercised to assure that it fully and accwately 
refiects the view3 =d policies of your organization. (For present purposes, 
"Mvisicn" is defined &as a semi-independent operating unit and policy center 
tit.hin ~b single compsny wd "Subsidiary" ia defined as A compn;c having ever 
half its stock owned or controlled by xiother company.) ' 
Company (Include DivAsion u&or Parent Company, if relevant -1 completicn of 
this question is optional) -- 
If previous queetian 2.3 tm.mar;ered; 
Is your organization a division or a cubsidiary of a larger fh? (Check one> 
Mvluion Subsidimy Neither 
Anauera herein represent policy of (check which applLea)t 
Company aa a ahole only Mviaion Subaldi,ary I. 
Is any asJor inturml corporati reorgcniaatior. in procats or pexiing? If 
80, pleme dcectibe brist’ly its go..srsl nature .znd rutionale, 
Is mtrga- tith mothar canpany in piocesa or perding? If 80, ploese describa 
briefly its circumtances. a- 
T%tle aS official suporri8L?g completion af this questiomaimt 
- -. _. _ w-1. -- 
'Thmk you for your coopertztion. 
- 
t: ) 
A, Oil3hNIZATIO~~ S',RVEY 
-. 
:- 
1. In the ptst year what was the averofp numb, - of employees (ell types md 
levels) IL your orp;anization? (Check onaj 
’ 25,0x or more 
-- 12,oco - 21,797 
-- '?,Ooo - 11,999 
- 2,coo - 6,399 
la. If your orqanixation iJ 8 ciivis~cn of a larger firm, approxinately 
what uas tl-8 averxe tot&l Cumwr of employe?s (all types ~nci louels) 
in ycur parent firn? (Place an X in the space above that ap?liesj. 
$35 - ?h tilion 
- $20 - 3& tillion 
-‘$l, 9 million 
- less than $1 rri!Jf.cn 
29. If your orger,laatLw Is a division of a lxge~ firm, approximately ulrat 
were ths totAl s9le3 of yozqzizit firm? (Flace an x in tiR-3 t3FECS 
above that applies). 
3, hrhg the met recent full year, and 
organization's l uctsl f&3 nxpenditures? 
L!;l.;dir sif sourcea, what were your 
ccc o+l 
over $75 tillion 
- $15 - 75 million 
-$1-15dlUo3 s- 
$lSsOOO - 1 million 
- less thin? wxJ,!33? 
L. Dwing the met recent fullyem, #hat v&s the q-proximate m5.x of govem&nt 
c 
I 
-- -a- ‘, .- - - ’ ; .-I-. 
., 1- , ,. . . I . - .r -_ , 
. - 
. / .  ..- :- _--- 7 I  -.. ---- ---I-- 
5. Vhrre is your otgmlizz&io~r located (principal operations)? , 
Northeast Eidwcst 
- Soatheazt - Soutkdes t 
6. About how mar~v uersons hold stock in your 
(Check one) 
0 - loo icy) - ia3.l 
Pacific 
* - Coast 
(p,*ent) organizat5on? 
over icoO 
7. ~%ich of the foiiowinng describe your organization:; businea3? (Check all 
thaii app3j' -- i.f zore tbar! me, encircle tl.at one which n~rmily accounts 
for the gfxtcst volb,~kt cf s&Isa7 
-- 
-- 
- Textiiw prodncte (intluding Eppsel! 
-* Lmbcr ad wood products 
- Paper wd allied DrOdcCtS 
-- Cho~=J.ccnls md allied products 
- Petroleum and refinix? rend related industries 
Mactio~*y (except &.&tsic;i?. but including computing mect&mn 
- K3chFnery (el0ctrico.l) 
? 
- Mot&r Vri-i!icifS Wd squipmant 
- Aircraft and p&s 
--Ships 
 
- h-ofs?as~c.mti&, scientific; ami co:rtrolling lnstrutvants, photographic -- 
cind OFtiCCii go&s, watches a’%$ clocks 
Cthcr (dsscribe)t , _ CL*- ..-- 
i 
,  I  
i-j 
_ . . . . 
;.j  
B . G E N E W L  C G ? J T E U M T IN C  S U R V E Y  I_ _ ---- 
1 . S i n c e  1 9 5 0  ro u g h l y  h o w  m a n y  c o n tra c t3  h a s  y o u r o rg a n i z a ti o n  p e rfo rm e d , 
c f:h e r a s  p ri m e  o r a u b c o o trs c to r, fo r a g e n c i e s  o f th e  fe d e ra l  g o v e rn w e n t 
a n d  w i th i n  w h a t ra n g e  h a s  th e  d o i l a r v a l u e  o f m o a t o f th e s e  c o n tra c ts  
fa  1  l c n ?  
-, 
p r i m e  a n d  s u b c o n tra c ts  
ra n g i n g  i n  v a l u e  fro m  $  to  $  
2 . In  w h a t y e a r w a s  th e  fi rs t s u c h  c o n tra c t rtc c i -re d ?  (If p r i o r to  1 9 5 0 , 
r i m p l .v  0 0  s ta te .) r-  ----= ^ .“T  -- ., <  _  , _ - 
3 . T & M  th e  b u l k  o f y c w r q e e n i r.m tl o n ’s  e x p e ri e n c e  w i th  fe d e ra l  g o v e rn m e n t 
c o n tra c ti n g  b e e n : - ’ 
P r i o r  to  1 9 6 2  
-  S i n c e  1 9 6 2  
-- U i th o u c  re a l  d l fi a re n c c  a a  c o  ti m e  
4  
4  ‘. W i th  u k n t fe d e te i  p ro c u re m e n t e g c e c i e s  (e .g ., & S h -G o d d a rd , S A S A - H O U ~ ~ ~ , 
A F S C , S A N Y O , N a v y -O S C , A r m y  .X .i o o i l e  C w ~ z d , A E C , e tc .) ‘h a s  y o u r o rg a n i z a - 
ti o n  m o a t o fte n  c o n tra c te d ?  ( S l a t i n  o rd e r, th e  2  3 3  3  m o s t fre q u e n t 
a l o n g  w i th  th e  k i n d s  o f w o rk  m o u e t c r l n a o a l y  c a v e re d .) 
A g e n c y  W o rk  C o v e re d  
: 
. i  
-:----- ---_  -._  
3 . D o e o r y o %  (p ? T fi n t) c o m p a n y  s e p a ra te  o rg a n i rx ti o n a l l y  o r rd n i n C v ttc ti v e l y  
g o -;o rw ta n t t! I ._  o m z ta rc frl  w o rk ?  If s o , g h a b t d e s c ri b e  h a u . - 
---  -  _ ..-a  
*  -------F _ Ie z !E -  .- -_ --- --  
6 . F o r  y o u r c o m p a n y  x  r w b o l a  v o u l d  y o u  ra y  th e re  i r  p rc :a n tty : 
a  tre n d  to w a rd  m o re  tn p h rL r  o n  g o v a rn m e n r C o W X s c ti n g ?  
‘- a  tre n d  to w s < . l e s s  z m p b % ~ O  o n  g o v a rrv a c n t C Q I~ ! ra c ti r r g ?  
a  g m c ra l l y  c o c s ta n r  p a tte rn  o f g o v e rn m e n t c o m ra z tl n g ?  
.-,,.--__. _ __--~ _.. _ _e.e, ,-- . 
.’ 
i 
; 
i 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
:1. 
12. 
For your cotcpany ~18 a whole, approxtitoly what percentage mix of govern- --- 
amtt and commercial bueincss ia regardad as vptinnl? 
from  about Z  to about X government 
Approximately what percent of R&D work perforncd under governmunt contract 
$.n your organization has reoulted, directly or indirectly, ire Pollw-on 
production work, either fn your organization or cloewnere in the fixi? 
about x 
Xatas the bizlk of your organttatlon’o governinent-sponoorcd work been par- 
formed as: 
prime contractor? _ 
sub-contractor? 
sLe,,- m tr’a’ 1.. -.-4-L . -- y(*r and sqh-aontractor? 
By offics or position, who in your cctaaparq aonmxlly cxercLdso final line 
decision rqacdhtg types, te3n??0 and other contract features? 
What is the ~dtil coqoaLtFoa cf your organizstivn’a contract negotiation 
team? Ey pooition title, plsnss identify the ncrmrl pxfncipal negotfntot, 
deacribr? the function of each tean mer?lber and indicate what variaticna in 
cmporition or function might bo aaeczknttd vith veriatfon in the contract’s 
mire or nature. 
Ueun! chief negotiatxn?: 
Usual team mmbem (pooi;lon title) 
,# 
-I 
Qunc t lona 
Varirtionr by coetracc 8;~s or nature (deocrfbe): 
- 
When lattiog aubcoatrbcts, dots your ffna tted to rely OR a relatively 
asrsblishrd group of eubcvntrectors with vha* you’ve had long-term rela- 
tionrhipr f~volvfng the Wnd of work taqulrcdf X 80, phssc dcncribe 
briefly the rationale for thlr policy. If not, ploorc deectibo briefly 
l n$ parley that Is follarcd alon vith ito titimair. 
_.-. 
. . ..-- -. 
. > 
‘. . 
. ^ . . : -. - . ~_ . . ,- -.I,. ---.. -,- , , _ . _ . .,_ - , ; 
I 
nefthet a2reot irl 
not even desirable 
13. l?hc~~ contracting, and cspecfally for I&D-type work, heu lntpoftant does 
your mano~cment bellcvo it to ba that &I epeciffc contract: 
Protect the contractor against tLsk (check one) 
eeaenticll desirable but not 
really etaaantfal 
Offat operetloral flcxibFlity (check ona) 
esaaattol dasLr=t not jj neither e@Gent Lo1 
rrally csscntial nor even derirabla 
POPker progmz discipline (scope, methods, procedures) (cheek one) 
-- 
tsstncLu I dcs hrnt aot aeftContla.1 
sealiy e&sential nor even destrablc 
Reduce tJavcrment tecirnfcal direction QY ourveitlance (check one) 
cbsonLhl dasfr=k not 
rcrlly eoscntinl 
Safcgmard proprietary fntoroeta (check one) 
-- 
rmfther esstntfcrl 
nor even derireble 
-- 
6#86nti81 dealruble but not 
really essential 
rester quality parfomanta (check one) 
neither essential 
not even dcsfmble 
eosantial dstirabls but not nef thtr essen’.Lal 
:,-. rsrlly csssneti1 nor aven dctxablc 
Engander high dagreu of raotivrtior. to control costs (check one) 
-._I- --. 
auecntial desirable but not naiLhat corential 
really eesent i.n t nor even desirable 
StLwlate high levall of coatractor/Sovarnaieat comunication (check one) 
-. 
srrentL6 1 dasirablr But not 
rully oSe4tntiAl 
Yield e high pref?t Ieva (back me) 
neither caoenrfal 
nor evan OesIrabls 
1 r ,-.. Ij . _ ._- - 
* 
14. In your organization, arc them procedural differences in the adminis- 
tration of incentive contracts rehtivc to other types? Plea66 outline, 
them briefly. 
_- _ _. ._,____ 
15. For R&D, in general are paople throughout tho firm  mare of the pa”-icJlar 
types of contracts (i..e.. Incentive, fixed price, etc.> they arc uarkLng 
under? What is the latest level of the organi%etLon to which awareness 
extends and how is it brought obout’r 
Lcm33t level of awarene60: . 
Are there Giifere&s 1; the case of production contracts7 If 80, please 
describe: c 
-- 
--- I 
16. Kith apectai reference to contracts having incentive fcaturcs, to what 
extent and in what ways are fumtional departments in the organization 
!e.e- , engineering, accounting, etc.} informed, directly or indirectly, 
about the structuring a5 fndlviduat contracts vith which they arc 
involved? (For cxeaple, hte production workers told how IZUC~ a reduc- 
ticn in cost will incrcaso profits?) 
, --- 
- 
-. - 
-- 
17. Do incentivt! rtructures affect resource allocation, staff and m ttrj.a; 
priorities mad trensfcrs or the like? If so, hw? 
18, Ma your organization received 0;: let subcontract6 that contain Fnctn- 
tivae for COSt %bVill8, ~crfanamxt, orZIp de:iv6-? If SO, p1U666 
daacrfba why they vcr6 wad, 684 how often t!lny at6 u66d. 
Hav often wed: _ ___. -- 
R66R6IlD for WC: 
a-- 
1 ,- .,-, .,..” ‘..” - (.% . I- , . . I . 
‘_ 
19. If you have let or reccivtd rubcontractr wfth Inctntiveg, what kinds of 
conrttalnte wore placed m  you or yout tubcontractor (a,~., coat account- 
ing procedurea, inapectfo:! cfr subcoatractor’e preai8eo, ectedulfng, ccc.)? 
19e. Hw arc the type and degree of zonatrofctr dttttafotd? 
_, 
m - - -- 
19b. Hw might Lhe conecrainu descriLed above differ from oubcoatraets 
with n f:rP fixed price? 
-- -L----- 
20. km there any special polictw quidiag the Linda (L.c., KG+, CPhF, etc.) 
of govarnmeot contracta your srgsafzstioo vi11 seek or accept, or 
setting mndLr:icn# rtlntivw to bid8 or prr&&x!s fur govet;:sxxx work? 
If so, pleum describe thm. 
-- - -1. 
I-- 
--- --I_ 
208. If your orgenitotbon is a subsfdflary, what pottlon of the gufdai:nts 
dercrfbed above ore astabliohed by the perent? - check if not 
l pplfcmbla. .m- 
- 
2%. If your organrtetioo hslc suhridlsrfes, vhat types of guidelfncs do 
you (the parent) aatablirh for the aubblidLor:ca1 As :isy the 8.m~ 
for crll rubcidiarFer? - check if not appllcablc. 
--u-v I 
-. 1 
x. -ce 
21. pou your orgaaiication employ nny forr of wage ioeaerlvz pian (i.e., any 
. sybttm for ptavldiq eer3 mxsecbr7 paper sues 0;’ other oon+idetaelcct cm- 
vsrtible to mmoy -* a.&., s:ock -- in direct rr!ation tt.i Lndfvidual, qroup 
or campmy pctforatate)? If so, pi<mse dQar,ribr ic briefly and ftiicqta 
prrrmntl lavsle co &x&h it La .zppiLud. 
. . 
----a- 
---w - 
--- 
-e-r -- 
-., :- 
. _. ‘- :. .I 
L , . I.- . d” ::‘t 
1 , ., .-I : : - $~ .T ., I L *. - .* I/<. ., : a _ *. .-i.,, 
., . ..-? ,..-.. < - 
c’ . r ,- 
, -. , . . 
C. INCOXI AND MBMDITI!RE SURmY 
In this section of the questionnaire, please an!Sier from the point of 'KLeU 
of the corporation or the corporate division, ss ap~progriate, and indicate 
this orientation in the space below. 
TIw following ansuerz describe and reflect policy ct 
. . j_ the corporate level 
,-the divisional level 
1. Approximately, what is the total acquisition value of machinery, buildings, 
tools, and test equipment (not h-12) currently used in ymr activities? 
2. wh8t percentage is used for R&D (Research and Development) projects? 
---c____L_--.-- - 
2a. what percentage 09 R%D is under government contract? 
3. What percentq.e oL' faci?Lties and eqtiprcsnt used for governlnent R&D i8 
government furnished? 
&. Which ktids of contracts tend to be associated with larger amounts of 
government furnished materials? (cheek the 
production contracts 
-- operations snalyses 
-- pilot production 
testing 
other: (describe) 
m- 
5. what percentaka of total revenues, in a typical year, represents fees for 
resesrch and development contracts with the federal government? 
6. What percantage of tota? revenues, in a typical yea", re?resnnt,s fees for 
research and development contracts with other corporations? 
- -,, ,77 
,, 
2 , 
II 
.’ 
- ..,’ 
1 
, . ->“. ; 
; 
(over) 
7. 
; 
9. 
IO. 
il. 
,. * ‘. i,d 
j a 
What percentage of reven'dos cr profits is Qpicaliy a-loco%d to llin-hnuse" 
research and development? 
percent reven58s 
percent profits 
- 
_ . 
With respect only to R&D contracts with the federal government, do lerger 
contracts differ from smaller contracts uith respect to g>vernntent 
furnished materials (including facilities, machinery xx! equipment) as a 
oercentage of totsl co:ltract costs? (check one} 
Larger contracts have relatively larger 
goverment ccntributiono 
Larger contracts have abouf t1.e sm8 relatl.v.? 
gOVerTlm8tkt COntributiOn8 
Larger contracts have relatively small government 
contributions 
Of capjt.4. equipment and facili.ties not furnished by government, what 
percentage, ti~plcally, must be Drocured new by the company/division? 
rf, - 
'fiat part of total contract costs do such new procurements normtllly 
represent? 
* -- -- 
What is the useful life of capital. equipment procured for RPrD w.rk in the 
conpany/c~vjsion? 
l2:'What is the age-distribution of capital equipment (Valued at acqu;siticJn 
cost) used by the compsny/divinion? What is the age-distribution of 
capital equipment used priasipally for I&D by the company/divisiopl? 
(Check one in each column! \1 
R&D Total ' I 1 
Less than 2 iears 
2 - & years 
4 - 6 yea-s 
6 - 8 years 
8 - 10 years 
over 10 year3 
-- 
-- 
. . , 
i :> 
1’ 6, ’ r- ..--. a . ,_,, .^ Ii 
i : I , 
_I., . . ,_L :..4 I .__,__ ?-I. _-- . ’ -,.I. ,‘ . . _ I. ., 
t ; 
12 -1 E 
f ; 3 
Cr 
\ 3 1 
_* 
3 
a 
b. Xow we'd like you to tell u8 whether you think tNngs should be 1 
different from the way youlve just described them. Please fill 1 
out the form once again, this time describing what ,wu believe 
differences botwttn governmental and non-govemental projects 
be. 8hWld 2 ,_,L,( .' .t 
SH03IJ.I BE sI?oLml BE - SHOUD BE -. 
LESS ABOUT EQuALLY 
, _? LIKELY LIWLY :.'a 
1 
Q 
MORE 
LIKELY -- 
To increase the 
lmg-run profita- 
bility of the firm? 
To increase end ex- 
tend the rqutation 
of the firm? 
vn h- srlhsaow?rlt lv 
used on many other 
projects? 
To increase the 
skills of employad 
techz:licizxj and 
workere? 
To result Jn more 
precise or higher 
qna'?ity prcducts? 
To be disnoued of 
bx resell.ing to 
another firm? 
To be leased rather 
thw purchased from 
the supplier7 
.I t 
-i . _. I. _. 
d . 2’ 
l,3. What is the disposition of capital eqtipment used in R&D wrk? 
(chsck most typic&l) 
. 4 I. ‘. I Returned to lender '. . . 
- SaWned wd purchased .= 
Retained on loan 
- Scrapped 
Sold to th.ird party 
- _* 
ll~. 'd-to (by function, office, or posit?on) in your organization make8 
decisions concerning capital budgeting? - 
-- 
-- m-e 
15. Pleaze complete the follcwing check lists: 
a4 When compared with non-governrental. pro)ects, are investments by 
your org~3izetfni 5-n capita1 equipmei:t for fulfilling government 
contra&z mwe Ukely, lers likely or about equally likely. (Check 
the appropriate box alongside each statement.) 
To Incre,azt the long-run 
profitability of the firm? 
M m E  ABOUT EQVALr;f 
LIKELY LIhELY LIKELY 
To increase and extend the 
reputation of the firm? 
To be subsequent'ly used on 
many other projects? 
To increase the Skill8 of 
8mployed technician5 & 
workers? 
,. Ta result in more precise 
or higher quality products7 
To be di.zposed of by reselling 
to another firm? ., I 
To be leased rather than 
purchased from  the supplier? 
' 16. For uhat uses does your company require profit,? Ple,?se rank each of 
the followiog functions in terms of their importance to Fur particular 
Use 1 to indicate "most important," 2 to indicat?'next most 
ff$i%$%," e&C. ' - _ 
meet aw'rent capital requirements 
c - enlarge capital base (growth) -.-- pay stockholders and attract, c@,tta 
--- me&surf3 overall perform=lcs effectivenoss 
--- finance int3nal R&D 
- other (descr*ibe): 
lba. Relative to firms in other industries having annual salts comparable 
with yours, would you SW your firm's level of capital investment is: 
PW -xx- p-y 
lower the sazna higher 
16b. Ralatlve to firms in other industries having annual sales comparable 
tith your%, would you say your firm:8 investment in technical/ 
errgimering persomel is: 
pa= -.7Ex- 
lower the same 
piGG%iy 
highr 
17. In ganoral, what would yau say a reasonabl c "going out" profit would be 
for your compm,y cm ~pll RirD contract? 
$ of sales 
I;c of invastmont -- 
18. Undsrvtanding that a number of factors might influence the acceptability 
of a given level of profit, uhat percentages ciofhe the ?&its of the 
range betvcen what you would regard ES rather a IOW fee for I&D work 
and a hig5 one? 
LCM: any-tung ‘oelow $ Of 8dW.I HIGH2 3nytbLng ahove % Of 8d.eS 
SAW: a?ythi.ngbelow -5 of investment HIGH: anythin,- above -$ of lnvestmnc 
D. CRGANIZATIOh' STATUS psTjESSME!JT 
For each of the folluning, ch&k the space that best describes your organizatfm. 
I cc 
1. physical p1ar.t capability currently ewloysd (relative to normal 
r 
I 
; operations) t 
"jC$ ar leas :--1--:--2--1--3--:--t----S--:--6--, near total 
2. Future expectations concerning availability to pur industry of government 
bu.sFnessz 
less work :--1--r--2--:-3--.:--L--:--5--:-~-: more work 
3. Fixed overhead costs: (relative to industry averages) 
relatively boii r~l--:--2-:--3--~--lj~:-.-S1-r--6--: relatively high 
j$. Staff capabSLity currently employed: < 
s',c;d.ficant :--1-t-~---~~3,--:--4n;--5--:~6--: near total 
~&r-w+; .eS" u.,r -t 4 en G.--s.. utilitiation 
St Payroll eqenses pertaining to technic& persorfiel: 
fixed :--1--:--2-:--3-::--4-::--~-:-#--: vciable 
6. Present level of wmpetition from other firms: 
.- 
very low :--ly-:--2--:r--3--:-Lj--:-~--:-A-: very high 
7. Expected future level of competition from other firms: 
decreasing ~4--:--2-:--3-:--h-:-~--:--6--r increasing 
'2. Comnicrcial outlets presently available: 
almost none ;--1--:-2-‘~:--3--r-&----~-:--6--: \reFy marry '.. . . 
9. Anticipated futurs availability of commercial outlets: 
decreasing :--I-z--2--::--3”-:--&--:--S--:-d--: increasing 
10. Current relatianship with agencies such as NASA or DoDt c 
fa;iP* poor t-1--:--2-- :--?--r--L-.,;-S--:-5--: quite good 
ll. Anticipated future relationship with NASA a&/or DoD: , 
less involvement :-l--:--2"-:-3-:--lr-:-S-:--6-: more j.nyolveqent 
thzn nou , I thwnou 
: - 
I 
12. GulTwt sales &welt (relative t0 industFy aVcra@s) 
rslatLvaly 10% :--1--r--2--.:-3-~---~--r-~--:--h-~ rclativaly high 
13. Anticipated aales levelt (relative to current level) !k !C I :r 
decreasing z--l--r-- 2U-;--3--t--L--r--Sn-1-6--t in&~ing 1 ', 7' s 
IL. Current profit levolsz (relative to lndtotrg averages) 
rdativ& 10~ ~--1--:~2--~--3-~-4-~~~-~--6--: ralativeiy Mgh 
1s. Ex-pocted short-term future profit levelr (relative to current lersl) 
17. Potential commercial spin-off From g3uernment work: 
1~ r--l--:--2-::--3--:-JJ--r--5--:--6-: high 
18. Currant rate of technological chz~ge in yaw indus+J: 
1~ :mm1-::-m2--:-3--:-&-~:--~--:--6--x high 
19. Expected short-term future rac*e of teeh?olo&xLl change: 
accelerating :--l--:-2-:--3-sr-4--:--5--:-d--: decelerating; 
1 - .._ 
- 
\ -, ’ ‘_ 
Please enter hers any contments you tmllevs pertinent either to matters 
saisc!d in thia questionnaire or any others x0-d belleve to be r&avant 
to our lnvestlgstlon: 
I 
I POLICP QUBSTIOXCb4IBB 
Pins1 Code wm- 
/’ 
(SAry) 
Use general codeo: -I 
,O for omitted from qutst&caira ruppfled 
/ 2 for unaoswered , 
x for inapplicable 
I. Contractor Experisnce (B)* 
Iten+ 
‘G-’ 
T 
, cQ& --I 
9 (Prime or Sub) 
,I^ 
‘. 
la (No. Prime1 
1’ lb (30. Sub,) 
lc (Contract Va kues) 
:;: 
c 
2 (Coot. hou long) 
3 (Pre/Post McNamara) 
4a (Agencies) 
:‘ 1 - Prke; 2 - Sub; 3 - Equal 
z 1 . IcyIdp “F  feuqr: 2 - cm.-*?- 1nnn 
>' 
: l- SW or fever; 2 - over 500 
.Yi 
: l- ccxat above 10 million \ 
J 
2 - nof3t above 108 million ; 
3- above 100 millton ‘3 
1 
: l- pre-1950; 2 - 1951-‘56; 3 - 1951 or late! 
. MULTXYLE 
CODING 
: l- 1962 or esrlfer; 2 - since 1962 
: L- aA3, USAF’ 
2 - DOD, USN _- 
3 - DOD, USA 
4 : DOB, other or unsgscified 
5 - W, Marshal’r (Hunte~.llt) 
I< 1. 6 - B&4, Houston 
? - NM%, other or unspecified 
8 7. ‘, Other (specify): 
. 
-N.B. ” Pui ‘purposes of subsequent enalyaio most codes were reduced to simple 
dP chotchnfes by combining adjacent catagorfes. . * Heading ttftre to Section from Policy Qut8tiCi2MLrtr /’ ‘ ,’ 
*-* Refers to items *.&thin Questionnaire Sections, 
I: 
Policy Questloanaire n Pins1 Code 
,: 
La 
II. Contractor OrganLzatioa (B) 
Item 
’ 
,“--: 
, 
5 (Coinn/Govt .’ Sepsratfon) 
,., :la (Chief Fegotiator) 
,’ : . , 
L 
llb (Negotiation Team) 
Code 
_’ ;.I . I 
: 1 *‘No; 2 * at least part Cq! separation 4 
;r 
: 1 - r;ontracts, marketing or busineso mgmt 
2- Program, Project, or technical mgmt 
3- Other: : 
Does the negotiation team include 
a. PinancLal Personnel 
h. Pricing &/or Estimating 
Specfhlists 
c. Technical Specialists 
d. Contracts Personnel (Lf 
not ckrief negotiator) 
e. Program/Project Manager 
(if not chief negotiator) 
f. Legal 
<‘, 
7, 
gd Clther (specify) 
10 (Canrract Administration: 
!- Insentiver) 
15s (Level of Awarcntse) 
‘: 1 - Yes; 2 - No or doesn’t say 
: 1 - Yes; 2 - No or doesn’t say >x -I 
1 r,. 
: l- Yen; 2 - No or doesn’t say 
: l- Yes; 2 - No or dcesn’t say 
: 1 - Yts; 2 - No or doesn’t say 
: 1 - Yes; 2 - No or doesn’t say 
: 1 - Yes; 2 - No or doesn’t say 
: l- NO 
2 - Yes, closer monitoring and control 
re ircentive formul-as or opportuni tie 
1Sb (Means of Iyl~cing Avarmees) 
As mtane of inducing awarcnesa does ,R mention 
8.Detailed briefing6 &/or revfevs : 1 - Ye@; 2 - No or doesn’t mention 
whether written, oral OS both 
b.&ontract-bared‘ program planning : 1 - Yes:. 2 - No or doesn’t say 
budgeting, etc. I- 
c.Unfarmalfzed supervlsory/mana- 
geriol comnunicatlon (includLng : 1 - Yes; 2 - No or doesn’t say 
distribution of memos, new5- 
letters, etc.) . -c- * 
Policy Queatlonwfre - Pins! Co1?2 . : 
: ;< ” -$ 
(Di f f&ences between F&+ yr Pwduc+on) - a’:.- ’ -- )>Z ,1 . . 8.. , -I- -. ‘-! .-’ 
Arc there differttces &‘the level srrd extent of &ccnes& betw*en R&L ys 
1 
.T,>’ ,’ . 
Prod&ion contracte. -. 
r.’ 
: l- No; 2 - Yea i.. 
1. 
fna~plicsble {code here if 16~ ia code! 4, 
. 
‘L’ .j 
I, I 
‘. I, ,: 3 
No; 2 ‘- ,Yes, Pra&rtly; 3 - iA*;. fnh*eqJ 
To irxloce general2zsd motivation, b3r ’ 
I 
ope:ati.onal discipline -- co imr;ze vork 1 
recctvcs atteatjoa of mgmt -- <Inc!.ud!o Y 
conr,erns wfith ail aspects cf perforwnce)j 
.t 
Sndwe motiwatfqa, empivrsls an y.co6:m%xi 
qualfty and/or delivl: .f 
i 
'Xetrfbute risii maze eqcireblp ’ , 
r;’ 
,3; :j P- ,, 
(GenerFlity of Awnrenesa) ‘. : l- 
:. 
:2- -. 
I  :3- 
:4- 
17 (Incentives affect Resource ” 
hl?ocl t ion) : l- 
(Use of incentives. subcon- 
tracting) 
,J : l- 
‘: 1 - (Rationale) I 
1:, 
\” :2- 
:3- 
, - I’ 
Other (spqcify): . 
- 
:4- 
", 
(Comtraints iapo~ id) f., 
Are any of these constraint8 bqm8ed i 
I~ ‘6 
a. Pew or no constrcinta are 1 ’ 
I 
Lzosed: If code yea, code 01: \ I 
cthere ?f, insp~licable) : 1 -c Yes; 2 - No, comtrafr.t8 are Kmpoacd j . LA .- ’ 1 
19a 
i \ 
b.-Rcqulre access to plant & Ire- ! 
delivery inspectfoc rights : 1 - Pes; ;.? - No, qr daenn’t say - 4 
-cc- -.“< -‘I ‘_ ’ _-, -- \ _I .)I _ L ,I_. I. 
’ Polfcy Ouastlorx’,re - Final Psrm k_ ,‘L. ,I 
c. Approval tr monitoring of work : 1 - Yes; 2 - No cr doesn’t saq 
plans, operating procedures, 
parforfxmnce, etc. . 
2 d. Roport5 & ac~esa to records rc : 1 - Yea; 2 - NQ or doesn’t say 
‘, co5 to (aepecinl Lg iabor 6 
material) 
8 
* ! t. c. h A., burden, etc. cciXngo : 1 - Yes; 2 - No or doe;a’t say 
‘imposed 
., -, 
f. Other (specify): : 1 -‘Yes; 2 - No or doesn’t ray 
19b (Rstionaie for Constrair,te; 
As a rstlona?t for Pmposing cone28ruinte, does _R mention 
a. Terms of prlsz conctnct : i - Yes; 2 - No or doesn’t say 
b. Prlme’o analysis of ctitical 
needs in addition to of : 1 - Yes 
ssrgsrt3tely from terms of 
ptime contract 
; 2 - No nr doesn’t say 
c. Supplier ‘3 past record : 1 - Ye8 ;2- No or doesn’t mestion 
1 I 
d. NcgotMtfon or mtual 
agreement : l- Yes; 2 - No or doesn’t say 
9. Other (specify): - 1 s- * - Yea; 2 - No or Goest,:t sey 
x 
19~ (Dfffercncet re FFP) : 1 - Constraint5 Iargely eliminated 
, 
$ 
.d 
:: 
c ’ 2 - ConztraLnts reduced, but not -/ , , -j 
elimirated . 2 1 
! 
3 - Otter (specify): ’ 1 1 
1 
20 (Stwdard list of subs) : 3. - No 
, 12 
2 4 -. Varies vith item or sarvice (eqhdeis is , 
, s _ on cwetitiou for off-tha-shelf items, 1 
\’ othcrv:se best ecurce) or give iqortent ! 
weight to past perform5nce in source : 
rclectio~. 
I 
3 1 -. - Yea (at least far Iollc~on uork withtn a i 
,r i. - program or so long as remain competitive)~ -I 
., . .” 
‘, 4 - Other . ./ . 4 ? 1 
1 -. - 
‘Policy Questionnaire - FinaL Code 
r .I 
; 
, 
? 
. Section 3. htiitudcs, Perceptions, riotives te Government Contracting (B) 
Item 
.;, 
Code - <Q1 - . - 
6 (Trends in emphasis) - 1 i Eoro; 2 1 - - Less; ‘3 - No change 
I’, 
7 (Optimul mix - Govt./Coxxvs.) : L- 75 or more a. (use highest figure cited: 
2 .. SO-74 
3 - 25-49 ’ 
4 - under 25% b. (code second :ime using 
lowest figure cited) 
13 (Contracting Goals) : 6 - Essentia 1 
1 - HaLther -- (Code omnisCions 86 “L*‘) 
ScALe each of 9 item -L-- 
L3a (Vin%cFaL GoaLs) : 2 Ca, =, g, a) 
L3b (Performaxe Goals) : f (b, c, f? 
13~ (Relationship Goals.) : a$Cd. h -- reverse scoring for d) 
20 (special policies re contracts) : 1 - Po; 2 - Yes 
(2Oa end 29b are aitted) 
8 (Instrizmental value of W) : L Less than 4; 2 - Horc thnn 4 
Section 4 - Wage Incentives (8) 
21a (Recipients; : 1 - no pLan’ 
2 - only mgux 
39 all Levels 
4- others 
c 21b (Criterion of award) : l- awards do ‘not relate to individual effort .- I 
.’ 2 - ‘awards ho relate to ind!.viduaL effort 
(uhether or irot also relate to group cffol -- >. ; 
3- CM& 
- Kct appLicable (code here if 21a coded “1’ 
, u -. 
I , + r .- 
I 
I 
I 
, 
I 
i I 
! / 
. 
, 
<  
, : 
- : 
3 
Section 5. Income and Expenditures (C) (Items L - 15 om:t) 
<, 
Item 
LG (Functions of Profit) 
17 (Going out Profit) 
Code . . 
: For each asaigr! rank es score 
,- 
'. Sales : 1 - 3-S% 
2 - 6-8x 
18 (l.ow Profit Boundary) 
Sales 
ROI 
(High profit boundary) 
Sa Lcs 
ROI 
Section 6. Organization Features 
Item 
AL (Employees) 
self 
pareut 
A2 <Sales) 
self 
parent 
A3 CR=) 
.’ 
3 - 9% or more 
:L- 19 or less % 
f 
2 - over. 1% 1 
j 
: Record figure cited lzp respondent 
1 
! - 
1 
: Record figure cited by tebpondent 
i 
d Code 1 
:L- 12,OOG or more 
; 
1 
:2- 2,000 - 11,999 i 
:3- fewer than 2,000 1 
3 
: 1" 325 million or more .j 
:2- 75-324 miLLion 1 
1 
: 3- Less than 75 million dollers 1 
: 1 - Over 75 miLlion 1 
2 - 15-75 mi.LLion ,i 
1 
3- Z-15 miLLion 
$ 
i 
Policy Questfocnalre - Final Ccdc 
A4 (Govb'cumn mix) 
nelf 
ii4 (Govt/cum mix) ' 
parent 
r. 
AS (Lmation) 
‘.A6 (Stockholders) 
; f ‘I . 
A7 (Euainass) 
C16a (Investment level: Capital) 
-.. 
C16b (Investment level: Permxmel) 
C16c (Investment lev&: Total) 
Section 7 
L-19 (IIndividuaL ire=) 
a. Current Status 
h. Future 
c. Govt. Depecdence 
I. 
d. Mrket Prospects _ 
e. Gcn. Finan. Health 
I, -.,, 
, .’ 
: .? A - am or more govt. 
2 i leso than aG4, govt. 
-i , 
:, 1 - over aox govt.. 
f -3 
I 
2 - 51-807, govt. - 1 
I 
3 - 26-5GX govt. .i 
_ - 4 - less than 259. govt. ._ 1 
OinLfz . 
~\- _ 
: I- oy1000 1 . 
2 - aver 1000 , : . 1 
: 1 - Aesonpace aid Elccero&s 
j 
i-. i 
2 - Other rzmufacturing 
-I 
3 - Techabcsl, engineering, support i 
setslices, and other : 
: l- lower 
j 
- . 
. % 
3 -8ame , - c 1 
5 - higher t < . 
: f- laxer _ - 3 
3 -- Emma ., 3 
I 
6 - higher .>\- i 
: < ‘(%a, 16b) . f 
. -. 
_ Code -, 
: S,core each L-6 (ES per scab) -i 
:p 
I- 
1,3,4,6,8,10,i2,14)8averse scale, item’s 
9 
: g {2,7,9,11,13,15,16,17,19~Rev.acaZe, item’ 
J 4 (6;9,11) Reverse scale, item ZX 
f / 
: -: : $ (13,35,X6) . ’ ,. ’ . . 1 , *q , _. . . .- . . _ . 1 

